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California Supreme Court Survey
August 1992 - September 1993
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof
the issues that have recently been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to
serve as a startingpoint for researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions
are analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the
extent to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline
and judicial misconduct cases have been omittedfrom the survey.

. CIVIL PROCEDURE
In a marriage dissolution proceeding, a spouse has
the right to discover business records and tax returns of a closely held corporation where the other
spouse is a shareholderand the stock is community
property, while payroll tax returns that identify
third persons remain privileged and may not be
discovered:
Schnabel v. Superior Court .....................
II.

CIVIL RIGHTS

Obesity alone, without further proof of underlying
physiological disorder, is insufficient to establish a
prima facie case of employment discriminationbecause the condition does not fall within the scope of
"handicapped"or "disabled"as protected by the Fair
Employment and Housing Act:
Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc .................
III.

266

271

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

Under the California Constitution, the State: (1) is
required to provide uniform public education; (2)
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The Regents of the University of California may
impose a mandatory student activity fee; however,
the Regents can not collect mandatory fees from
students who object to subsidizing student groups
that engage in political or ideological activities:
Smith v. Regents of the University of California....
Content-neutral zoning ordinancesfor adult entertainment establishments that are proper time, place,
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potential defense trial witness, provided the defense
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citation, pursuant to CaliforniaPenal Code section
1054.5(b):
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When the prosecution has presented the jury with
alternative theories of guilt, one of which lacked
factual support, an appellatecourt should affirm the
criminal conviction, absent positive evidence in the
record that the jury's general verdict rested upon an
insufficient ground:
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The trial court at a permanency planning hearing
must address only the statutory options for a child's
placement and may not consider family reunification, unless the procedural safeguard of alleging
changed circumstances has been met. Furthermore,
such exclusive options do not violate due process:
In re Marilyn H ..............................
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court may only consider a supporting spouse's
earnings acquired through a normal work regime,
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rigorous work regime during the marriage:
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Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Macri ..............
B. Under section 1031 of the Insurance Code,
reinsurers are entitled to setoff claims against insolvent insurers with priority over policyholders
and other creditors:
Prudential Reinsurance Company v. Superior Court..
C. Insurer did not breach its duty of good faith and
fair dealing or violate statutory duties regarding
unfair claim settlement practices by declining to
pursue arbitrationunder policy until after resolution of workers compensation claim:
Rangel v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club ...

329

333

336

340

346

VIII.

IX.

X.

LABOR LAW
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extend the forty-five day period allotted under section 5950 of the Labor Code for filing a petitionfor
writ of review of a Workers' Compensation Appeals
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Camper v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board... 350
B. While the state's general authority to approve an
apprenticeship program avoids ERISA preemption,
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TAx LAW
Title insurance companies do not receive taxable
income when an underwritten title company pays a
policyholder's claim pursuant to a contractual arrangement. Further,the State Board of Equalization
must follow the statutorily required administrative
proceedings before it may assert a deficiency assessment in superior court:
Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota v. State Board of
Equalization ..................................
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In a libel action against a newspaper, the California Civil Code section 48a(1) notice requirement is
satisfied by serving notice upon: (1) the publisher;
(2) a person designated by the publisher to receive
notice; or (3) another newspaper employee and the
publisher acquires actual knowledge of the demand
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Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court........

366

[Vol. 21: 261, 1993]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

B.

Under the principles of comparativefault, where the
defendant does not have a duty to protect the plaintiff from the risk that caused the injury because of
the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the assumption of the risk doctrine continues to operate as a complete bar to the
plaintiffs recovery; however, where the plaintiff
assumes a known risk caused by a breach of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff, the assumption of
the risk doctrine is merged with comparativefault
principles, and any loss from the injury may be
apportioned among the responsible parties:
Knight v. Jewett.............................
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I.

CIVL PROCEDURE
In a marriagedissolution proceeding, a spouse has
the right to discover business records and tax
returns of a closely held corporationwhere the other
spouse is a shareholderand the stock is community
property, while payroll tax returns that identify
third persons remain privileged and may not be
discovered: Schnabel v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Schnabel v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court considered the scope of a spouse's right to discover2 business records and tax
returns of a closely held corporation in a marriage dissolution proceeding where the other spouse's stock was community property The court
emphasized that the California Legislature has a strong policy favoring
full disclosure of community property assets and liabilities in a marriage
dissolution proceeding.4 The court also acknowledged, however, that the
legislature manifested a clear intent to create a privilege against forced
disclosure of tax returns.5 The Schnabel court reconciled these compet-

1. 5 Cal. 4th 704, 854 P.2d .1117, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (1993). Justice Arabian
wrote the unanimous opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli,
Kennard, Baxter, and George concurring.
2. See generally Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266,
15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961) (discovery of documents); 2 B.E. WITKIN, CAIJFORNIA EVIDENCE, Discovery and Production of Evidence §§ 1422, 1507 & 1511 (3d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1992) (discussing California discovery rules); 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery and
Depositions §§ 18-22 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the scope of discovery).
3. For a discussion on how other states have treated this issue, see Lee R. Russ,
Annotation, Spouse's Right to Discovery of Closely Held Corporation Records During
Divorce Proceeding, 38 A.L.R. 4th 145 (1983).
4. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 711, 854 P.2d at 1120, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 203. Full and
accurate disclosure of community and quasi-community property, separate assets,
income and expenses is required by statute. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.11(a)(1) (Deering
Supp. 1993).
5. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 719-20, 854 P.2d at 1126-27, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 207-09.
In Webb v. Standard Oil Co., the court construed REVENUE AND TAXATION CODE

§ 19282 to imply a privilege against forced disclosure of personal tax returns in civil
discovery proceedings. Webb v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Cal. 2d 509, 513, 319 P.2d 621,
624 (1957); see CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 19282 (Deering 1988) (providing that it is a
misdemeanor to disclose information contained in an individual's personal tax return).
The Webb court explained that the purpose of the statute was to "encourag[e] a
taxpayer to make full and truthful declarations in his return, without fear that his
statements will be revealed or used against him for other purposes." Webb, 49 Cal. 2d
at 513, 319 P.2d at 624. The Schnabel court stated that the same privileges apply to
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ing policies by carving out a narrow exception to the tax return privilege
when the case involves community property in a marriage dissolution
proceeding.6
The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
and court of appeal, holding that business records and quarterly payroll
tax returns regarding the shareholder spouse were discoverable.7 The
court reversed the trial court and court of appeal, however, on the issue
of payroll tax returns that identify third persons on the basis of privilege.'
II.

A.

TREATMENT

Business Records

In determining whether corporate business records were discoverable,
the court balanced the spouse's interest in obtaining a fair division of
community property with the rights of third parties in maintaining financial privacy.' The court concluded that the spouse's interest in obtaining
discovery materials outweighed the privacy interests of the corporation.'" The court reasoned that because the stock was community property, each spouse had an equal interest in that stock." In addition, each

corporate tax returns. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 720, 854 P.2d at 1126-27, 21 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 209-10; see CAL REV. & TAx. CODE § 26451 (Deering 1988) (providing that it is
a misdemeanor to disclose any information contained within the tax returns of a
corporation).
6. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 722, 854 P.2d at 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
7. Id. at 708, 854 P.2d at 1118, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 201.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 714-15, 854 P.2d at 1122-23, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205-06. See Valley Bank
of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 657, 542 P.2d 977, 979, 125 Cal. Rptr.
553, 555 (1975) (balancing the right of bank customers to maintain privacy of their
financial affairs with the right of litigants to discover relevant facts); Harris v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 661, 663, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 564, 565 (1992) (action to increase
child support; balancing a former spouse's right to discover ex-husband's household
income with new spouse's right to maintain financial privacy); Rifidnd v. Superior
Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1049, 177 Cal. Rptr. 82, 83 (1981), partially overruled
by Schnabel v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 704, 723, 854 P.2d 1117, 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr.
2d 200, 211 (1993) (dismissing argument that fiduciary relationship between spouses
justifies discovery). See infra note 18. See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.4 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing need to protect the privacy of third
persons from discovery).
10. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 715, 854 P.2d at 1123, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206.
11. Id. at 715, 854 P.2d at 1123, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206. See generally 11 B.E.

spouse had a fiduciary duty to the other in managing the community
property. The fiduciary duty requires full disclosure of all material facts
regarding the value of the property and access to all information and

records pertaining to the property. 2
The court found the corporation's privacy interest weak when compared with the spouse's interest in obtaining a fair division of property. 3
Under Corporations Code section 1601, a shareholder may inspect accounting books and business records of the corporation."4 The court
explained that because the shareholder spouse had access to the
business records, and because any information obtainable by the shareholder spouse was subject to inspection by the other spouse, the corporation had no expectation of privacy as to those business records.'
Thus, the court held that the business records of the corporation were
discoverable. 6
B.

Tax Returns

The California Supreme Court's has consistently defended the privilege
against forced disclosure of tax returns. 7 The Schnabel court asserted,
however, that this privilege is not absolute. 8 An exception will apply if
there is a public policy at stake greater than that of the confidentiality of
tax returns. 9 The court concluded that the strong legislative policy for a

SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Community Property § 176 (9th ed. 1990) (discussing spouse's position as shareholder when the stock is community property).
12. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 715, 854 P.2d at 1123, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206; CAL. Civ.
CODE § 5125(e) (Deering Supp. 1993).
13. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 718, 854 P.2d at 1125, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208.
14. Id. at 715, 854 P.2d at 1123, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206; CAL. CORP. CODE § 1601
(Deering 1977).
15. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 718, 854 P.2d at 1125, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208.
16. Id.
17. See Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 538 P.2d 739, 742,
123 Cal. Rptr. 283, 286 (1975) (holding that information related to sales tax returns is
privileged); Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d 274, 277, 398 P.2d 150,
153, 42 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 (1965) (concluding that employment tax returns are privileged); Rifkind v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1049, 177 Cal. Rptr. 82, 84
(1981), partially overruled by Schnabel v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 704, 854 P.2d
1117, 21 Cal Rptr. 2d 200 (1993) (holding that tax returns of law corporation in marriage dissolution proceeding are privileged); Sammut v. Sammut, 103 Cal. App. 3d 557,
562, 163 Cal. Rptr. 524, 527 (1980) (finding income tax returns of former spouse in
spousal support modification proceedings privileged). See also supra note 5.
18. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 721, 854 P.2d at 1127, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210. The
court stated that Rikind is disapproved to the extent that it holds that all tax returns absolutely privileged. Id. at 723, 854 P.2d at 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
19. Id. at 721, 854 P.2d at 1127, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210. In Miller v. Superior
Court, the court of appeal found that the public policy of enforcing child support
obligations mandated an exception to the tax return privilege. Miller v. Superior
WITKIN,
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fair division of community property warrants an exception to the general
rule of privilege.' The court emphasized, however, that the exception
was narrow and contingent on the specific facts of the case.2 In this
case, the court noted that the corporation was closely held, that it had
only two shareholders, and that the shareholder spouse owned thirty percent of the stock. The court seemed to suggest that the outcome might
have been different had the case involved a public corporation whose
shares had an ascertainable market value.'
The court further emphasized that the exception to the privilege is
"limited to those tax returns that are reasonably related to the purpose
for which they are sought."' The court concluded that corporate and
payroll tax returns regarding the shareholder spouse were clearly related
to the spouse's interest in determining the value of the community property.2' Therefore, those taxes were held to be discoverable under the
exception.' Payroll tax information regarding employees other than the
shareholder spouse, however, did not have a sufficient nexus to the community property interest to justify an exception to privilege.' Thus, payroll tax returns that identified third persons were found undiscoverable. 7
III.

CONCLUSION

The court showed sensitivity toward the unfair division of community
property in a marriage dissolution proceeding by carving out an exception to the general rule of privilege with respect to tax returns. In keep-

Court, 71 Cal. App. 3d 145, 149, 139 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (1977). Until Schnabel, Miller
was the only case concluding that public policy warranted an exception to the privilege. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 721, 854 P.2d at 1127, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
20. Id. at 722, 854 P.2d at 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210.
21. Id. at 722, 854 P.2d at 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
22. Id. See generally 11 B.E. WrrOGN. SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Community

Property § 175 (9th ed. 1990) (discussing community property with respect to publicly held stock).
23. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 722, 854 P.2d at 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
24. Id. at 723, 854 P.2d at 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
25. Id.
26. Id. The court explained that the only effect of such production would be to
"invade the privacy of those employees." Id. See also Rikind, 123 Cal. App. 3d at
1049, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (explaining that disclosure of corporate tax returns relating
only to other shareholders and their families would unnecessarily invade the privacy
of persons who had no part in the matrimonial dispute).
27. Schnabel, 5 Cal. 4th at 723, 854 P.2d at 1129, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212.

ing third party payroll tax returns privileged, the court managed to balance the privacy interests of those who were not parties to the action
while simultaneously protecting the property interests of the spouse. The
court emphasized, however, that the exception was narrowly tailored to
the specific facts of this case.' Accordingly, one can expect that in future cases the exception will be triggered only if the spouse can show
specific relevance or need for such discovery.'
APRIL LERMAN

28. Id. at 722, 854 P.2d at 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
29. Id. at 723, 854 P.2d at 1128, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211. The court seemed to
suggest that even the strong public policy favoring full disclosure in a marriage
dissolution proceeding will not justify an exception to the tax return privilege if the
specific facts of the case do not convince the court that the spouse has a legitimate
need for such discovery.
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II.

CIVIL RIGHTS
Obesity alone, withoutfurther proof of underlying
physiological disorder, is insufficient to establish a prima

facie case of employment discriminationbecause the condition does not fall within the scope of "handicapped"or
"disabled"as protected by the FairEmployment and Housing
Act: Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc.,' the California Supreme Court
considered whether the provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing
Act ("FEHA") 2 extend to people claiming employment discrimination
based on weight.' The court carefully evaluated existing definitions of
"physical handicap" to determine the scope and intent of the legislative

1. 5 Cal. 4th 1050, 856 P.2d 1143, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 287 (1993). Justice Arabian
authored the opinion for the unanimous court.
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12976 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
3. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1055, 856 P.2d at 1146, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
Cassista applied for cashier/stockperson position at Community Foods, a local
health food collective. Id. at 1053, 856 P.2d at 1144, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 288. The position requried manual labor, included carrying 50 pound bags of grain and produce,
and changing 55 gallon drums of honey. Id. Community Foods sought experienced
candidates who could eventually become members of the collective, assuming management and ownership responsibilities. Id. At the time Cassista applied for the position, she was five feet four inches tall and weighed 305 pounds. Id.
Community Foods denied her the position. The collective considered her weight,
among other factors, in assessing her ability to perform the job. Id. at 1053-54, 856
P.2d at 1145, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289. Cassista filed suit alleging FEHA violations. Id.
at 1054, 856 P.2d at 11-5, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289. A jury found in favor of Community Foods because Cassista failed to establish that her weight was the reason for
denial of employment. Id. at 1054-55, 856 P.2d at 1145-46, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289-90.
The court of appeal reversed the decision and held that 1) Community Foods
considered Cassista's obesity to be a physical handicap as defined by the FEHA, and
2) the lower court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff was required to
demonstrate that but for her obesity, she would have been hired. Id. at 1055, 856
P.2d at 1146, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at .290. The court of appeal determined that once
Cassista showed the employer considered her weight, the burden shifted to the
employer to prove that it would have made the same decision if the plaintiff's weight
had not been at issue. Id. Because the appellate court found that the jury instruction
prejudiced the plaintiffs case, it remanded for a new trial. Id. The supreme court
granted review to determine whether Cassista established a prima facie case of
employment discrimination pursuant to the FEHA. Id.

language.4 The court concluded that establishing a prima facie case of
employment discrimination based on a "physical handicap or disability"
requires a showing either an actual physiological disease or disorder
affecting a body function or a perception that she suffered such an affliction.' The plaintiff did not meet the burden of providing clear and competent medical evidence establishing a handicap or perceived handicap,
and thus, her claim failed as a matter of law.'

II. TREATMENT
The court began its analysis by examining the history of the term
"physical handicap" under the FEHA.7 Concluding that the provisions of
the current act were modeled after the American Disabilities Act of
1990,' the court determined that the FEHA distinguished three categories
of disabilities: "(1) impairment of sight, hearing or speech; (2) impairment of physical ability because of amputation or loss of function or
coordination; and (3) any other health impairment requiring special education or related services."' The court further noted that in 1992 the legislature dramatically modified these definitions to incorporate "any physiological disease, disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss" which affected a body system and the ability to participate
in major life activities."0 Acknowledging legislative intent to synthesize

4. Id. at 1056-57, 856 P.2d at 1146-47, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290-91.
5. Id. at 1065-66, 856 P.2d at 1153, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297. The California Government Code defines "physical disability" to include people suffering physiological
disease or disorder, anatomical loss, and cosmetic disfigurement which affects one of
the body systems and limits participation in major life activities. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12926(k) (West Supp. 1993). But see 2 B.E. WITIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Agency and Employment § 306 (9th ed. 1987)(noting that an employer may refuse to
hire an individual whose disability prevents performance of the required duties or
endangers himself or others).
6. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1066, 856 P.2d at 1154, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 298.
[Ilt is not enough to show that an employer's decision is based on the perception that an applicant is disqualified by his or her weight ...
the condition, as perceived by the employer, must still be in the nature of a physiological disorder within the meaning of the FEHA, even if it is not in fact disabling.
Id. at 1065-66, 856 P.2d at 1154, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297.
7. Id. at 1056-61, 856 P.2d at 1146-50, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290-94.
8. Id. at 1056 n.6, 856 P.2d at 1147 n.6, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 n.6. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (1993) (provisions of the American Disabilities Act); see generally
Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An
Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEx. L. REV. 759 (1992)(providing
extensive interpretation of the parameters of the act, including detailed analysis of
prerequisites to disability status).
9. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1056, 856 P.2d at 1147, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291.
10. Id. at 1058, 856 P.2d at 1148, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292. See also CAL. GOVT
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previous definitions of handicap with current definitions of disability,"
the court applied the revised FEHA provisions for "disability" to the instant case. 2 Thus, the plaintiff was required to show that her obesity
fell within one of the statutory categories of actual or perceived disabili3

ty.1

The court looked to case law for guidance on the issue of obesity as a
physiological disorder protected by FEHA."4 Finding little adjudication

§ 12926(k) (West Supp. 1993). The code provides in part:
(k) 'physical disability' includes, but is not limited to, all of the following:
(1) Having any physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss that does both of the following:
(A) Affects one or more of the following body systems: neurological, immunological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, including speech
organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.
(B) Limits an individual's ability to participate in major life activities.
(2) Any other health impairment not described in paragraph (1) that requires
special education or related services.

CODE

(4) Being regarded as having, or having had, a disease disorder, condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health impairment that has no
present disabling effect but may become a physical disability as described in
paragraph (1) or (2).
Id.
The statute specifically incorporated the definition of physical handicap developed in
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 651 P.2d
1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982). See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(k) (West Supp. 1993).
See also American Nat'l Ins., 32 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 651 P.2d at 1155-56, 186 Cal. Rptr.
at 349-50 (expanding the definition of handicap to include conditions which will be
disabilities at a future time).
11. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1059-61, 856 P.2d at 1149-50, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293-94.
See also CALIFORNIA CON. ED. OF BAR, FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING COMMISSION:
PRECEDENTIAL DECISIONS § 12955.3 (1993)(updating the definition of disability to reflect
the language of Government Code § 12926).
12. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1061, 856 P.2d at 1150, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294.
13. See id.

14. Id. at 1061-62, 856 P.2d at 1150-51, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294-95. The court examined two appellate decisions, Hegwer v. Board of Civ. Serv. Comm'rs, 5 Cal. App. 4th
1011, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (1992) and McMillen v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 6 Cal. App. 4th
125, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548 (1992). In Hegiver, the court found that although a thyroid
condition caused the plaintiff's obesity, the Los Angeles City Fire Department did not
improperly discriminate by enforcing weight requirements for paramedic positions.
Hegwer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1015, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (1992). Due to Hegwer's obesity,
she was not able to properly perform the physical demands required of a paramedic.
Id. at 1022, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395.

on point in California, the court sought guidance from other jurisdictions.'8 Ultimately, the court concluded that most states have determined that obesity, without further medical complication, is insufficient
to constitute a disability.18 Further, the court found that the states accepting obesity as a disability had adopted broader statutory language
than California's law.'"
The court then examined case law discussing the Rehabilitation Act,'8
the pertinent federal act upon which the California statute was based.'9
As part of its analysis, the court made specific reference to two federal
decisions.' In Tudyman v. United Airlines,2' the district court determined that an airline employee, seeking damages for employment discrimination based on an inability to meet weight requirements, had a
self-imposed condition arising from bodybuilding.' In Cook v. Department,of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals,2' a district court
found that, among other deficiencies, the plaintiff failed to prove that her
obesity was caused by "systematic or metabolic factors" creating an
"immutable condition."24 Therefore, her condition did not qualify, as a

McMillen also involved an employment discrimination suit against the Los Angeles City Fire Department McMillen, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 127, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548.
The court held that the Department properly suspended McMillen from his position
as an ambulance driver. "[blecause sudden incapacitation of an ambulance driver
could be life-threatening, [and] the standards governing this job call for employees
who are not suspectible to injury and who are not overweight, as this could impair
job performance." Id. at 128, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549.
15. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1061 n.11, 856 P.2d at 1150 n.ll, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
294 n.11.
16. Id.
17. Id. See generally Donald L. Bierman, Jr., Comment, Employment Discrimination Against Overweight Individuals: Should Obesity Be a Protected Classification?, 30 SANTA CLARA L REv. 951 (1990) (providing an in-depth examination of case
law on the subject).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1993).
19. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1063-65, 856 P.2d at 1152-53, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 296-97.
See also Paula B. Stolker, Note, Weigh My Job Performance, Not My Body: Extending Title VII to Weight-Based Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 223 (1992)
(providing extensive analysis of the current treatment of obesity on both federal and
state levels).
20. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1063-64, 856 P.2d at 1152, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 296.
21. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
22. Id. at 746. The plaintiffs bodybuilding did not cause a limitation in a major
life activity. Id. Further, his weight was a self-imposed condition, and therefore, distinguishable from physiological disorder, disfigurement, and anatomical loss. Id.
23. 783 F. Supp. 1569 (D.R.I. 1992), aWfd, 1993 WL 470697 (1st Cir. Nov. 22, 1993).
The California Supreme Court relied upon the district court decision. The First
Circuit's opinion, which was subsequent to the Cassista decision, affirmed a jury
award for damages resulting from discrimination based on a perceived handicap.
Cook, 10 F.3d at 17, 28.
24. Cook, 783 F. Supp. at 1573.
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physiological handicap subject to the provisions of the Rehabilitation
Act.' However, the court stated that the plaintiff could prevail on the
theory of a perceived handicap by proving that she was otherwise qualified for the job, and the perceived handicap was the sole basis for denying employment.28
Based on the foregoing analysis of judicial interpretation of "handicap"
and "disability," the California Supreme Court concluded that an individual asserting a FEHA violation must provide convincing evidence that obesity is the result of an underlying physiological disorder and not merely
self-imposed.'
In the instant case, the plaintiff argued that the court's failure to find
her obesity to be an "actual" disability under FEHA guidelines did not
bar statutory relief if the employer "perceived" her weight as a disability.' The court found her contention unpersuasive, concluding that the
statutory language requires a perceived handicap to fall under one of the
enumerated disabilities listed in the act itself.' Thus, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination within the meaning of the FEHA. °

25. Id. To the extent obesity is self-imposed, it is neither a physiological disorder
nor a handicap. Id.
It should be noted that in Cassista the jury found insufficient evidence to support a finding that the plaintiff was denied employment solely on the basis of weight.
Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1055, 856 P.2d at 1146, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
26. Cook, 783 F. Supp. at 1575-76. The California Supreme Court, on the other
hand, seemed to presume that the plaintiff would be unable to prevail on a perceived
handicap claim. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1065-66, 856 P.2d at 1153-54, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 297-98. However, the First Circuit reasoned, "[i]n a society that all too often confuses 'slim' with 'beautiful' or 'good,' morbid obesity can present formidable barriers
to employment. Where, as here, the barriers transgress federal law, those who erect
and seek to preserve them suffer the consequences." Cook, 10 F.3d at 28.
27. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1065, 856 P.2d at 1153, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1065-6.6, 856 P.2d at 1153-54, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297-98.
30. Id. at 1066, 856 P.2d at 1154, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 298. The supreme court also
determined that the matter had been fully presented before the trial court. Id. Therefore, it reversed the appellate court's order for a new trial, because a new trial was
not necessary. Id.

III.

CONCLUSION

In Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., the California Supreme Court
ruled that to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination
pursuant to the FEHA, the plaintiff must provide medical evidence showing that the claimed disability has an underlying physiological condition
or disorder affecting one of the body systems and that disability limits
participation in a major life activity.' Therefore, in most instances, obesity will not qualify as a disability or handicap.'
Cassista reflects the traditional belief that a person does not have a
"physical" or "mental" disability unless he or she suffers from an immutable, medically diagnosable condition.' Qualifications for disability status
are of great concern to society, yet they are often obliquely defmed in
statutory language.' As a result, more classes of people have litigated
and lobbied for disability designation.
Presently, disability status has been extended to persons with manic
depressive syndrome, high blood pressure, epilepsy, nervous and heart
conditions, AIDS, compulsive gambling, and drug addiction.' In contrast, conditions such as homosexuality, bisexuality, kleptomania, pyromania, and illegal drug abuse have been denied disability status.37 The
meaning of "disability" will be continually explored, both judicially and
legislatively, and the term may come to include many classes of people
whom are currently unprotected.
CATHERINE CONVY

31. 5 Cal. 4th 1050, 856 P.2d 1143, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 287 (1993).
32. Id. at 1066, 856 P.2d at 1154, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 298.
33. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1061 n.11, 856 P.2d at 1151 n.11, 22 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 295 n. 11 (discussing "handicap" as it appears in several state statutes).
36. See Thomas H. Christopher & Charles M. Rice, The American Disabilities Act:
An Overview of the Employment Provisions, 33 S. TEx. L. REV. 759, 765-68 (1992);
Maureen O'Connor, Note, Defining 'Handicap'for Purposes of Employment Discrimination, 30 ARiz. L REV. 633, 642-43 (1988); Jane Osborne Baker, Comment, The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection for Victims of Weight Discrimination?, 29
UCLA L. REV. 947, 959-61 (1982) (providing in-depth analysis of judicial and legislative
determinations of classes of persons qualifying for disability status).
37. Christopher & Rice, supra note 36, at 765-68; O'Connor, supra note 36, at 64243; Baker, supra note 35, at 959-61.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Under the California Constitution,the State: (1) is required
to provide uniform public education; (2) may be required to
provide necessaryfunding for such education; (3) may
suspend the existing school board and assume operations;
and (4) may only use funds appropriatedfor purposes
specifically prescribedby the legislature: Butt v. State.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Butt v. State,' the California Supreme Court found that a school
district's inability to fund the remaining six weeks of public school education was an insufficient reason to justify the early closure of the Richmond Unified School District's ("the District") school system.2 The su-

1. 4 Cal. 4th 668, 842 P.2d 1240, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480 (1992). Justice Baxter
authored the majority opinion. Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk and Kennard
filed separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.
2. Id. at 703-04, 842 P.2d at 1264, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504. See generally 56 CAL
JUR. 3D Schools §§ 84-97 (1980) (discussing district funds and proper methods of
distribution). Due to a lack of funds, the District announced that it would be forced
to terminate the 1990-91 school term six weeks early. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 674, 842
P.2d at 1243, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483. Subsequently, Thomas K Butt and other parents filed a class action seeking temporary and permanent injunctions against the
State and school board forbidding the premature closing of the schools. Id. A school
board member declared that the District had a $23 million deficit for the school term
and consequently only had enough money to pay its employees through April of 1991.
Id. at 675, 842 P.2d at 1244, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484. The school board's attempts to
obtain emergency funds were unsuccessful and the District was in the process of
filing for bankruptcy. Id.
The trial court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the State to provide
students with a full school term or education equivalent thereto. Id. At an evidentiary
hearing, the plaintiffs' motions and declarations detailed the harmful effects of the
school closure of upon the educational development of the affected students. Id. Afterward, the trial court declared that the students had a fundamental right to an education, and thus, the State must provide students with an educational opportunity
equivalent to that provided elsewhere within the State. Id. The court ordered the
state to act as "they deem appropriate" to ensure that the schools remained open for
the entire school term or ensure the availability of an "equivalent educational opportunity."
The State submitted a proposal to the trial court detailing its plan to remedy the
situation. Id. The State indicated that the legislature had designated $19 million in excess funds for use in the Greater Avenues for Independence program and for emergency assistance to the Oakland Unified School District ("OUSD"). Id. Neither organi-

preme court held that under the California State Constitution, the State:
(1) is required to provide uniform public education;3 (2) may be required
to provide necessary funding for such education;4 (3) may suspend the
existing school board and assume operations;6 and (4) may only use
funds appropriated for purposes specifically prescribed by the legislature.6

II. TREATMENT
Majority Opinion

A.
1.

Standard of Review

The California Supreme Court first discussed the factors for determining whether a trial court may issue a preliminary injunction and then
determined whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in this particular case.7 The court stated that the trial court must weigh two dependent factors before issuing a preliminary injunction: "(1) the likelihood
that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the
relative interim harm to the parties from the issuance or nonissuance of
the injunction."8
In considering the first factor, the trial court specifically found that the
plaintiffs' case had a "reasonable probability" of success on the merits at

zation objected to the State's submission that the excess funds be utilized as an
emergency loan to the District. Id. at 676, 842 P.2d at 1245; 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484.
The trial court approved the plan and ordered disbursement of the excess funds. The
court further declared that the State had the authority to relieve the school board of
its duties and appoint a trustee. Id.
The State appealed, and in an attempt to escape the required intervention altogether, it requested transfer of the appeal to the supreme court and a stay of execution of the trial court's order pending the appeal. Id. at 676-77, 842 P.2d at 1245, 15
Cal. Rptr. at 485. The California Supreme Court granted a transfer but denied the
requested stay. Id.
3. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 692, 842 P.2d at 1256, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 694, 842 P.2d at 1258, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.
6. Id. at 703, 842 P.2d at 1264, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
7. See generally id. at 677-93, 842 P.2d at 1246-57, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486-97.
8. Id. at 677-78, 842 P.2d at 1246, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486. The court explained
that "the greater the plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on the other
to support an injunction." Id. at 678, 842 P.2d at 1246, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486 (citing
King v. Meese 43 Cal. 3d 1217, 1227-28, 743 P.2d 889, 895, 240 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835
(1987)). However, the court noted that for a preliminary injunction to be granted,
there must be some possibility that the plaintiff may succeed on the merits, regardless of the degree of interim harm. Id. (citing Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors, 49 Cal. 3d 432, 442-43, 777 P.2d 610, 615-16, 261 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579-80 (1989)).
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trial.' In making this determination, the trial court evaluated the equal
protection guaranties provided by the State Constitution,"0 and reasoned
that Articles I and IVmandate state intervention to ensure the availability
of an equal educational opportunity to all students, even in the event of
fiscal shortages." The State argued that it fulfilled its Constitutional duties by providing all school districts with an equalized revenue base.
The State further contended that in the absence of a specific constitutional violation, the State had no duty to ensure the prudent spending of
such appropriated funds." In addition, the State asserted that the resulting educational disparity does not involve a "suspect classification" and
therefore does not trigger a "strict scrutiny" analysis. " Because strict
scrutiny should not apply, the State insisted its policy of "local control
and accountability" was rationally related to its desire not to intervene."
The court rejected the State's contentions," relying on numerous principles set forth in previous decisions: (1) the Constitution mandates state
responsibility for public education; 7 (2) the public school system is a
single, unified system despite its being administered through local districts;'8 (3) the State has the responsibility to provide an equal educational opportunity to all students;"' (4) the State is ultimately responsible for the management and control of schools;2' (5) within the

9. Id.
10. Id. at 678-79, 842 P.2d at 1246-67, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486-87. See CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16; 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools §§ 291-301 (1980) (discussing the right to attend public school and unlawful discrimination).
11. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 678-79, 842 P.2d at 1247, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487. See generally 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools §§ 84-97, 310-27 (1980) (discussing school district funds
and compulsory education law).
12. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 679, 842 P.2d at 1247, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 679-80, 842 P.2d at 1247, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487.
15. Id. at 680, 842 P.2d at 1247, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 680, 842 P.2d at 1248, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488. (citing San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 951-52 479 P.2d 669, 677 92 Cal. Rptr. 309,
317 cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 (1971)).
18. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Miller, 97 Cal. 429, 432, 32 P. 558, 559 (1893)).
19. Id. at 680-81, 842 P.2d at 1248, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488 (citing Jackson v.
Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 880, 382 P.2d 878, 881, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606,
609 (1963)).
20. Id. (citing Kennedy, 97 Cal. at 431, 32 P. at 558 (1893)).

school system, local districts act as agents of the State;2 and (6) the
ultimate responsibility of public education lies solely'with the State and
may not be delegated.'
In applying these principles, the court stated that although school districts are separate entities for some purposes, under the California Constitution, the State retains the responsibility to provide an equal educational opportunity to all students.' Furthermore, the court held that previous court decisions mandated heightened scrutiny in state-maintained
discrimination cases which impact a fundamental interest.24 Consequently, the State is required to intervene if the local school district does not
provide educational equality, unless the State can show a compelling
reason for relieving it of its duty to do so.25
After reviewing the trial court record, the supreme court held that ending the school term six weeks early would deprive the District's students
of an equal educational opportunity.26 Moreover, the court found the
State did not identify a sufficient compelling interest to justify dismissing
its duty to intervene. 7 Therefore, the court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by concluding that plaintiffs' could potentially
prevail on the merits of their case.'
In considering the second factor, interim harm, the trial court concluded that if a preliminary injunction was not granted, the plaintiffs would
suffer "substantial and irreparable harm. "' That harm would outweigh
the harm that defendants would suffer if the injunction were granted.'
The trial court relied on the plaintiffs' evidence which detailed the severe

21. Id. (citing Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 181, 302 P.2d 574, 577 (1956)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 681, 842 P.2d at 1248-49, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 488-89. See generally 56
CAL. JUR. 3D Schools §§ 310-27 (1980) (discussing compulsory education law).
24. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 685-86, 842 P.2d at 1251-52, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 491-92. See
also 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools §§ 291-301 (1980) (right to attend public school and
unlawful discrimination). The court reiterated that public education is a "fundamental
interest for purposes of equal protection analysis under the California Constitution."
Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 686, 842 P.2d at 1252, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492. The court noted
that unplanned interruptions in the school term do not automatically constitute a
denial of equal educational opportunity. Id. To violate the California Constitution, the
school district's program must fall below statewide standards. Id. at 686-87, 842 P.2d
at 1252, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492. See generally 7 B.E. WIThIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 139-41 (9th ed. 1988) (fundamental rights).
25. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 692, 842 P.2d at 1256, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. See also 56
CAL. JUR. 3D Schools § 4 (1980) (discussing state control and administration of educational system).
26. Butt, 5 Cal. 4th at 692, 842 P.2d at 1256, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 692-93, 842 P.2d at 1256, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
30. Id.
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and disruptive effects an early closure would have on students." The
State put forth no evidence indicating that the State would suffer comparable harm if it were required to provide emergency funding.'
Consequently, the California Supreme Court concluded that the record
sufficiently supported the trial court's finding of interim harm to the
plaintiffs.' After considering the two factors, the court ruled that the
trial court had not abused its discretion by ordering a preliminary injunction against the State.' The supreme court determined that the trial
court correctly found the plaintiffs' claim to have potential merit and the
potential interim harm was sufficient to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction.'
2.

Scope of the Remedial Order

The trial court ordered the State to ensure an equal educational opportunity to the District students "by whatever means they deem appropriate."' The State subsequently submitted a proposal to the trial court for
approval. 7 The proposal called for the superintendent of Public Instruction to relieve the school board of its duties, to appoint a trustee to be
responsible for the operation of the schools through the end of the
school term,. and to impose a plan for the permanent financial recovery
of the District.' The State contended that even if it had a responsibility
to intervene to provide an equal educational opportunity, the trial court
had no legal or equitable authority to displace the school board, to appoint a trustee, or to impose financial recovery plans.'
The supreme court rejected the State's contentions and found that the
trial court had not exceeded its equitable power by authorizing such a

31. Id. at 693, 842 P.2d at 1256, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. The trial court relied on
declarations made by various teachers, school officials, and specialists. Id.
32. Id. at 693, 842 P.2d at 1257, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497. The State had only made
contentions that such additional funding would harm the State's policies of local
control and accountability. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 678, 842 P.2d at 1246, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 694, 842 P.2d at 1257, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497. The trial court order
went on to state "[hlow these defendants accomplish this is up to the discretion of
defendants." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. See generally 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools §§ 149-65 (1980) (governing boards
of school districts).
39. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 694, 842 P.2d at 1258, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498.

plan.4" The court further explained that although the statutes failed to
provide direct legal authority for such action, trial courts retain the equitable authority to enforce their decisions.4 ' In this case, the court ultimately determined that the trial court's order had been "tailored to the
harm at issue" and in response to "extreme and aggravated" conditions.42 Consequently, the court held that it was within the trial court's
inherent equitable power to order the temporary displacement of the
school board and to appoint a trustee to implement a financial recovery
plan.'
3.

Source of Loan Funds

The proposal, which had been ordered and approved by the trial court,
included the disbursement of unused funds which were designated for
other programs." The State argued that the trial court exceeded its
power because the legislature appropriated these funds for their respective purposes, and the current financial difficulties of the District were
not "reasonably related" to the intended purposes. 4' Because the legislature appropriated these funds to specific agencies with very narrow purposes, the court agreed with the State's contention and overruled the
trial court's order.46
The supreme court noted that Article III of the California Constitution
provides for separate legislative, executive, and judicial powers and specifically forbids any person to exercise two or more of these powers
unless permitted within the Constitution. 47 The court explained that precedent has long established that such principles limit judicial authority
over appropriations.' The legislature appropriated the funds at issue for

40. Id.
41. Id. at 695, 842 P.2d at 1258, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498. See Crawford v. Board of
Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 309-10, 551 P.2d 28, 47-48, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724, 743-44 (1976)
(finding that a court may order busing to accomplish desegregation if a school district falls to meet its constitutional obligation to desegregate).
42. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 695-97, 842 P.2d at 1258-59, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498-99. See
generally Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986)
(holding that a judicial remedy must be tailored to the harm at issue).
43. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 697, 842 P.2d at 1259-60, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499-500.
44. Id. at 697, 842 P.2d at 1260, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500. The excess funds included $19 million designated for use in the Greater Avenues for Independence program
($9 million) and for emergency assistance to the Oakland Unified School District ($10
million). Id.
45. Id. at 697-98, 842 P.2d at 1260, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
46. Id. at 698, 842 P.2d at 1260, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500.
47. Id.
48. Id. See generally Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Chambers, 169 Cal. 131,
145 P. 1025 (1915); Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341 (1858); California State Employees'
Ass'n. v. Flournoy, 32 Cal. App. 3d 219, 108 Cal. Rptr. 251, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
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a clear and narrow purpose, and consequently, the supreme court held
that such funds were not "generally related" to the trial court's purpose.' Hence, the court found that the trial court exceeded its judiciary
authority by ordering the use of the funds to alleviate the District's financial problems.'
B.

Concurring& Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Lucas

Chief Justice Lucas agreed with the majority's analysis and conclusions
regarding the State of California's constitutional obligation to provide an
equal educational opportunity to all students.5 However, he dissented
with the majority's consideration of the trial court's appropriation of
emergency funding.52 Chief Justice Lucas reasoned that consideration of
appropriate funding was unnecessary because the issue was moot at the
time of the decision.' He pointed out that the emergency funds were
loans to the District, a loan repayment plan had already been worked out
by the parties, and the State was seeking no additional relief.' Consequently, Chief Justice Lucas contends that because the State only seeks
future guidance by the majority's opinion, the majority inappropriately
rendered an advisory opinion.'
C.

Concurring & Dissenting Opinion of Justice Mosk

Justice Mosk authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in general
agreement with Justice Kennard's opinion.' However, Justice Mosk refused to participate in Justice Kennard's concession that the trial court's
order posed "a potential for disruption of a function of the legislative

1093 (1973).
49. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 699-70, 842 P.2d at 1261-62, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 501-02. See
generally Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. State, 225 Cal. App. 3d 155, 275 Cal. Rptr.
449 (1990); Carmel Valley FIre Protection Dist. v. State, 190 Cal. App. 3d 521, 234
Cal. Rptr. 795 (1987).
50. Butt, 4 Cal. 4th at 703, 842 P.2d at 1264, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
51. Id. at 704, 842 P.2d at 1265, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505 (Lucas, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
52. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
53. Id. (Lucas, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
54. Id. at 705, 842 P.2d at 1265, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505 (Lucas, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
55. Id. (Lucas, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
56. Id. at 705, 842 P.2d at 1265, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).

branch."57 Justice Mosk contended that any recognized interference was
inconsistent with concluding that the funds were "reasonably related" to
the purposes served.'
D.

Concurring& Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kennard

Justice Kennard concurred with the part of the majority's opinion
which held that the threatened closure of the District schools deprived
students of their constitutional right to an equal educational opportunity
and hence mandated state interference to protect those rights.' However, Justice Kennard dissented from the majority's characterization that
the trial court violated the separation of powers doctrine when it ordered
the disbursement of unused funds for purposes other than those
specified by the legislature. 60 Justice Kennard argued that the practical
effect of the majority's opinion might deprive students of their fundamental rights if no specified means of funding existed."' She further contended that the trial court's ordering the use of funds which were already
appropriated for educational purposes was reasonably related to the
needs of the District.6 2
Justice Kennard asserted that the majority opinion was based on a
"fundamental misunderstanding of the separation of powers doctrine."'
She explained that the majority's formalistic approach mandates that
powers only be exercised by one branch of government; for instance,
appropriations of funds may only be exercised by the legislature.4 In
practical effect, the majority approach limits funding to the specific uses
contemplated by the legislature without regard to any fundamental rights
which might be compromised if such specified funding is not appropriated.' Justice Kennard further pointed out that the United States Supreme
Court has "squarely rejected" such a formalistic approach to the separation of powers.' The Supreme Court has instead adopted a more

57. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
58. Id. at 705-06, 842 P.2d at 1265-66, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505-06 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
59. Id. at 706, 842 P.2d at 1266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
60. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
61. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
62. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
63. Id. at 707, 842 P.2d at 1266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 506 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
64. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
65. Id. at 707, 842 P.2d at 1267, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
66. Id. at 707-08, 842 P.2d at 1267, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting) (citing Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Ser., 433 U.S. 425 (1977)).
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flexible approach which Justice Kennard deemed appropriate for our
growing and complex society. 7
Justice Kennard then focused on California legal principles which establish that a court does not violate the separation of powers doctrine
when it orders funding from appropriated resources if such funds are
"reasonably available."' She contended that the appropriate question at
hand whether the funds could be considered "reasonably available."' In
determining this, Justice Kennard explained that the amount of disruption among the branches must be considered.' If the disruption is
slight, the funds must only further the court's objectives.71 In the instant
case, Justice Kennard opined that such a disruption was slight, that the
source of the funds was reasonably related to the purposes served, and
consequently, that the trial court had the authority to order disbursement
of the funds which were already appropriated by the legislature.' In
practical effect, Justice Kennard reasoned that if one branch of government protects some fundamental rights due to failure of the other
branches to provide such protection, all fundamental rights should have
that protection.'m The majority opinion merely provides the means by

67. Id. at 708, 842 P.2d at 1267, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
Justice Kennard cited to Supreme Court precedent which holds that with respect
to separation of powers, "'the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which the act
complained of prevents one of the three branches from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.'" Id. (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443). Under this approach, if
the possibility of disruption exists, the court must then determine whether the constitutional authority of the branch in question is a greater concern than the impact
on separation of powers. Id. (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443).
68. Id. at 709, 842 P.2d at 1268, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting). See generally Mandel v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 531, 629 P.2d 935, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 841 (1981); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. State, 225 Cal. App. 3d 155, 275
Cal. Rptr. 449 (1990); Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State, 190 Cal. App. 3d
521, 234 Cal. Rptr. 795 (1987); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Cory, 132 Cal.
App. 3d 852, 183 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1982).
69. Butt 4 Cal. 4th at 709, 842 P.2d at 1268, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
70. Id. at 710, 842 P.2d at 1268, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
71. Id. at 710, 842 P.2d at 1268, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
72. Id. at 710-11, 842 P.2d at 1268-69, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508-09 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
73. Id. at 713, 842 P.2d at 1270, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 510 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).

which such a violation might be recognized, but may forbid that branch
the power to remedy that violation.'
III.

CONCLUSION

The court found that the District's inability to fund the remaining six
weeks of public school was an insufficient reason to justify the early closure of the District's school system."5 The court affirmed every student's
right to an equal educational opportunity in the State of California and
concluded that this fundamental interest may only be thwarted by a necessary and compelling state interest.0 The State's interest in maintaining
the existing program of local management and control was not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify non-intervention.'
The court's holding recognized and protected each student's fundamental right to a state wide standard of education. The court concluded that
local school boards may be displaced, trustees may be appointed, and.
emergency loan funds may be disbursed.' However, the court protected
the legislature's appropriation powers by holding that funds earmarked
for other programs may not be used to remedy situations not specifically
contemplated by the legislature.m
M
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74. Id. at 713-14, 842 P.2d at 1271, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 511 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
75. Id. at 703-04, 842 P.2d at 1264, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id.
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B.

The Regents of the University of Californiamay impose a
mandatory student activity fee; however, the Regents can not
collect mandatoryfees from students who object to
subsidizing student groups that engage in political or ideological activities: Smith v. Regents of the University of
California.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Smith v. Regents of the University of California,' the California
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Regents of the University of California ("Regents") have the authority to impose a mandatory student activity fee, and if so, whether the Regents may utilize that fee
to support groups which engage in political or ideological activities.2 The
court held that the California Constitution authorizes the Regents to impose a mandatory student activity fee.3 However, the court ruled that the
Regents can not use the mandatory fee to force students to fund organizations whose primary purpose is to advance political or ideological
agendas.4 In order to protect the constitutional rights of dissenting students, the court concluded that the Regents must (1) identify those student groups which are not eligible for funding from mandatory fees and
(2) allow objecting students the opportunity to deduct a corresponding
amount from the mandatory fee.'
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Every student who attends the University of California ("University") is
required to pay a mandatory, non-refundable student activity fee which is
used to subsidize the Associated Students of the University of California
("ASUC"). 6 The ASUC utilizes the mandatory fee to support the ASUC

1. 4 Cal. 4th 843, 844 P.2d 500, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 181 (1993). Justice Pannelli authored the majority opinion in which Chief Justice
Lucas and Justices Kennard, Baxter, and George concurred. Id. at 847-69, 844 P.2d at
503-17, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184-98. See infra notes 19-71, 76-78 and accompanying
text. Justice Arabian wrote a separate dissenting. opinion in which Justice Mosk concurred. Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 869-92, 844 P.2d at 518-33, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198-214 (Arabian, J., dissenting). See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
2. Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 847, 844 P.2d at 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184.
3. Id. at 851, 844 P.2d at 505, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186.
4. Id. at 860, 844 P.2d at 511, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192.
5. Id. at 862-63, 866, 844 P.2d at 513-14, 516, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194-95, 197.
6. Id. at 848, 844 P.2d at 504, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185. The University authorizes

Senate,7 two lobbying groups,' and approximately 150 student activity
organizations.' Although most of the student groups pursue academic,
cultural, or recreational activities, many groups pursue purely political or
ideological goals.' ° These groups include Campus National Organization
for Women, Campus Abortion Rights Action League, Gay and Lesbian
League, Progressive Student Organization, Spartacus Youth League, and
Greenpeace Berkeley."
In 1982, several students at the University of California at Berkeley
filed suit against the Regents, the ASUC, and various University officers.'2 The plaintiffs asserted that the imposition and use of the mandatory fee violated the United States Constitution,"' various provisions of
the California Constitution, 4' and state statutory provisions. Despite the

the ASUC to "administer student government and student extracurricular affairs." Id.
at 848, 844 P.2d at 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184. In 1982, the year in which the
present case was tried, the fee was $12.50 per student per academic quarter. Id. at
848, 844 P.2d at 504, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185. During the 1981-82 academic year, the
ASUC collected $607,635. Id.
7. Id. at 849, 844 P.2d at 504, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185. The ASUC Senate is a
governing body comprised of elected student representatives. Id. The ASUC Senate
has debated and taken a position on various political issues such as "gay and lesbian
rights, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, gun control, the reelection of a particular United States Representative, a municipal initiative to legalize marijuana, and the
treatment of political prisoners." Id.
8. The ASUC subsidizes the University of California Lobby and the ASUC Municipal Lobby. Id. The former group seeks to influence pending legislation and has
lobbied the state legislature on such issues as abortion and rent discrimination. Id.
The latter group has lobbied the City of Berkeley on issues such as nuclear weapons,
public transportation, city investment policy, and has also endorsed student candidates for public office. Id.
9. Id.

10. Id. at 849-50, 844 P.2d at 504, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185.
11. Id. at 850, 844 P.2d at 504-05, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185-86. The remaining groups
which were deemed to pursue political and ideological goals include: Amnesty International, Berkeley Students for Peace, Radical Education and Action Project, Students Against Intervention in El Salvador, Students for Economic Democracy, UC
Berkeley Feminist Alliance and Women Organized Against Sexual Harassment, UC
Sierra Club, and Conservation and Natural Resources Organization. Id.
12. Id. at 850, 844 P.2d at 505, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186.
13. Id. The First Amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend I.; see also Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 850 n.1, 844 P.2d at 505 n.1,
16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 186 n.1.
Specifically, the students claimed that the practice in question abridged their
First Amendment right to free speech. Id. at 852, 844 P.2d at 506, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
187. They alleged that contributions which support political or ideological causes are
a form of speech, and "compelled speech offends the First Amendment." Id.
14. Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 850, 844 P.2d at 505, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186.
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fact that the trial court found that certain political activities violated the
University and the ASUC Rules and Regulations, the lower court ruled in
favor of the defendants." The court of appeal affirmed. The California
Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the appellate court's decision
which concluded that the Regents have the power to impose a mandatory student activity fee." The supreme court, however, reversed the court
of appeal in all other respects."
III.
A.

TREATMENT

The Majority Opinion
1.

The Regents Have Sufficient Authority to Impose a Mandatory
Student Activity Fee

The California Constitution vests the Regents with "full powers of
organization and government" over the University.' In prior rulings, California courts have interpreted this grant of power as "giving the Regents
'virtual autonomy in self-govemance. '"' On that basis, the court concluded that the constitutional grant of power clearly authorizes the Regents to impose and collect a mandatory student activity fee.2'
2.

The Use of Mandatory Student Activity Fees to Subsidize Student
Groups Devoted to Political or Ideological Causes Violated the
Dissenting Students' First Amendment Rights to Freedom of
Speech and Freedom of Association

In determining whether the use of the mandatory fee was constitutionally permissible, the court identified the competing interests at stake. '
On the one hand, it is well established that the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits the government from forcing an

15. Id. at 850-51, 844 P.2d at 505, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186.
16. Id. at 851, 844 P.2d at 505, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186.
17. Id. at 868, 844 P.2d at 517, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198.
18. Id.
19. CAL CONST. art. IX, § 9(a).
20. Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 851, 844 P.2d at 505, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186 (citing
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. City of Santa Monica, 77 Cal. App. 3d 130, 135, 143
Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (1978) (holding that the Regents are exempt from local building
codes and zoning regulations)).
21. Id.
22. See id. at 852-53, 844 P.2d at 506-07, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187-88.

individual to contribute money for the support of political or ideological
causes.' On that basis, the plaintiffs argued that the use of the student
activity fees to support organizations engaged in political and ideological
activities violated their constitutional right not to speak.24 On the other
hand, however, the court recognized that the Regents must be given
broad discretion in determining "how best to carry out the University's
educational mission."25 As such, the defendants argued that the political
and ideological goals inherent in certain student group activities provided
educational benefits which warranted the burden on the dissenting
students' rights.'
The court reasoned that the mandatory fee implicated the First
Amendment freedom of association, and therefore, the strict scrutiny
standard applied.27 As such, the court emphasized that the use of the
fee, to subsidize political and ideological activities, could be justified only
if: (1) the fee served a compelling state interest unrelated to the suppression of ideas, (2) the state interest could not be achieved through less
restrictive means,' and (3) the defendants' use of the mandatory fee
was germane to the University's educational purpose.'

23. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1990) (ruling that a state bar
can not utilize mandatory dues to fund political or ideological activities which are
unrelated to the bar's stated goal of improving the -administration of justice); Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (holding that a union must finance its ideological activities from dues paid by employees who do not object to
the advancement of such causes); see also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 247-58 (1974) (striking down a state law guaranteeing political candidates the "right to reply" to criticism); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-96
(1961) (overruling a state statute requiring public officers to declare a belief in God).
In the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, Thomas Jefferson declared: "[T]o compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13
(1947).
24. Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 853, 844 P.2d at 507, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188.
25. Id. at 852, 844 P.2d at 506, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187.
26. Id. at 853, 844 P.2d at 507, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188.
27. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the First Amendment freedom of as.sociation, see JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.41
(4th ed. 1991); B.E. WTK1N, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Freedom of Association
§§ 271-280 (9th ed. 1988).
28. Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 853, 844 P.2d at 507, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188 (citing
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 & n.11 (1986) (striking down a
union's procedural safeguards aimed at addressing the concerns of those members
who disagreed with the union's political activities)). See also Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (upholding a state statute requiring a men's group
to accept female applicants).
29. Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 854, 844 P.2d at 508, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189 (citing Keller
v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990) (ruling that a state bar cannot utilize
mandatory dues to fund political or ideological activities which are unrelated to the
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In assessing the validity of the defendants' use of the mandatory student fee, the court focused on two related United States Supreme Court
decisions.' In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,3' a group of public
school teachers challenged the validity of a Michigan statute which compelled teachers to financially support a union's collective bargaining efforts.' Particularly, the teachers maintained that the union utilized mandatory union dues to support political and ideological views which were
unrelated to collective bargaining.'
The Supreme Court ruled that a state may compel employees to support a union's collective bargaining efforts.," However, the Court noted
that it is well established that an individual's right "to associate for the
purpose of advancing ideas and beliefs is protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. "' The Court emphasized that it is equally well
established that a government cannot "require an individual to relinquish
rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment. "' On that basis, the
Court ruled that the constitutional prohibition against compelled speech
prevented the union from using the mandatory dues to fund political and
ideological activities which were unrelated to collective bargaining.37

bar's stated purpose); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 217-23, 232-37
(1977) (holding that a union must finance its ideological activities from dues paid by
employees who do not object to the advancement of such causes)).
30. See generally id. at 852-55, 844 P.2d at 506-08, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187-89.
31. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
32. Id. at 211-13. See MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.210) (West 1978). Section
423.210(l) permits employment to be conditioned upon the payment of union dues.
Id.
33. Abood, 431 U.S. at 213.
34. Id. at 217-23.
35. Id. at 233 (citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1976) (enjoining a
governmental entity from dismissing employees who would not affiliate with or sponsor the Democratic Party); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (striking
down a state law barring citizens from voting in a primary election of a political
party if the citizen had voted in the primary election of any other political party
within the preceding 23 months); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)
(holding that an organization's freedom of association rights protected the organization from being forced to disclose its membership lists)).
36. Id. at 234 (citing Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357-60; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972) (finding that a college's dismissal of a professor who criticized the college was
violative of the professor's First Amendment rights); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) (striking down a state law requiring teachers to affirm that they
are not members of the Communist Party)).
37. Id. at 234. For additional analysis of Abood, see The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70, 188-98 (1977) (arguing that unions should be required to

In Keller v. State Bar of California,' the plaintiffs, members of the
California State Bar, sued that organization alleging that its use of the
plaintiffs' mandatory dues to finance political and ideological activities
violated their First Amendment rights.' The Court noted that the State
Bar's broad statutory mission is to "promote the improvement of the administration of justice."' However, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant engaged in various lobbying efforts which were unrelated to the
practice of law and contrary the plaintiffs' views." Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were actively involved in activities
aimed at addressing such issues as employer's rights, gun control, air
pollution, special education, senatorial elections, nuclear weapons, abortion, and public school prayer.4"
The Supreme Court ruled that the State Bar may require its members
to pay mandatory dues.' However, the Court also ruled that the Bar
cannot fund political or ideological activities which are not pertinent to
the purpose and function of the organization." The Court rejected the
defendant's argument that its lobbying efforts on matters of social interest were germane to the Bar's stated goal of regulating the legal profession.'
In light of Abood and Keller, the Regents in Smith argued that the
University's purpose is to educate.4" The Regents further asserted that
the funding of politically oriented student groups provided important
educational opportunities, and was therefore, germane to the University's

prepare a schedule of estimated annual disbursements before collecting union dues);
Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity: Majority and Minority Rights
and Remedies, 126 U. PA. L REv. 386 (1977) (analyzing the relationship between the
First Amendment rights of unions and the First Amendment rights of union members).
38. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 5 (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1156 (1989)). See
also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6031(a) (West Supp. 1990).
41. Keller, 496 U.S. at 5-6.
42. Id. at 5-6 n.2, 15.
43. Id. at 14.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 14-16. For additional analysis of Keller, see David F. Addicks, Note,
Renovating the Bar After Keller v. State Bar of California: A Proposal for Strict
Limits on Compulsory Fee Expenditure, 25 U.S.F. L REv. 681 (1991) (asserting that

as a result of the Keller decision bar expenditures should be strictly limited to activities which further the legal profession). For additional analysis of the California Supreme Court's treatment of Keller, see Katherine K Freberg, California Supreme Court
Survey, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 263 (1989).
46. Smith v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 4 Cal. 4th at 854-55, 844 P.2d at 508, 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189.
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purpose.47 Specifically, the Regents maintained that the groups gave students the opportunity to express their views, provided self-education in
government processes, developed social skills, and ensured freedom of
expression and association.' However, the court rejected the Regent's
position and stated that "a group's dedication to achieving its political or
ideological goals, at some point, begins to outweigh any legitimate claim
it may have to be educating students on the University's behalf."49 On
that basis, the court concluded that once a group's educational function
becomes merely incidental to its political and ideological agenda, "the
infringement of dissenting students' constitutional rights can no longer
be justified. "'
The ASUC attempted to justify its expenditures by arguing that its
rules and procedures prohibit any funding related to partisan politics or
ballot measures.5 Nevertheless, the court found the ASUC standards to

47. Id.
48. Id. at 855, 844 P.2d at 508, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 862, 844 P.2d at 513, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194. The California Supreme
Court was not the first judicial body to address the issues presented in this case. In
Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 300 (1992), students at the State University of New York ("SUNY") challenged the use of mandatory
student activity fees to support the New York Public Interest Research Group
("NYPIRG"). Id. at 993-94. NYPIRG conducted both on-campus and off-campus activities aimed at lobbying state government on issues such as economic and social
justice. Id. at 994. In regard to NYPIRG's on-campus activities, the court noted that
the organization's activities infringed on the dissenting students' right to be free from
compelled speech. Id. at 999. Nonetheless, the court found that the organization offered benefits which justified the infringement. Id. at 1001. However, the court
reached a contrary conclusion in regard to NYPIRG's off-campus activities. The court
reasoned that the group's educational benefits ceased when student funding was
"spent in the halls of the state legislature." Id. at 1002.
In Galda v. Rutgers, 772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065
(1986), students at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey ("Rutgers"), objected
to the use of a mandatory student fee to support the New Jersey Public Interest
Research Group ("NJPIRG"). NJPIRG was active in lobbying governmental entities on
issues such as equal rights, nuclear weapons, and the environment. Id. at 1061. In
contrast to Smith and Carroll, students voted to support NJPIRG through a separate
mandatory fee, rather than a general student activity fee. Id. at 1064. However, the
court held that the educational benefits offered by NJPIRG did not justify the infringement on the dissenting students' speech and associational rights. Id. at 1065.
The court concluded that the organization's educational benefits were only incidental
to the group's principal objective of promoting political and ideological activities. Id.
at 1065.
51. Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 861, 844 P.2d at 512, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193.

be unconstitutional both on their face and as applied.' The court
stressed that the ASUC rules and procedures actually permitted the funding of activities which were "indisputably political and even 'partisan' by
any reasonable defmition."' The ASUC's vice-president testified that the
ASUC's standards had been interpreted as prohibiting funding for the
Young Republicans and the Young Democrats.' However, the ASUC
funded the Young Spartacus League, an organization which supported
the former Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and promotes a revolutionary socialist movement which can intervene in all social struggles
based on Marxist*philosophy.' The court stated that the distinction between the Young Spartacus League as "non-partisan" and the Young Republicans and the Young Democrats as "partisan" was practically "absurd."'
In order to protect the rights of dissenting students, the court ordered
the Regents to identify those student groups which are ineligible for
mandatory funding pursuant to the standards set forth in the court's
decision and "offer students the option of deducting a corresponding
amount from the mandatory fee."57 The court further ordered that the
Regents "provide a refund only to those students who object to the use
of their fees for political and ideological activities."'
3.

The Use of Mandatory Student Activity Fees to Subsidize the
ASUC's Governmental Lobbying Efforts Violated the Dissenting
Students' First Amendment Rights to Freedom of Speech and
Freedom of Association

The plaintiffs also objected to the ASUC utilizing the mandatory student fee to lobby governmental entities.' The ASUC has lobbied the
state and municipal governments on issues such as the nuclear weapons,

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 861-62, 844 P.2d at 513, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194. As an additional example, the court noted that "students who favor abortion rights must pay to support the
political activities of Berkeley Right to Life, a group opposed to abortion, and students opposed to abortion must subsidize groups such as Campus N.O.W. and Campus Abortion Rights Action League, which favor abortion rights." Id. at 860, 844 P.2d
at 512, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193. Further, despite the "partisan politics" rule, the ASUC
also funded "organizations that [held] demonstrations against the policies of the Rea-

gan administration." Id. at 861, 844 P.2d at 513, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193.
56. Id. at 862, 844 P.2d at 513, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194.
57. Id. at 862, 844 P.2d at 514, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194.
58. Id. at 863, 844 P.2d at 514, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195. The court noted, however,
that the Regents are free to assess those students who do not object. Id.
59. Id. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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public transportation, rent control, abortion, and, ironically, mandatory
student fees.' The court found that no meaningful relationship existed
between these activities and the students or the University."
The court then ruled that the defendants cannot force unwilling students to finance the defendant's lobbying efforts.2' The court emphasized that where "core" political freedoms are at issue, "the educational
benefit to a few student lobbyists cannot justify the burden on all
students' free speech and associational rights. " '3 Therefore, the court
ordered that the Regents must identify those students who object to the
ASUC's governmental lobbying efforts and afford those students the
opportunity to deduct a corresponding amount from the mandatory

fee.'
4.

If Mandatory Student Activity Fees Were Used to Subsidize the
ASUC Senate's Political Activities, Such Action Violates the
Dissenting Students' First Amendment Rights to Freedom of
Speech and Freedom of Association

The court noted that "[f]or many years, the ASUC Senate has debated,
adopted, and publicized resolutions on current political issues." ' The
ASUC has addressed such issues as homosexual rights, gun control, draft

registration, the re-election of a'United States Representative, and the
legalization of marijuana.' The Plaintiffs argued that the University
should not compel them to financially support these political activities.

60. Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 863, 844 P.2d at 514, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195.
61. Id. at 864, 844 P.2d at 514, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195.
62. Id. at 866, 844 P.2d at 516, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197.
63. Id. The court's ruling was in accordance with the United States Supreme Court
decision of Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991). In Lehnert, the
Court ruled that the State can "not compel its employees to subsidize legislative lobbying or other political union activity." Id. at 1960-61. The Court reasoned that:
By utilizing petitioners' funds for political lobbying and to garner the support
of the public for its endeavors, the union would use each dissenter as "an
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he
finds unacceptable." The First Amendment protects the individual's right of
participation in these spheres from precisely this type of invasion.
Id. at
64.
65.
66.
67.

1960 (citations omitted).
Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 866, 844 P.2d at 516, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197.
Id. at 866, 844 P.2d at 516, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197.
Id.
Id.

On the other hand, the Regents asserted that they did not use the mandatory student activity fee to subsidize the alleged activities.'
The California Supreme Court recognized that the ASUC Senate's political activities may possess educational value for those students involved
in the activities.' However, the court once again emphasized that if the
student fee was being used for the purposes alleged by the plaintiffs,
there would be an unconstitutional burden on the First Amendment
rights of the dissenting students.0 Therefore, the court remanded this
issue for further evidentiary proceedings to determine whether the mandatory fee was being used to fund political activity conducted by the
ASUC Senate.7
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

Writing for the dissent, Justice Arabian attacked the majority by asserting that the court's decision itself violated the United States Constitution
by prohibiting the defendants from disseminating controversial ideas.'
The dissent reasoned that student group political activity was germane to
the University's educational mission." The dissent stressed that "such
speech is inherently educational. It is not the 'price' students pay for a
university education, it is the very essence of that education."' As such,
the dissent would affirm the court of appeal's decision in favor of the
defendants."
The majority was equally as strident in attacking the dissent's position.
The majority noted that the First Amendment does not allow the government "to make speech a matter of compulsion and coercion."7' The majority pointed out that "[alt the heart of the dissenting opinion is a frank
proposal to sacrifice students' constitutional right not to be compelled to
support political causes in order to teach them about the 'fundamental

68. Id. at 867, 844 P.2d at 516, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197. Unfortunately, the trial
court did not address this issue in its decision. Id. The appellate court upheld the
ASUC Senate's activities as a matter of law. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. Id. at 868, 844 P.2d at 517, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198.
72. Id. at 869, 844 P.2d at 518, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Arabian argued that "[tihe funding
of on-campus activities groups engaged in a broad variety of speech-controversial,
political, ideological, social, cultural-no matter how annoying or disagreeable to
some, plays an integral role in the University's mission." Id. at 870, 844 P.2d at 518,
16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 892, 844 P.2d at 533, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 848, 844 P.2d at 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184.
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republican virtues upon which this nation was founded.'"' The majority
concluded that the "irony of that proposal speaks for itself."'
IV.

IMPACT

The supreme court's decision obviously impacts thousands of University of California students. The court definitively stated that the Regents
are duly authorized to impose a mandatory student activity fee.tm However, with equal emphasis, the court ruled that the Regents cannot utilize
the mandatory fee to fund organizations whose primary purpose is to
advance their own political or ideological agendas.' The constitutional
rights of dissenting students takes clear precedence over any educational
value which is inherent in such student activities."' In addition, dissenting students must be given the opportunity to deduct from the mandatory fee that portion which is allocated for political or ideological activities.'
On a larger scale, the court's decision represents a continuation of a
long line of United States Supreme Court cases which have held that an
individual may, under limited circumstances, be compelled to affiliate
with and financially support an organization.' However, the individual
does not have to financially support every activity which the organization
chooses to undertake.' On that basis, state bar associations, labor unions, and now, public universities, may compel their constituents to pay

77. Id. (citation omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 850, 844 P.2d at 505, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186.
80. Id. at 860, 844 P.2d at 511, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192.
81. Id. at 867-68, 844 P.2d at 516-17, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197-98.
82. Id. at 862-63, 866, 844 P.2d at 513-14, 516, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194-95, 197.
83. See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, Ill S. Ct. 1950, 1959 (1991) (concluding that a union may. charge its collective bargaining activities to its member so
long as the member's free speech rights are not infringed); Keller v. State Bar of
Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1990) (allowing the California State Bar to require dues from
its membership); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 217-23 (holding that
union members may be financially compelled to support a union's collective bargaining efforts); Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 842-43 (1961) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Wisconsin State Bar's requirement that attorneys pay annual dues does
not violate an attorney's freedom of association).
84. See, e.g., Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1960 (asserting that a union may not compel
its members to support political lobbying outside the scope of the union's purpose);
Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14 (concluding that the California State Bar may not use mandatory dues to fund activities outside of the State Bar's stated purpose).

mandatory fees in support of the organization.' However, these organizations cannot compel their members to financially support political or
ideological activities which are not germane to the purpose of the organization and to which the individual personally objects.'
Currently, great tension undeniably exists along partisan lines. Therefore, it should not be long before students across the country take to the
courtrooms in attempts to prohibit our nation's universities from utilizing
mandatory fees to support political or ideological groups which many
students find offensive or "politically incorrect."
MICHAEL R. O'NEILL

85. See Smith, 4 Cal. 4th at 851, 844 P.2d at 505, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
86. See id. at 862, 844 P.2d at 513, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194.
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C. Content-neutralzoning ordinancesfor adult entertainment
establishments that are proper time, place, and manner
regulations do not violate FirstAmendment guarantees if
such ordinances serve a substantialgovernmental purpose
and provide alternative avenues of communication: City of
National City v. Wiener.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In City of National City v. Wiener,' the California Supreme Court
held that a municipal zoning ordinance which restricted the location of
adult entertainment businesses, but which provided an exception for
those businesses located within enclosed shopping malls, did not violate
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 Due to redevelopment, the city of National City forced respondent, Steven D. Wiener, to
close his adult bookstore.3 In December 1986, Wiener, and his sister,
Patricia Sanders, opened another adult entertainment establishment in
the same area under the name of Chuck's Bookstore.' The city brought
suit against the respondents, alleging that the establishment constituted
both a common law public nuisance as well as a violation of section
18.69.030 of the city's municipal code.2 Although the respondents admit-

1. 3 Cal. 4th 832, 838 P.2d 223, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701 (1992). Justice Arabian
wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Baxter,
and George concurred. Id. at 835, 849, 838 P.2d at 225, 234, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703,
712. Justice Baxter wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 849, 838 P.2d at 234,
12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712. In addition, Justice Mosk wrote a concurring and dissenting
opinion in which Justice Kennard joined. Id. at 851, 859, 838 P.2d at 236, 241, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 714, 719.
2. Id. at 835, 838 P.2d at 225, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.
3. Id. at 836 n.1, 838 P.2d at 225 n.1, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703 n.1. See generally
83 AM. JuR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 463 (1992) (defining "adult entertainment
establishments").
4. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 835-36, 838 P.2d at 225, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703. The
parties stipulated that Chuck's Bookstore was within the meaning of an adult entertainment establishment as intended by the ordinance. Id. at 836 n.3, 838 P.2d at 22526 n.3, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703-04 n.3.
5. Id. at 836, 838 P.2d at 225, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703. Section 18.69.030 provides
in pertinent part:
A. No person or entity shall own, establish, operate, control or enlarge, or
cause or permit the establishment, operation, enlargement or transfer of ownership or control, except pursuant to Section 18.69.060, of any of the following adult entertainment establishments if such adult entertainment establishment is within one thousand five hundred feet of another adult entertainment

ted that their business violated the requirements of the municipal code,
they asserted that the code provision itself was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.'
The superior court heard testimony from the city's planning director
regarding the rationale for the restrictions on adult entertainment businesses enumerated in the city's municipal code. The planning director
testified that the restrictions were a part of an overall redevelopment
plan which was enacted in response to both the city's high crime rate
and increasing urban decay.' The superior court also heard testimony regarding the impact Chuck's Bookstore had on the surrounding neighborhood.' A woman who lived adjacent to the establishment testified that
her son could no longer play in his own backyard due to the actions of
respondent's customers.'0
The court also admitted evidence indicating the existence of vacancies
within enclosed shopping malls in National City." These locations could
escape the municipal code section's various distance requirements by
falling within the specific allowable exception for enclosed shopping

establishment or within one thousand feet of any school or public park within the city or within one thousand five hundred feet of any residentially
zoned property in the city, measured along street frontages:
1. Adult bookstore; ...
3. Adult mini-motion picture arcade (peep shows); ...
C. Nothing in this chapter prohibits the location of adult entertainment establishments within retail shopping centers in all commercial zones wherein such
activities will have their only frontage upon enclosed malls or malls isolated
from direct view from public streets, parks, schools, churches or residentially
zoned property.
Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 836 n.3, 838 P.2d at 225-26 n.3, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703-04 n.3.
6. See generally David J. Christiansen, Note, Zoning and the First Amendment
Rights of Adult Entertainment, 22 VAL. U. L.REV. 695 (1988); Alfred C. Yen, Judicial
Review of the Zoning of Adult Entertainment: A Search for the Purposeful Suppression of Protected Speech, 12 PEPP. L REv. 651 (1985).
7. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 837, 838 P.2d at 226, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
8. Id. See 8 B.E. WITEIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Law
§§ 834-36 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing local zoning regulations, scope of zoning power,
and applicable zoning procedures); 83 Am. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 465
(1992) (noting that total exclusion of adult entertainment establishments from within
a municipality has not been permitted).
9. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 837, 838 P.2d at 226, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
10. Id. at 837 n.4, 838 P.2d at 226 n.4, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704 n.4. She stated that
men regularly urinated in her backyard and that her son often found both pornographic material and used condoms on her property. Id. In addition, a reporter for a
local newspaper testified that he had personally witnessed both oral and anal sex
being performed within the establishment, and anal sex being performed behind the
respondent's business establishment. Id.
11. Id. at 838, 838 P.2d at 226-27, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704-05
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malls.'2 However, evidence was also introduced that some leasing agents
within the area might refuse to rent their locations to potential adult entertainment businesses. " Finally, evidence was presented regarding the
possibility of either constructing new shopping malls or modifying existing ones in order to satisfy the municipal code provisions. 4
Without addressing the common law nuisance allegation specifically,
the superior court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. 5 The
,court of appeal determined that the municipal code provision was facially constitutional and that it sought to achieve a substantial governmental interest. 6 However, the court of appeal ultimately held that the
provision as applied was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech
due to the lack of available alternate sites for adult entertainment businesses. 7 The majority of the California Supreme Court overruled the

12. See supra note 5.
13. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 838, 838 P.2d at 227, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
14. Id. However, there was no evidence introduced to determine if such projects
would be financially feasible, or whether the respondent's would be financially capable of undertaking such projects. Id.
15. Id.at 838-39, 838 P.2d at 227, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705. The court reasoned that
the municipal code provision "was a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation
designed to serve a substantial government interest." Id. at 838, 838 P.2d at 227, 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705. Because the available shopping malls located within the area
could satisfy the municipal code provision's exception, the superior court also held
that the code provision allowed for other means of communication, thus providing
the opportunity for free speech. Id. See 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 465
(1992) (stating that reasonable regulations on adult entertainment establishments are
permissible if necessary to further significant governmental interests, content neutral,
and do not necessarily limit alternative avenues of communication. See generally W.G.
Roeseler, Comment, Regulating Adult Entertainment Establishments Under Conven.tional Zoning, 19 URB. 125 (1987); Jim Bobo, Recent Decisions, Constitutional
Law--First Amendment-Cities May Restrict Location of Adult Theaters Through
Narrowly Tailored, Content-Neutral, Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions, 56 Miss.
LJ. 401 (1986).
Based on the court's determination that Chuck's Bookstore violated the municipal ordinance enacted by the city, the court held that the establishment was a public
nuisance and prohibited its continued operation. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 839, 838 P.2d
at 227, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
16. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 839, 838 P.2d at 227, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
17. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the various shopping
malls discussed were not realistic options and, in fact, were not of a sufficient number to provide ample opportunities to the respondents. Id. In addition, the court noted that the cost of developing available land into a conforming mall would prove to
be impractical to businessmen of the respondent's stature and economic means. Id.
The court relied upon evidence showing that within the city limits there was only

court of appeal and consequently upheld the superior court's ruling on
the constitutionality of the municipal code. 8

II.. TREATMENT
A.

Majority Opinion

Justice Arabian, writing for the majority, first considered the previous
and directly on point decisions of the United States Supreme Court."
The Supreme Court case of City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.2
provided the guidelines on which the majority based its holding.' In
Renton, the Court solidified a two part test to determine the constitutionality of certain zoning regulations.22 The Renton test examined "(1)
whether the ordinance is designed to serve a substantial government
interest, and (2) whether the ordinance allows for reasonable alternative
avenues of communication. " 23
one other existing adult entertainment establishment as providing partial proof of the
restrictive nature of the municipal code provision. Id.
18. Id. at 849, 838 P.2d at 234, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712.
19. Id. at 839, 838 P.2d at 228, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706. The court of appeal also
cited the controlling Supreme Court decisions. Nevertheless, the California Supreme
Court held that the court of appeal's application of the cases was superficial. Id.
20. 475 U.S. 41, 43-44 (1986). According to Justice Arabian, Renton involved a
distance requirement which, as a practical matter, concentrated adult theaters in one
location. Id. at 44. Reasoning that the regulations controlled only the location and
not content of speech, the Court stated that such distance requirements should be
viewed as time, place, and manner regulations. Id. at 46. The Court held the statute
content-neutral, because it was concerned with the effect of communication on adjacent neighborhoods and simply not an attempt to control the content of the communication. Id. at 48.
21. Wiener, 4 Cal. 4th at 839, 838 P.2d at 228, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706. The court
discussed Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Young v. American Mini Theaters,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring), in which he explained that an ordinance may result in loss of income to a party and still be held constitutional. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 840, 838 P.2d at 228, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706. The court also highlighted the similarities that Justice Powell recognized between ordinary commercial
land-use regulations which may have negative economic consequences on businesses
and the adult entertainment establishment regulations which may have similar effects.
Id. See generally Charles H. Clarke, Freedom of Speech and the Problem of the
Lawful Harmful Public Reaction: Adult Use Cases of Renton and Mini Theaters, 20
AKRON L. REV. 187 (1986); Ronald M. Stein, Regulation of Adult Businesses Through
Zoning After Renton, 18 PAC. L.J. 351 (1987); William M. Sunkel, Note, City of
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.: Court-Approved Censorship Through Zoning, 7
PACE L. REv. 251 (1986).
22. Id. at 840-41, 838 P.2d at 228, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706 (citing Renton, 475 U.S.
at 50).
23. Id. See generally 13 CAL JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 260 (1989) (discussing
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Before applying the Renton test, the California Supreme Court first
discussed whether the ordinance in question was a proper time, place,
and manner regulation and whether it was content-neutral. 24 The court
held that because the ordinance did not prohibit the operation of such
establishments but merely regulated the permissible locations, the ordinance was a proper time, place, and manner regulation.' In addition,
the court found the regulation to be content-neutral, since the legislature
focused on the "secondary effects" of such businesses on adjacent neighborhoods rather than the specific content of the material.26
Applying the Renton precedent to the case at hand, the California Supreme Court held that the ordinance satisfied the first prong of the
test.2 7 The city enacted the ordinance to curb both the city's high crime
rate and increasing urban decay.' The court found that these objectives
served a substantial governmental interest.' The court also held that the
enclosed shopping mall exception was narrowly tailored to achieve such
governmental purposes.'

time, place, and manner regulations). In upholding the Renton ordinance, the United
States Supreme Court held that the first part of the two part test was satisfied
because the ordinance was established to protect the quality of life within the community. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. The Court held, therefore, that the restriction sought
to achieve a substantial governmental interest. Id. The Court then considered the
second prong of the Renton two part test, reasonable alternative avenues of communication. Id. at 53. The fact that commercial property was available to the respondents in Renton was critical in satisfying this requirement. Id. at 53-54. In concluding
that the Renton ordinance was an allowable restriction under the First Amendment,
the Court held that the ordinance did not seek to suppress expression but merely to
control the location at which it was presented. Id. at 54.
24. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 843, 838 P.2d at 230, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708.
25. Id. at 844, 838 P.2d at 231, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709. The California Supreme
Court acknowledged that the ordinance in Renton had effectively forced all adult
businesses into one area while the municipal code in the present case sought to
spread such establishments throughout the community. Id. Without addressing the
particular merits of either scheme, the court simply noted that either type of control
was a constitutionally permissible restriction on time, place, and manner of communication. Id. See 83 Am. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 464 (1992) (noting that the
right to concentrate or disperse the location of such establishments is included in the
right to regulate time, place, and manner).
26. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 845, 838 P.2d at 231, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709.
27. Id. at 845, 838 P.2d at 233, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710.
28. Id. at 837, 838 P.2d at 226, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704. Evidence in the record
demonstrated the effect of such urban decay on surrounding neighborhoods in National City. Id. at 846, 838 P.2d at 232, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710.
29. Id.
30. Id. See generally 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 263 (1989) (describing

In applying the second prong of the Renton test, the California Supreme Court concluded that sufficient possibilities for alternative avenues of communication existed for respondents to continue operation.3
The court cited Renton to establish that they need not be concerned with
the economic impact of the ordinance.' The court further indicated that
the regulation provided for both sufficient alternative sites and construction options.' Thus, the court reasoned that sufficient alternative avenues of communication were available to the respondents.'
B.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Baxter wrote a separate concurring opinion in an effort to
emphasize the procedural implications of the superior court's determinations.' Justice Baxter argued that the superior court did so only in considering the effects of adult businesses on surrounding neighborhoods.'
Thus, in Justice Baxter's opinion the ultimate finding of whether Chuck's
Bookstore did, in fact, constitute a common law public nuisance could
not be substantiated by the evidence. 7 Consequently, Justice Baxter disagreed with Justice Mosk's dissenting assertion that the disposition of
the case could be decided without constitutional considerations.'
C.

Concurring & Dissenting Opinion

Justice Mosk wrote an opinion concurring in the outcome but dissenting in substance with the majority.' Although Justice Mosk agreed that
the court of appeal's decision was properly reversed, he believed that the

the burden of showing that the statute is narrowly tailored and necessary to further
a substantial governmental interest as borne by the government).
The court also noted that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Renton
required that a statute be narrowly tailored to achieve the substantial governmental
interest in order to satisfy the first prong of the test. Wiener, 3 Cal. 4th at 841, 838
P.2d at 229, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707. Although the regulations must be narrowly tailored, the court stated that the most narrow and least restrictive method need not be
employed in order to satisfy such a requirement. Id.
31. Id. at 847, 838 P.2d at 233, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711.
32. Id. The court stated that "[wlhile a city may not suppress protected speech,
neither is it compelled to act as a broker or leasing agent for those engaged in the
sale of it." Id. at 848, 838 P.2d at 233, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711.
33. Id. at 847, 838 P.2d at 233, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 850-51, 838 P.2d at 235, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713 (Baxter, J., concurring).
See generally 9 B.E. WITIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 262 (3d ed. 1985).
36. Id. at 851, 838 P.2d at 235, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713 (Baxter, J., concurring).
37. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 851, 838 P.2d at 236, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714 (Baxter, J., concurring).
39. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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constitutional discussion by the majority was wholly unnecessary.4"
Along with the statutory claim, the city brought a common law public
nuisance claim against Chuck's Bookstore.4" Justice Mosk argued that
the evidence presented to the superior court was adequate for the court
to prohibit its operation solely on common law grounds of public nuisance.4
According to Justice Mosk, the majority's constitutional discussion
amounted to mere dicta.' Furthermore, he felt that if the appropriate
principles had been applied, the alternatives sanctioned by the majority
would fail to meet the required standard of reasonableness.' In the case
at hand, Justice Mosk viewed the city's ordinance as wholly unreason45
able for the respondents, and thus, contrary to the First Amendment.
III.

CONCLUSION

In City of National City v. Wiener, the California Supreme Court concluded that content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations did not
violate the First Amendment, when such ordinances served a substantial
governmental purpose and provided alternative avenues of communication.' Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court, the court
held that the operation of adult entertainment establishments can legally
be controlled
under the First Amendment through municipal zoning ordi47
nances.
The practical effect for adult entertainment establishments may be
higher rents and undesirable locations. In addition, sites recognized as
alternative forms of communication by the court may not prove to be

40. Id. at 855, 838 P.2d at 238, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
41. Id. at 853, 838 P.2d at 237, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
42. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). While the superior court, did not
make clear whether its holding was based on common law or statutory grounds, the
court of appeal chose only to deal with the statutory infirmities. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
43. Id. at 855, 838 P.2d at 238, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
44. Id. at 857, 838 P.2d at 239, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
45. Id. at 858, 838 P.2d at 241, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 719 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
46. Id. at 849, 838 P.2d at 241, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712.
47. Id.

economically viable for an individual entrepreneur. In some instances an
ordinance may effectively prohibit the establishment of such adult entertainment businesses by mere economic impact. However, a strict reading
of Wiener renders such ordinances constitutional as long as the ordinance facially allows for alternative avenues of communication and satisfies a substantial governmental purpose.'
KIMBERLY WOSICKI DAVIS

48. Id. at 847-49, 838 P.2d at 233-34, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711-12.
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IV.

CRIMINAL LAW
A. A county department of corrections'director may not bestow
limited peace officer status on custodial officers because such
action conflicts with the CaliforniaPenal Code and is not
authorized by the home rule provisions of the California
Constitution: County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriffs'
Association of Santa Clara County.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The home rule provisions of the California Constitution permit a county to make and enforce local ordinances and regulations which do not
conflict with state law.' However, if local action conflicts with state law,
the action is valid if it relates to a matter of strictly local concern.2 In
County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n of Santa Clara County,' the California Supreme Court considered whether the bestowal of
limited peace officer status on custodial officers by the Santa Clara
County Department of Correction ("the department") conflicted with

1. Article XI, § 7 of the California Constitution provides in part, "[a] county ...
may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." CAL CONST. art. XI, § 7; see 8
B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 799 (9th ed. 1988)
(discussing the home rule provisions of the California Constitution and examining the
principle that chartered counties, such as Santa Clara County, have exclusive authority over matters of local concern); David S. McLeod, The California Preemption Doctrine: Expanding the Regulatory Power of Local Governments, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 728,
728-29, 733-34, 750-51 (1974) (discussing the home rule provisions of the California
Constitution, examining the various tests used to determine whether local action is
preempted by state law, and suggesting methods for local entities to avoid preemption); 45 CAL. JuR. 3D Municipalities §§ 114-115 (1978) (providing background information regarding Constitutional limitations on state legislative control of counties).
2. County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n of Santa Clara County, 3 Cal.
4th 873, 878, 838 P.2d 781, 784, 13 Cal. Rpt.. 2d 53, 56 (1992) (citing Baggett v.
Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 136, 649 P.2d 874, 878, 185 236 (1982); Bishop v. City of San
Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 61-62, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1969)); see also
CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 4(f) (declaring that county charters must provide for "the prescribing and regulating by [county governing bodies] of the powers, duties, qualifications, and compensation" of county employees); 45 CAL. JUR. 3D Municipalities
§§ 67-69 (1978) (discussing the ability of counties to adopt, amend, and repeal charters).
3. 3 Cal. 4th 873, 838 P.2d 781, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (1992). Justice Mosk authored
the unanimous opinion of the court.

state law, and if so, whether such action was nevertheless valid because
it did not relate to a matter of statewide concern.' The court concluded
that the department's bestowal of peace officer status on its employees
conflicted with state law.' It held the department's action invalid reasoning that questions regarding whether or not government employees may
act as peace officers and whether they may carry firearms in the performance of their duties are clearly matters of statewide concern.'
The department is responsible for Santa Clara County's five jail facilities and employs both "peace officers," who are correction deputies authorized to carry firearms,' and "custodial officers," who are expressly
denied peace officer status and prohibited from carrying firearms.' The
department director proposed to grant custodial officers limited peace
officer status which would allow them to carry firearms in the performance of those duties thus requiring that the employee be armed.
Against opposition by the Deputy Sheriffs' Association of Santa Clara
County, Inc. ("DSA"), the county and the director sought a declaratory
judgment pronouncing the director's recommendation legal.'" The trial
court held that the department had an implied right to confer limited
peace officer status on department employees because the county had
transferred control of the county jail facilities from the sheriff to the
*department thereby removing the sheriffs responsibility to provide the
county jails with peace officers." The trial court further declared that
custodial officers could replace peace officers at the county jails provid-

4. Id. at 876, 838 P.2d at 782, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54.
5. Id. at 883, 838 P.2d at, 787, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 59.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 876-77, 838 P.2d at 782, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54. California Penal Code
§ 830.1 provides in relevant part that "[a]ny sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff,
employed in that capacity . . .is a peace officer." CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1(a) (West
1985 & Supp. 1993).
8. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 877, 838 P.2d at 782-83, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 54-55. Penal Code § 831 provides in relevant part that "[a] custodial officer is a
public officer, not a peace officer," and "shall have no right to carry or possess
firearms in the performance of [his or her] prescribed duties." CAL PENAL CODE
§ 831(a), (b) (West 1985).
9. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 877, 838 P.2d at 783, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
55. The director's suggestion to arm certa,in custodial officers was in response to a
decrease in the number of peace office - at the county jails, resulting in a total
number of peace officers below that required by state law. Id. The decline was
caused by peace officers exercising their contractual options to transfer to the
sheriffs department as vacancies arose. 1M.
10. Id. at 877-78, 838 P.2d at 783, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55.
11. Id. at 878, 838 P.2d at 783, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55; see CAL Gov'T CODE
§ 23013 (West 1988) (providing for the establishment of a county department of
corrections and the appointment of a department head to supersede the sheriffs
jurisdiction over county jail facilities).
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ed that the custodial officers complied with state law firearm training
requirements. 2 The department director department subsequently granted limited peace officer status to qualified custodial officers while the
DSA appealed the trial court's judgment.' 3 The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's ruling, with the California Supreme Court reversing
here. '

II.

TREATMENT

The court's first level of inquiry was whether the department's bestowal of limited peace officer status on custodial officers conflicted with
state law. 5 The court examined the legislature's intent in enacting Penal
Code chapter 4.5."1 It concluded that the legislature made its intent clear
in Penal Code section 830 when it declared that only persons designated
in chapter 4.5 are peace officers.' 7 The court further acknowledged that
Penal Code section 831 expressly denies custodial officers both peace
officer status and the authority to carry firearms. 8 In addition, the court
noted that Penal Code section 831.5 contains an exception to section 831
that allows custodial officers to carry firearms in the performance of
certain duties, but only in certain counties and under the direction of the

12. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 878, 838 P.2d at 783, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
55.
13. Id. at 878, 838 P.2d at 783-84, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55-56. The duties that the director of the Department assigned to armed custodial officers were:
(1) transporting and supervising inmates outside correctional facilities; (2)
carrying out duties relating to facility entry and perimeter and internal security; (3) investigating crimes and pursuing escapees; (4) responding to emergency situations declared by the director or his designees; (5) operating emergency vehicles to carry out the functions described above; and (6) temporarily substituting for correction deputies on sick leave, vacation or other relief
time.
Id. at 878 n.6, 838 P.2d at 784 n.6, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56 n.6.
14. Id. at 878, 838 P.2d at 784, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56.
15. Id. at 879-83, 838 P.2d 784-87, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56-59. See generally 8 B.E.

Constitutional Law § 794 (9th ed. 1988) (examining the various tests applied by the courts to determine whether local action conflicts with state law).
16. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 879, 838 P.2d at 784, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
56.
17. Id. at 880, 838 P.2d at 785, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 57; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 830
(West 1985) (defining who may be a peace officer).
18. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 880, 838 P.2d at 785, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
57; see supra note 8. and accompanying text.
WrIIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,

sheriff or the chief of police."9 The court found that Santa Clara County
did not fall within this exception and, even if it did, the department's
action still conflicted with the statute because the county assigned duties
not found in the exception to armed custodial officers, and neither the
sheriff nor the chief of police supervised the custodial officers in Santa
Clara County.' Finally, the court recognized that recent amendments to
the Penal Code provide a procedure by which a county can request that
the legislature grant peace officer status to persons not found in the
peace officer provisions of the Penal Code.2 The court explained that
the statutory procedure impliedly prohibits the county from independently granting peace officer status to its employees.22 Taking all of the foregoing Penal Code provisions into account, the court concluded that the
legislature intended Penal Code chapter 4.5 to be the exclusive source of
peace officer status and, therefore, the department's autonomous grant
of peace officer status to custodial employees clearly conflicted with
state law.'
The court began its second level of inquiry by stating that if the designation and qualifications of peace officers are matters of local concern,
then despite conflicting state law, the department's action would nevertheless be valid." The court further expressed that in matters of statewide concern, county charter provisions must be consistent with state
law in order to be valid.' The court found that the duties which the

19. Deputy Sheriffs' Assn, 3 Cal. 4th at 880-81 & n.9, 838 P.2d at 785 & n.9, 13
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 57 & n.9; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 831.5(a), (b) (West Supp. 1993)
(excepting custodial officers in San Diego County, Fresno County, and counties with
populations of 425,000 or less from the prohibition against carrying firearms while
transporting prisoners, guarding hospitalized prisoners, suppressing jail riots, lynchings
and escapes, or performing rescues in or around a jail facility, and only under the
supervision of the sheriff or chief of police).
20. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 880-81, 838 P.2d at 785, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 57. Cf. supra text accompanying note 12.
21. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 881, 838 P.2d at 786, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
58; see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13540-13542 (West 1992) (providing a procedure for the
county to request that a feasibility study be undertaken by the Commission on Peace
Officer Standards and Training and further providing that the results be submitted to
the legislature in order to designate persons not found in chapter 4.5 as peace officers).
22. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 881, 838 P.2d at 785, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
57.
23. Id. at 879, 838 P.2d at 784, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56.
24. Id. at 883, 838 P.2d at 787, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 59. See generally 8 B.E. WITIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 800-802 (9th ed. 1988) (stating
that no test has emerged from case law to determine whether a matter is one of
statewide or local concern, and further expressing that the legislative purpose is not
determinative of statewide concern, whereas the purpose of the local regulation may
be determinative of local concern).
25. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 883, 838 P.2d at 787, .13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
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armed custodial officers would perform if granted limited peace officer
status would impact the public at large.26 Accordingly, the court concluded that the designation and qualifications of peace officers are clearly matters of statewide concern.27 Thus, the court held that the county's
grant of peace officer status to custodial officers was invalid because it
conflicted with state law and the matter was one of statewide concern.'
III.

CONCLUSION

In County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n of Santa Clara
County, the California Supreme Court determined that the director of the
Santa Clara County Department of Correction could not bestow limited
peace officer status on department employees because the director's
action conflicted with state law in an area of statewide concern. The
county wanted a ruling that would allow it to operate the prison system
without having to depend on the sheriffs department to supply the county with correction deputies to serve as peace officers in the jail facilities.' However, the court's ruling makes it clear that only the state may
confer peace officer status on state, city, and county employees.' Further litigation may follow if the sheriff refuses to assign deputized officers to the department, as it is unclear whether the department director
can order the sheriff to do so." Alternatively, the department may re-

59.
26. Id. at 883, 838 P.2d at 787, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 59.
27. Id. The court placed great weight on the duties that would be performed by
the armed custodial officers. Id. at 883-84, 838 P.2d at 787, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 59;
see supra note 13. Because the custodial officers would have a significant impact on
the public when "pursuing escapees, transporting prisoners, operating emergency vehicles, and acting as substitute for correction deputies who are absent," the court
concluded that the state has an important interest in designating who may perform
such duties. Id.
28. Id. at 886, 838 P.2d at 789, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61.
29. See Mark Walsh, Jail Official Can't Make Peace Officers, THE RECORDER, Nov.
3, 1992, at 6. The cost of operating jail facilities would dramatically decrease if
counties were permitted to confer peace officer status on their own employees.
Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 886 n.13, 838 P.2d at 789 n.13, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 61 n.13.
30. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 886, 838 P.2d at 789, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

61.
31. Id. at 885-86, 838 P.2d at 789, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61. The court also stated
that there is uncertainty as to which agency, the sheriff or the department, would
bear the employment cost of the corrections deputies if they were assigned by the
sheriff, and further uncertainty exists as to which agency would be responsible for

quest the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training to undertake a feasibility study to determine whether department employees may
be designated as peace officers.' The feasibility study would then be
submitted to the legislature for the ultimate determination of whether to
grant peace officer status to department employees.3
MICHAEL EMMET MURPHY

overseeing those correction deputies. Id.
32. Id. at 881 & n.10, 838 P.2d at 786 & n.10, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 58 & n.10. This
course of action would result in the Commission making its recommendation to the
legislature within a period of 18 months. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13542 (West 1992);
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 3 Cal. 4th at 881, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 58, 838 P.2d at
786.
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B. A trial court retainsjurisdictionto impose a more favorable
sentence on a defendant from when the sentence is formally
entered in the court record up until commencement of the
execution of the sentence: People v. Karaman.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Karaman,' the California Supreme Court addressed
whether a trial court retains jurisdiction to grant a defendant a more
favorable sentence after the initial sentencing has occurred and a stay of
execution has been granted.2 The California Supreme Court held that the

1. 4 Cal. 4th 335, 842 P.2d 100, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801 (1992). Justice George
authored the majority opinion.
2. Id. at 345, 842 P.2d at 106, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807.
The defendant, Nabil Karaman, an immigrant from Israel who came to this country in 1965, owned and operated, unsuccessfully, several different businesses. Just
prior to his arrest, the defendant failed to meet the payroll obligations of his latest
venture. In order to meet his financial obligations, he robbed an Alpha Beta grocery
store on December 7, 1989. Carrying an unloaded handgun, the defendant entered the
grocery store and approached the store manager. He instructed the manager to go
into the office and empty the safe. Another employee witnessed the exchange and
was also shown the handgun. After obtaining less than $950 in cash from the safe,
the defendant disabled the office telephone and left the store.
Once in the parking lot, the defendant was unable to locate his company vehicle
even though it bore the company name on the side. The police apprehended the
defendant walking in the opposite direction of his vehicle. The police conducted a
curbside lineup in which the defendant was identified by witnesses. Upon seeing the
manager of the store, the defendant requested that the police to express his apologies for what had occurred.
The defendant was subsequently charged with robbery, and upon a plea of not
guilty, an enhancement was added for the use of a firearm. A second enhancement
was added to the information for the infliction of great bodily injury to the store
manager.
The parties reached a plea bargain agreement which provided that the allegation
of great bodily injury would be dropped in exchange for the defendant's plea of
guilty to the charges of robbery and personal use of a firearm. In addition, the plea
agreement provided that the prosecutor would request a relatively light sentence (two
years) for the robbery charge. The trial court accepted the agreement and, upon the
recommendation of a probation officer, imposed consecutive sentences of two years
for the robbery and an additional two years for the use of a firearm.
The trial court granted a seven day stay of execution of the sentence to allow
the defendant to put his affairs in order. At the conclusion of the stay of execution,
another hearing was held in which the trial court modified the sentence to a single
two year term for the robbery charge. The district attorney appealed, stating that the
trial court had relinquished jurisdiction over the defendant, and the court of appeal

trial court retains jurisdiction until execution of the sentence.3 Thus, a
lesser sentence may be imposed by a trial court even after entry of the
sentence in a court record.'
II. ANALYSIS
The court first considered the common law rule which provides that
subsequent to the commencement of a sentence, a trial court relinquish-

es its jurisdiction over the defendant.' The court explained that in a
criminal case, execution of the sentence begins when a certified copy of
the order or judgment is provided to the officer responsible for its execution.6 In the case at bar, the court further considered whether jurisdiction was relinquished when the clerk of the court entered the sentence in

the record.7
The court distinguished prior decisions holding that the trial court
lacks jurisdiction to modify any sentence imposed once the judgment has
been entered in the court record.' In contrast to previous cases in which

reversed the trial court's decision to modify the sentence.
3. Id. at 350, 842 P.2d at 110, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 344, 842 P.2d at 105, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806. The court further stated
that if "the trial court 'retains in itself the actual or constructive custody of the
defendant and the execution of his sentence has not begun,' the court may" alter the
sentence initially imposed. Id. (quoting In re Black, 66 Cal. 2d 881, 888, 428 P.2d
293, 298, 59 Cal. Rptr. 429, 433 (1967)); see also 6 B.E. WTKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Judgment and Attack in Trial Court § 3131 (2d ed. 1989).
Section 12022.5(a) of the California Penal Code states in relevant part:
[A]ny person who personally uses a firearm in the commission or attempted
commission of a felony shall, upon conviction of such felony or attempted
felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the
felony or attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be punished by an additional term of imprisonment in the state prison for three,
four, or five years, unless use of a firearm is an element of the offense of
which he or she was convicted. The court shall order imposition of the midde term unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. The
court shall state its reasons for its enhancement choice on the record at the
time of sentencing.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5(a) (West 1992).
6. Karaman, 4 Cal. 4th at 345, 842 P.2d at 106, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807. The
court specifically stated "[ilt is clear then that at least upon the receipt of the abstract of the judgment by the sheriff, the execution of the judgment is in progress."
Id. (quoting In re Black, 66 Cal. 2d 881, 890, 428 P.2d 293, 298, 59 Cal. Rptr. 429,
434 (1967)); see also 6 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW,
Judgment and Attack in Trial Court § 3115 (2d ed. 1989).
7. Karaman, 4 Cal. 4th at 345, 842 P.2d at 106, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807. See
generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3674-3683 (1985) (preparation, certification, and filing of the record).
8. Karaman, Cal. Rptr. 4th at 347-50, 842 P.2d at 107-11, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
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the trial court attempted to increase the severity of the original sentence,
the court here sought to impose a more favorable sentence.' The court
held that where the trial court seeks to modify a sentence in a manner
favorable to the defendant, the trial court retains jurisdiction until execution of the sentence. 0
The court reasoned that a trial court retains jurisdiction to impose a
lesser sentence after the initial sentence is entered in the record on the
grounds that: (1) the desire to provide finality to criminal proceedings is
still satisfied;" (2) forbidding the trial court from exercising jurisdiction
based on the actions of the clerk of the court would have inequitable
results should the clerk not perform his or her duties; 2 and (3) denying
the trial court jurisdiction to mitigate a sentence would not further the
legislature's intent that the trial court retain the ability to resentence a
defendant for any rational reason.'3
III.

CONCLUSION

In granting the trial court discretion to modify a sentence in favor of
the defendant, even after the sentence is entered in the record, the California Supreme Court has afforded a unique opportunity to a defendant
who is granted a stay of execution to achieve the most favorable sen-

808-12. See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3407-3410 (1985) (mitigating
factors, multiple counts, and enhancements); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3516
(1985)

(urisdiction

to modify or correct an erroneous sentence); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D

Criminal Law §§ 3674-3683 (1985) (modification of the judgment); 21 AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law §§ 1-631 (1981).
9. Karaman, 4 Cal. 4th at 350, 842 P.2d at 110, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811.
10. Id. The court qualified its holding by stating that a modification to increase a
sentence would not be permitted by the trial court after entry of the sentence in the
minutes of the court record. Id. at 350 n.16, 842 P.2d at 110 n.16, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
811 n.16.
11. Id. at 350-51, 842 P.2d at 110, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811.
12. Id. at 351, 842 P.2d at 110, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811.
13. Id. at 351, 842 P.2d at 110-11, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811-12.
Section 1170(d) of the California Penal Code states in relevant part:
When a defendant ...

has been sentenced to be imprisoned in the state

prison and has been committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections,
the court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion . . . recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he or she had not previously
been sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the
initial sentence.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (West Supp. 1993).

tence possible in his or her situation.'4 This provides the defendant's
attorney with the opportunity to seek out any relevant provisions in the
California Penal Code which the trial judge may not have given full consideration or due deference during the initial sentencing hearing. Moreover, this provides the trial court with the discretion to reexamine the
relevant provisions and award a lesser sentence on its own motion. 5
KIMBERLY WOsICKI DAVIS

14. Karaman, 4 Cal. 4th at 350, 842 P.2d at 110, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811.
15. Id.
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C. A defendant's right to a public trial is not violated by locking
the courtroom doors and posting a "do not enter" sign for
ninety minutes: People v. Woodward.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Woodward,' the California Supreme Court considered
whether the right to a public trial2 was violated when a criminal court
locked its doors and posted a "do not enter" sign for ninety minutes.3
The supreme court held that the temporary closure did not infringe upon
the defendant's right to a public trial.'

1. 4 Cal. 4th 376, 841 P.2d 954, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434 (1992). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and
George concurred. Justice Mosk wrote separately concurring in the judgment.
In Woodward, the trial court locked the courtroom doors and posted a "do not
enter" sign for about ninety minutes while the prosecuting attorney delivered his
closing argument. The courtroom observers who were present were not required to
leave and others could enter during designated recesses or through the judge's chambers. The court did not notify the defendant before sealing the courtroom. Afterward,
the court stated that the reasons for the temporary closure were to eliminate distractions during closing arguments and for security purposes. Id. at 380, 841 P.2d at 955,
14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435. The jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder
and other charges and enhancements. Id. at 379-80, 841 P.2d at 955, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 435. On appeal, he argued that the temporary closure was an infringement on his
right to a public trial. Id. at 380, 841 P.2d at 955, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435. The court
of appeal agreed with the defendant and overturned the conviction. Id. This court
reversed. Id.
2. The right to public trial is based upon the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, as well as article I, § 15 of the California Constitution. Woodward, 4 Cal. 4th at 382, 841 P.2d at 956, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 436. The right
to a public trial requires that criminal proceedings be open to members of the public.
Id. at 383, 841 P.2d at 957, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437 (citation omitted). See generally 2
B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts § 61 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1992); 19 CAL
JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2077 (1984 & Supp. 1992); 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
§ 666 (1981 & Supp. 1992) (discussing the right to a public trial and its use in criminal proceedings).
3. Woodward, 4 Cal. 4th at 379, 841 P.2d at 955, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435.
4. Id. at 386, 841 P.2d at 960, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440. See 5 B.E. WITKIN &
NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial § 2616 (2d ed. 1989)(discussing a
defendant's right to a public trial and whether a defendant has been denied that

right).

II. ANALYSIS
The court reasoned that closing the courtroom for a short period of
time did not violate the defendant's right to public trial because: (1) the
defendant's right to public trial was only partially and temporarily affected;5 (2) the trial court was attempting to avoid interruptions and minimize distractions, as well as maintain security and orderly proceedings;'
and (3) the trial court's failure to notify the defendant, although improper, was harmless error.'
Ill.

CONCLUSION

In Woodward, the court held that a temporary denial to spectators of
access to the courtroom was not a denial of the right to public trial.8
The court warned that in future cases, the trial court should explain the
reasons for closing the courtroom and permit the defendant to object.'
The court limited its holding to cases in where the infringement occurred

5. Woodward, 4 Cal. 4th at 384-85, 841 P.2d at 958, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438. The
court explained that the circumstances of this case did not violate the defendant's
right to a public trial because the persons in the courtroom were not required to
leave and the courtroom was sealed for only ninety minutes. Id. at 385-86, 841 P.2d
at 959, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439. In addition, the closure occurred only during the
prosecutor's closing argument and did not occur during any part of the evidentiary
phase of the trial. Id.
6. Id. at 385, 841 P.2d at 958-59, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39 (citing People v. Buck,
46 Cal. App. 2d 558, 116 P.2d 160 (1941) (holding that a defendant's right to a public
trial is not denied when persons are forbidden to enter and leave the courtroom during jury instructions)). The court also noted that courts have been justified in denying admittance to spectators to prevent overcrowding. Id. at 385, 841 P.2d at 959, 14
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 (citing People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 P. 153 (1894)). See
Roy H. Mann, Note, Constitutional Law--Sixth Amendment-Right to Public Trial,
23 S. CAL L. REV. 91 (1949) (considering the nature of the Sixth Amendment right
and its compatibility with a court's interest in orderly progress).
Justice Mosk, concurring in the judgment, noted that the trial court's statement
about "court security" was made a day after it agreed to remove the sign. Woodward,
4 Cal. 4th at 387-88, 841 P.2d at 960, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Thus, he believed that the security risks were an afterthought and that the court
could have used other methods of preventing interruptions. Id. at 388, 841 P.2d at
961, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441 (Mosk, J., concurring).
7. Woodward, 4 Cal. 4th at 386-87, 841 P.2d at 960, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440. The
court held that even though lack of notice denied the defendant due process, such
was harmless error. Id. Therefore, the defendant was required to prove specific
prejudice. Id. The court concluded that the error did not affect the jury's determination and the failure to give notice was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
387, 841 P.2d at 960, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440. Therefore, the holding of the appellate
court was reversed. Id.
8. Id. at 386, 841 P.2d at 960, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440.
9. Id.
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at less critical stages of the proceedings and where a valid reason for the
infringement existed. It is important to note, however, that the court
remained firm in upholding the defendant's right to a public trial.
KIMBERLY J. HERMAN

V.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A.

Section 1054.3 of the CaliforniaPenal Code mandates
disclosure of the name and address of any potential defense
trial witness, provided the defense has knowledge of, or
reasonable access to, such information;failure to comply
with a court order to produce such information may result
in a contempt citation,pursuant to CaliforniaPenal Code
section 1054.5(b): In re Littlefield.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In re Littlefield' addressed whether Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act,"2 requires defense counsel to disclose to the
prosecution the names and addresses of potential trial witnesses when
the defense has access to, but not actual knowledge of, such information.3 The court granted review in Littlefield to clarify the. scope of a defense attorney's obligations under the reciprocal discovery provisions of

1. 5 Cal. 4th 122, 851 P.2d 42, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (1993). Justice George delivered the majority opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, and Baxter concurred. Justice Mosk filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 140, 851 P.2d at 54, 19 Cal. Rptr 2d at 260
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Proposition 115 was enacted into law by voter initiative in June 1990. Section
5 of the act amended the California Constitution by adding § 30(c) to article I, which
provides that "discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature." CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 30(c). See generally Deborah Glynn, Proposition 115: The Crime Victims
Justice Reform Act, 22 PAC. L.J. 1010 (1991) (comprehensively reviewing Proposition
115 and its scope); Thomas Havlena, Proposition 115 and the Rebirth of Prosecutorial Discovery in California, 18 W. ST. L. REV. 3 (1990) (analyzing the history of
prosecutorial discovery and the constitutionality of Proposition 115); 2 B.E. WITIaN,
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Discovery and Production of Evidence § 1678A (3d ed. Supp.
1993) (reiterating nature and purpose of Crime Victims Justice Reform Act); 1 B.E.
WITuIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Introduction to Crimes
§ 10A (2d ed. Supp. 1993) (discussing adoption of Proposition 115).
3. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 125, 851 P.2d at 44, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250. The
prosecution requested that the defense disclose the address of a potential witness.
The public defender's office, however, had deliberately failed to obtain such information, for fear that the witness would be intimidated by the police department or
district attorney's office. In order to provide the prosecution with an opportunity to
interview the witness prior to trial, the trial court ordered the defense to contact the
witness and obtain her address. Nevertheless, the petitioner explicitly refused to
comply with the discovery order. As a result, the trial court held the petitioner in
contempt. The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, but the court of appeal
denied the writ. In re Littlefield, 9 Cal. App. 4th 329, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (1992).
Subsequently, the supreme court granted review. In re Littlefield, 839 P.2d 1019, 13
Cal. Rptr. 2d 511 (1992).
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Proposition 115,' as codified by California Penal Code section 1054.3. s
Additionally, the court examined whether failure to comply with a court
order enforcing such a6 disclosure requirement may properly result in a
sanction for contempt.
In resolving these issues, the court held that Penal Code section 1054.3
requires the defense to disclose the names and addresses of all potential
trial witnesses when the defense has knowledge of such information or
such information remains "reasonably accessible."' Furthermore, failure
to comply with a court order enforcing the reciprocal discovery requirements constitutes direct contempt, punishable under Penal Code section
1054.5(b).8 An appropriate finding of contempt must, however, recite
"facts with sufficient particularity" that demonstrate the attorney's failure
to comply.' Otherwise, the judgment of contempt will fall to satisfy the

4. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 129, 851 P.2d at 46-47, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252-53. See
generally 5 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial
§ 2498A (2d ed. Supp. 1993) (discussing reciprocal discovery provisions established by
adoption of Proposition 115); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2858 (Supp. 1993)
(discussing limitations of prosecutorial discovery following the enactment of CAL
CONST. art. I, § 30).
5. Section 1054.3 provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he defendant and his or her attorney shall disclose to the prosecuting attorney . .. [tihe names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, he or she intends to call as witnesses at trial." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1054.3 (West Supp. 1993). See generally 2 B.E. WITIN, CALIFORNIA EvIDENCE, Discovery and Production of Evidence § 1678C (3d ed. Supp. 1993) (denoting
information subject to discovery by prosecution following enactment of § 1054.3); 5
B.E. WrrnUN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial § 2498F (2d ed.
Supp. 1993) (delineating defense disclosure obligations under § 1054.3).
6. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 137-39, 851 P.2d at 52-54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258-60.
7. Id. at 135-36, 851 P.2d at 51, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257.
8. Id. at 137, 851 P.2d at 52, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258. Section 1054.5(b) provides
in pertinent part:
Upon a showing that a party has not complied with Section 1054.1 or 1054.3
and upon a showing that the moving party complied with the informal discovery provisions provided in this subdivision, a court may make any order
necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter, including, but not limited
to, immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings . . . or any other lawful order.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5(b) (West Supp. 1993).
9. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 138, 851 P.2d at 53, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 (quoting
In re Buckley, 10 Cal. 3d. 237, 247, 514 P.2d 1201, 1207, 110 Cal. Rptr. 121, 127
(1973) (confirming criteria for valid contempt order)).

criteria of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1211,0 and as a
result, be reversed on appeal.'

II. TREATMENT
A.

Majority Opinion
1.

Reciprocal Discovery Requirements of Proposition 115

To determine the scope of prosecutorial discovery authorized by section 1054.3, the court examined the voters' intentions behind Proposition
115.2 The court recognized that, as expressly asserted in Penal Code
section 1054(a), adoption of the initiative was intended "'[t]O promote the
ascertainment of truth in [criminal] trials by requiring timely pre-trial
discovery.'"" Furthermore, the court maintained that the specific objectives behind section 1054.3 included affording the prosecution an opportunity to properly investigate potential defense witnesses. 4 In other

10. Section 1211 provides, in pertinent part:
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court, or of the judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily; for which
an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate
view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby
guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as therein prescribed.
CAL.CIV. PROC. CODE § 1211 (West 1982) (emphasis added).
11. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 139, 851 P.2d at 54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260.
12. Id. at 130, 851 P.2d at 48, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254. The preamble to Proposition 115 states:
We the people of the State of California hereby find that the rights of crime
victims are too often ignored by our courts and our State Legislature...
and that comprehensive reforms are needed in order to restore balance and
fairness to our criminal justice system . . . In order to address these concerns and to accomplish these goals, we the people further find that it is
necessary to reform the law as developed in numerous California Supreme
Court decisions and as set forth in the statutes of this state. These decisions
and statues have unnecessarily expanded the rights of accused criminals far
beyond that which is required by the United States Constitution, thereby ...
diverting the judicial process from its function as a quest for truth.
Proposition 115 § l(a)-(b) (1990), reprinted in CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.1 (Deering Supp.
1993).
13. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 130, 851 P.2d at 48, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254 (citing
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054(a) (West Supp. 1993)). See generally 5 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial § 2498C (2d ed. Supp. 1993) (asserting purposes of Proposition 115 as codified by California Penal Code § 1054).
14. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 131, 851 P.2d at 48, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254 (citing
Hobbs v. Municipal Court, 233 Cal. App. 3d 670, 685-86, 284 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664-65
(1991) (holding that reciprocal discovery provisions do not violate a criminal
defendant's right against self-incrimination)).
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words, sections 1054.1 and 1054.3 create reciprocal discovery duties between the prosecution and defense. 5
As a result, the court held that mere disclosure of a potential witness'
name, without divulging information regarding where the individual could
be contacted, fails to satisfy the reciprocal discovery objectives of Proposition 115.1" The court reasoned, consistent with precedent regarding the
discovery obligations of the prosecution, that a duty to disclose information within counsel's knowledge includes an obligation to provide "information 'reasonably accessible"' to the attorney."7 To this extent, a defense attorney cannot attempt to elude reciprocal discovery obligations
by deliberately refraining from discovering a potential witness' address. 8
Therefore, the court concluded that sections 1054.3 and 1054.5 enable
the trial court to compel defense counsel to contact a potential witness,
and acquire that individual's address, in order to provide such information to the prosecution." Thus, defense counsel's refusal to obey the
court order constitutes direct contempt, punishable under section
1054.5(b).2.

Procedural Requirements of Valid Contempt Judgment

Although the court acknowledged that refusal to obey a discovery
order may result in a contempt sanction, the court nevertheless set aside
the trial court's judgment of contempt for failure to comply with the requirements of section 1211 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.2'

15. Id. at 133-34, 851 P.2d at 50, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256 (citing Izazaga v. Superior
Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 372-77, 815 P.2d 304, 315-18, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231, 24245 (1991)
(confirming constitutionality of reciprocal discovery provisions established by Proposition 115)). See generally Andrea L. Wilson, California Supreme Court Survey, 20
PEPP. L. REV. 308 (1992) (analyzing Izazaga's holding and impact of decision); Steve
Holden, Note, Izazaga v. Superior Court: Affirming the Public's Cry to Unshackle
the Criminal Prosecution System, 23 PAC. L.J. 1721 (1992).
16. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 132, 851 P.2d at 49, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255 (citing
Eleazer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847, 851-53, 464 P.2d 42, 4446, 83 Cal. Rptr. 586,
588-90 (1970) (outlining prosecutorial discovery duties in regard to potential trial
witnesses)).
17. Id. at 135, 851 P.2d at 51, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257 (citing Pitchess v. Superior
Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 522 P.2d 305, 308, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1974) (establishing extent of prosecutorial discovery obligations)).
18. Id. at 132-33, 851 P.2d at 49, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255.
19. Id. at 137, 851 P.2d at 52, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 137, 851 P.2d at 52, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258. See supra note 10.

The court reasoned that under section 1211, a contempt order must "recite[] facts with sufficient particularity to demonstrate ... that
petitioner's conduct constituted legal contempt."'
While the appellate record indicated that the petitioner refused to obey
a court discovery order issued at a hearing on June 20, 1991, the written
judgment of contempt referred only to a discovery order issued on June
17, 1991. In other words, the contempt order failed to "state on its face
the specific act constituting the contempt. " ' Thus, the court declared
the judgment of contempt invalid, setting aside the petitioner's sanction.24
B.

Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment to set aside the facially defective contempt order.' He disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that section 1054.3 authorized the trial court to compel disclosure
of a potential defense witness' address.26 In fact, Mosk asserted that
such an order would violate the criminal defendant's right against selfincrimination.27 Specifically, Mosk argued that the criminal defendant
retains a constitutional privilege to stand silent "at every stage of the
proceeding against him"' even though the court had rejected this same
contention in the Izazaga decision.' Consequently, Mosk simply reiterated his Izazaga dissenting opinion.'

22. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 138, 851 P.2d at 53, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 (quoting
In re Buckley, 10 Cal. 3d 237, 247, 514 P.2d 1201, 1207, 110 Cal. Rptr. 121, 127
(1973) (confirming criteria for valid contempt order)).
23. Id. at 138-39 n.10, 851 P.2d at 53-54 n.10, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259-60 n.10.
24. Id. at 139, 851 P.2d at 54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260.
25. Id. at 140, 851 P.2d at 54, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
26. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
27. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15).
28. Id. at 141, 851 P.2d at 55, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 69, 372 P.2d 919, 927, 22
Cal. Rptr. 879, 887 (1962) (Dooling, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing against
reciprocal discovery in criminal cases on constitutional grounds)).
29. Id. at 141, 851 P.2d at 55, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting). See Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 369, 815 P.2d at 312, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
See also supra, note 15. See generally 5 B.E. WITION & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial § 2498B .(2d ed. Supp. 1993) (addressing case precedent
regarding constitutionality of reciprocal discovery in criminal cases).
30. Littlefield, 5 Cal. 4th at 141, 851 P.2d at 55, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting). See Izazaga, 54 Cal. 3d at 387-402, 815 P.2d at 325-35;
285 Cal. Rptr. at 252-62 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See also supra note 15.
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III.

CONCLUSION

Following the precedent established in Izazaga, the majority opinion
in Littlefield further defines the reciprocal discovery measures of Proposition 115. The decision curtails the overprotection previously afforded to
the criminally accused, in favor of methods designed to provide "balance
and fairness"" in the criminal justice system. Thus, section 1054.3 functions to advance a primary objective of the judicial process: "the quest
for truth." '
MICHAEL ALDEN MILLER

31.
Supp.
32.
Supp.

Proposition 115 § l(a) (1990), reprinted in CAL CONsT. art. I, § 14.1 (Deering
1993). See supra note 12.
Proposition 115 § 1(b) (1990), reprinted in CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.1 (Deering
1993). See supra note 12.

B.

When the prosecution has presented the jury with alternative
theories of guilt, one of which lacked factual support, an appellate court should affirm the criminal conviction, absent
positive evidence in the record that the jury's general verdict
rested upon an insufficient ground: People v. Guiton.

In People v. Guiton,' the California Supreme Court determined whether a conviction obtained by a general jury verdict should be reversed
when the prosecution has presented to the jury alternative theories of
guilt, one of which was not factually supported! The court granted review in Guiton to reconcile the apparent discrepancy existing between
the California Supreme Court decision of People v. Green3 and the recent
United States Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. United States.'

1. 4 Cal. 4th 1116, 847 P.2d 45, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365 (1993). Justice Arabian delivered the majority opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Panelli, Kennard, Baxter, and George concurred. Justice Mosk filed a separate, concurring opinion.
2. Id. at 1119, 847 P.2d at 46, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. The defendant was
charged on two counts: (1) selling or transporting cocaine, in violation of § 11352 of
the California Health and Safety Code; and (2) possession of cocaine for sale, in
violation of § 11351 of the California Health and Safety Code. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 11351, 11352 (West 1991) (emphasis added). The prosecution presented the jury with both alternative elements of count one. Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th at 1120,
847 P.2d at 46, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. Although the prosecution clearly established
proof that the defendant transported cocaine, it failed to submit adequate factual
evidence that the defendant sold cocaine. Id. Nevertheless, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty on both counts one and two. Id.
The court of appeal affirmed the conviction under count two, but reversed the
conviction under count one. Id. at 1120, 847 P.2d at 46, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. The
court of appeal reasoned that the record did not clearly indicate which basis the jury
utilized in reaching its verdict under the first count. Id. Given that the prosecution
failed to present factual evidence in support of one alternative, the court of appeal
reversed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 1120, 847 P.2d at 47, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
367. In supporting its decision, the court of appeal relied on* the rule asserted in
People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980). Subsequently,
the supreme court granted review. People v. Guiton, 832 P.2d 146, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d
834.
3. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980) (holding that "[w]hen the
prosecution presents its case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are
legally correct and others legally incorrect, and the reviewing court cannot determine
from the record on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested, the
conviction cannot stand"). See generally 6 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Appeal § 3205 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the constitutional
standard for sufficiency of the evidence as recognized by California); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law §§ 3761, 3773 n.64 (1985) (discussing sufficiency of the evidence
warranting appellate review, and "miscarriage[s] of justice" requiring reversal of
conviction).
4. 112 S. Ct. 466 (1991) (holding that a general verdict in a criminal case should
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Harmonizing the two rules, the court held that a general jury verdict
should not be reversed, despite insufficient factual evidence to support
one alternative theory, without an affirmative showing that the jury
reached the verdict on the inadequate ground.6
In reconciling the conflicting state and federal rulings, the court individually addressed the standards adopted by both the California' and
United States Supreme Courts,7 respectively. On careful examination, the
court concluded that the rules did not contradict one another, but instead applied to separate circumstances." As a result, the court asserted

not be reversed on error, when alternative theories of guilt are presented, provided
that one of the theories introduced remains factually sufficient). See generally 6 B.E.
WIrKIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Appeal

§

3205 (2d ed. Supp.

1993) (discussing constitutional standard for sufficiency of the evidence); 16C C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 1037 n.44.5 (Supp. 1993) (addressing constitutional analysis of
convictions secured by presentation of multiple theories); 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal
Law § 783 (1981) (examining due process implications of insufficiency of the evidence).
5. Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th at 1129, 847 P.2d at 52, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
6. Id. at 1121-22, 847 P.2d at 47-48, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367-68 (citing Green, 27
Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1). In Green, the prosecution presented the
jury with three alternative examples of asportation upon which a conviction of kidnapping could be reached. Green, 27 Cal. 3d at 62-63, 609 P.2d at 506, 164 Cal. Rptr.
at 39. However, upon review, the California Supreme Court determined that two of
the three theories involved legal error. Id. at 67, 609 P.2d at 509, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
42. The court reasoned that, on the facts presented, the jury could have logically
reached a guilty verdict by means of a legally insufficient theory. Id. Absent any
evidence in the record as to which alternative the jury utilized, the court reversed
the defendant's conviction on the kidnapping charge. Id. at 74, 609 P.2d at 514, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 47.
7. Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th at 1122-26, 847 P.2d at 48-50, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368-70
(citing Griffin, 112 S. Ct. 466). In Griffin, the prosecution made two allegations in
support of a charge of conspiracy: "(1) impairing the efforts of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to ascertain income taxes; and (2) impairing the efforts of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to ascertain forfeitable assets." Griffin, 112 S. Ct. at 468.
Evidence presented at trial implicated the defendant in the first objective of the
conspiracy. Id. However, after anticipated testimony from one government witness
failed to materialize, the evidence remained factually insufficient to connect the defendant with the second objective. Id. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that juries
remain "well equipped to analyze the evidence," and dismiss factually insufficient
theories. Id. at 474 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968) (reaffirming
the Court's faith in the jury's ability to properly determine questions of fact in
criminal cases)). As a result, the Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, absent
any specific evidence that the jury reached its verdict on the basis of the factually
insufficient ground. Id.
8. Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th at 1121, 847 P.2d at 47, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367. See also

that California law should reflect both the federal and state principles,
thus, further defining the extent to which insufficient proof affects reversible error.'
Therefore, the court held that in cases where the inadequacy of proof
involves a mere factual insufficiency regarding an alternative theory, the
appellate court should affirm the conviction when the record does not
positively demonstrate that the verdict rested upon the improper
ground."0 However, in cases where an alternative theory remains legally
insufficient, the appellate court should reverse the conviction, absent an
affirmative indication in the record that the verdict rested upon the valid
ground."
The Guiton opinion clarifies criminal procedure in California by delineating when insufficiency of the evidence will result in reversible error.
Furthermore, the decision fortifies the state's ability to prosecute criminal cases, by reducing the reversal rate of criminal appeals. Under the
rule asserted in Guiton, the prosecution may present the jury with alternative theories on an individual charge, without concern that a factually
insufficient theory will result in automatic reversal on appeal.'"
MICHAEL ALDEN MILLER

People v. Anderson, 63 Cal. 2d 351, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763, 406 P.2d 43 (discussing alternative theories; premeditation, murder in perpetration of mayhem, and murder by torture).
9. Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th at 1121, 1126-31, 847 P.2d at 47, 50-54, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
367, 370-74. In a separate, concurring opinion, Justice Mosk objected to the majority's
"harmonization" of the rules asserted in Green and Griffin. Id. at 1132-33, 847 P.2d
at 50-54, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374-75 (Mosk, J., concurring). Mosk argued that the
Court's reasoning in Grffin involved an unsupported assumption: that any empaneled
jury can effectively distinguish insufficient evidence from substantiated evidence. Id.
at 1132, 847 P.2d at 55, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375 (Mosk, J., concurring). Mosk recognized that juries remain "well equipped" to address "pure questions of fact." Id.
(Mosk, J., concurring). Mosk noted, however, that challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence reflect "mixed questions of law and fact," which constitute appropriate inquiries for appellate review. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
10. Guiton, 4 Cal. 4th at 1129, 847 P.2d at 52, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
11. Id. Applying such principles to the instant case, the court concluded that the
prosecution had merely presented a factually inadequate theory to the jury. Id. at
1131, 847 P.2d at 54, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374. The court reasoned that the jury remained "fully equipped to detect" such error, and, under Griffin, reversal was not required. Id.
12. Id. at 1129, 847 P.2d at 52, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372. The court cautioned,
however, that the prosecution should not present completely unsubstantiated theories
to the jury. Id. at 1131, 847 P.2d at 54, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374. In fact, trial courts
maintain the responsibility of excluding such invalid theories by means of appropriate
jury instructions. Id. Nevertheless, alternative theories, when ultimately presented to
the jury, do not warrant automatic reversal. Id.
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VI.

FAMILY LAW
A.

The trial court at a permanency planninghearing must
address only the statutory optionsfor a child's,placement
and may not considerfamily reunification,unless the
proceduralsafeguard of alleging changed circumstances has
been met. Furthermore,such exclusive options do not violate
due process: In re Marilyn H.

In re Marilyn H.1 addressed whether juvenile courts must examine
the option of placing a dependent child with the child's parent(s) at the
permanency planning hearing,2 and, if not, whether such failure to examine denies due process. The California Supreme Court held that the permanency planning hearing should be devoted exclusively to developing
one of the four plans dictated by the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, 3 which does not include the option of family reunification

1. 5 Cal. 4th 295, 851 P.2d 826, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (1993). Justice Panelli
authored the unanimous decision with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk,
Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George concurring. In this case, a mother whose
children were removed from her due to neglect failed to comply with the court ordered reunification services, and thus, after 17 months, was ordered to appear at a
permanency planning hearing. At that hearing, she argued that her changed circumstances warranted modification of the court order even though she had not made
such a petition to the court prior to the hearing.
2. The permanency planning hearing is ordered once the trial court has determined that returning the minor(s) to the parent(s) would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the minor(s) and that reasonable services toward family reunification
were offered. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361(b), 366.21(e)-(f), 366.25 (West Supp.
1993). See generally 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Delinquent and Dependent Children § 196
(1987) (discussing procedural requirements of permanency planning hearings). Generally, this hearing occurs within 12 months of the original dispositional hearing, but the
trial court has discretion to extend services up to an additional six months. CAL
WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.25 (West Supp. 1993).
3. Hereinafter, all references to code sections are to the California Welfare and
Institutions Code. Section 366.26 states, in relevant part, that once the trial court has
reviewed reports specified in the statute, it shall do one of the following:
(1) Permanently sever the parent or parents' rights and order that the child
be placed for adoption. (2) Without permanently terminating parental rights,
identify adoption as the permanent placement goal ....
(3) Without permanently terminating parental rights, appoint a legal guardian ....
(4) Order
that the minor be placed in long-term foster care ....
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(b) (West Supp. 1993). See generally 10 B.E. WPTKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child §§ 717-20 (9th ed. 1987) (discussing

In addition, the court found that the statutory mandate did not violate
due process.
The court first addressed the contention that when section 366.26 is
read in conjunction with section 366(a),' it permits the trial court to
consider placing the children with the parent(s) before permanent placement is ordered.7 The supreme court flatly denied this assertion, stating
that section 366(a) is inapplicable to section 366.26 because section
366(a) speaks solely to periodic review hearings held priorto the permanency planning stage.' The court held that once the section 366.26 hearing was set, any efforts toward family reunification' should be terminated and the trial court should only implement one of the listed statutory
plans.'"
The court next examined the assertion that section 385" provides the
trial court with the discretion, at a section 366.26 hearing, to reconsider
the issue of returning the minor(s) to the parent(s), even without a properly filed section 388 petition.'2 The court noted that section 385 is part

procedural aspects of permanency planning hearings).
4. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 304, 851 P.2d at 832, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550.
5. Id. at 309, 851 P.2d at 835, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 553.
6. This section provides, in relevant part, "[t]he status of every dependent child in
foster care shall be reviewed periodically . . . until the hearing described in Section
366.25 or 366.26 is completed." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366(a) (West Supp. 1993).
7. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 304, 851 P.2d at 831, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550.
8. Id. The court conducted a thorough discussion of the history and legislative
purpose of § 366.26 and found that the "sole purpose" of the permanency planning
hearing was to choose one of the listed plans. Id. See also 10 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 717 (9th ed. 1987)(stating that the statutory
procedures are exclusive).
9. The court made note of the statutory importance of the initial commitment to
family reunification but stated that once those efforts have failed the focus shifts
toward permanent placement. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 309, 851 P.2d at 835, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 553. See also In re Michelle M., 4 Cal. App. 4th 1024, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172
(1992)(finding that the statute demands reunification services be terminated prior to
the section 366.26 hearing); 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Delinquent and Dependent Children
§ 176 (Supp. 1993) (stating that reunification services should not exceed 18 months);
Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten
Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223 (1989-90) (discussing the Congressionally enacted
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, which requires reasonable efforts to
reunite parents with their children).
10. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 304, 851 P.2d at 832, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550.
11. This section provides, in relevant part, "Any order made by the court . . . may
at any time be changed, modified, or set aside, as the judge deems meet and proper,
subject to such procedural requirements as are imposed by this article." CAL WELF. &
INST. CODE § 385 (West 1984).
12. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 305, 851 P.2d at 832, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550. Section
388 allows interested parties to petition the court to modify its orders due to
changed circumstances. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 388 (West 1984). See generally 27
CAL JUR. 3D Delinquent and Dependent Children § 199 (1987) (discussing petitions
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of Article 12, which provides that five procedural requirements must be
met before a court can assert its discretion. 3 Significantly, the appellant
failed to follow any of these procedures and, therefore, the court held
that the trial court could not have employed its discretion."
Finally, the court considered the argument that limiting the trial court's
ability to reexamine family reunification at the permanency planning
hearing is unconstitutional because it violates the due process rights of
both parent(s) and minor(s)." Additionally, the court addressed the issue that section 388 does not provide due process because it places the
burden of proof on the parent(s). 6 The court rejected both claims. 7
First, the court reasoned that although the right to parent a child is
fundamental, there is a compelling state interest in protecting a child
from abusive and neglectful parents. 8 This interest requires the state to
provide a minor with a permanent plan to ensure the child's well being
once reunification with the parent(s) is proven unsuccessful. " The court
found that the entire statutory scheme provides significant safeguards for
both the parent(s) and child's rights." Finally, requiring the parent(s) to
file a petition showing prima facie evidence of changed circumstances is
not unduly burdensome, and therefore, is not violative of due process.2'

for modification based on changed circumstances).
13. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 305, 851 P.2d at 832, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550. These
requirements include notice of all proceedings and the procedures for dismissing petitions. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 386, 387, 390 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993).
14. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 305, 851 P.2d at 832, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550. For a
thorough discussion of evidentiary requirements in dependency cases, see Evolution

in Child Abuse Litigation: The Theoretical Void Where Evidentiary and Procedural
Worlds Collide, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1009 (1992).
15. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 306-09, 851 P.2d at 833-35, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551-53.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 309, 851 P.2d at 835, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 553.
18. Id. at 307, 851 P.2d at 833, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551. See also 39 AM. JUR.
Parent and Child §§ 15-17 (1963) (stating that parental power is an "emanation from
God"); Christian R. Van Deusen, The Best Interest of the Child and the Law, 18
PEPP. L REV. 417 (1991) (providing an excellent overview of children's rights legisla-

tion); Michael Fine, Comment, Where Have All the Children Gone? Due Process and
Judicial Criteria for Removing Children from Their Parents' Homes in California,
21 Sw. U. L. REV. 125 (1992) (engaging in a thorough discussion of the due process
issues of dependency law).
19. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 307, 851 P.2d at 833, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551.
20. Id. at 307-09, 851 P.2d at 834-36, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551-53. See also In re
John B., 159 Cal. App. 3d 268, 205 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1984) (stating that the statutory
scheme must be viewed in its entirety as initially supporting family reunification).
21. Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th at 309, 851 P.2d at 835, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 553.

The California Supreme Court in In re Marilyn H. made a clear statement that the options enumerated within section 366.26 are exclusive
and any attempt to modify the court order directing them must be accommodated by a procedurally correct petition to the court.' The court
has placed a high premium on the need to give a dependent child direction and constancy by limiting the inherent uncertainty caused by juvenile court proceedings.' Practitioners should take note of this priority
and strictly comply. with all procedural rules, while also advising parent
clients that the time to comply with the law is limited and the consequences of their actions during that time are also final.
MARLEE ADAMS SNOWDON

22. Id. at 305, 851 P.2d at 832, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550.
23. Id. at 310, 851 P.2d at 835-36, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 553-54.
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B.

Under CaliforniaCivil Code section 4801, in determining
the amount of spousal and child support the court may only
consider a supportingspouse's earnings acquired through a
normal work regime, even if such spouse engaged in an
extraordinarilyrigorous work regime during the marriage:
In re Marriage of Simpson.
I.

In the case of In
Court addressed the
amount of child and
riage.2 Under section

INTRODUCTION

re Marriage of Simpson,' the California Supreme
effect of California Civil Code section 4801 on the
spousal support required upon dissolution of mar4801, the potential earning capacity of a supporting

1. 4 Cal. 4th 225, 841 P.2d 931, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1992). Justice George
authored the unanimous opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk,

Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, and Baxter concurred. Richard and Barbara Simpson were
married for over seven years. During their marriage the Simpsons had one daughter.
Richard Simpson earned an hourly wage working as a stagehand for various theater
companies and television studios. He contracted for overtime work requiring abnormally long workdays, evening work, and even weekend commitments. Mr. Simpson
testified that he maintained this rigorous schedule to allow his wife to attend school
to earn a teaching certificate. After the couple separated, Mr. Simpson accepted
mostly television studio work requiring only an eight hour a day commitment and
allowing him more time with to spend his daughter. Consequently, his earnings were
less.
Upon the dissolution of the marriage, the superior court awarded joint custody
of their daughter with Mrs. Simpson serving as the primary caretaker. The superior
court required Mr. Simpson to provide child and spousal support. The superior court
calculated the payments based on Mr. Simpson's earning capacity as determined by
his gross income in the years prior to the divorce, rather than his earnings at the
time of the action. Due to the overtime work, his average salary prior to the dissolution of the marriage was $60,000 a year.
Based on Mr. Simpson's average annual gross income of $60,000, the superior
court awarded child and spousal support payments totaling $1,650 per month. The
court then anticipated a contribution by Mrs. Simpson of $1,214 from her potential
teaching career. Mr. Simpson appealed the decision of the superior court and the
court of appeal affirmed. Id. at 228-30, 841 P.2d at 932-33, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412-13.
2. Section 4801(a)(3) provides in relevant part:
[Tihe court may order a party to pay for the support of the other party any
amount .

.

. the court may deem just and reasonable ....

In making the

award, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances of the
respective parties . . . [tihe ability to pay of the supporting spouse, taking
into account the supporting spouse's earning capacity, earned and unearned
income, assets, and standard of living.

spouse may be substituted for the actual earnings of a spouse if the evidence as a whole indicates that it would be just.' Applying this standard,
the California Supreme Court concluded that a court only consider the
earnings of a spouse acquired through a normal work regimen when
determining potential earning capacity.'

II.

ANALYSIS

First, the court considered whether the potential earning capacity can
properly be substituted for the spouse's actual earnings subsequent to
the dissolution of the marriage.5 The court recognized that spousal support statutes grant trial courts great discretion in determining whether
actual earnings or earning capacity form the basis for determining support payments." The court considered cases utilizing potential earning
capacity in place of actual earnings in determining support payments.7
These lower courts have held that evidence supporting the deliberate
reduction of a spouse's income justified applying the earning capacity
standard Upon reviewing the evidence before the trial court, the California Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Mr. Simpson's reduction in hours was due to a
desire to reduce support payments, and thus, subject to the potential
earning capacity standard.'

CAL CiV. CODE § 4801(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).

3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
4. Simpson, 4 Cal. 4th at 236, 841 P.2d at 938, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418. The court
described normal work regimen as one that is objectively reasonable within societal
norms. Id. at 235-36, 841 P.2d at 937, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417.
5. Id. at 232-33, 841 P.2d at 934-35, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 413-14. See generally 11
B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Husband and Wife §§ 226-228 (9th ed.
1990) (supporting spouse's ability to pay, income and earning capacity as factors in
awarding spousal support); 10 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNA LAW Parent and
Child §§ 260, 269 (9th ed. 1989) (parent's ability to pay as a factor in awarding child
support); 32 CAL. JUR. 3D Family Law § 310 (factors to be considered in determining
amount of allowance); 4 CAL. PRAc. Family Law Practice § 279 (Supp. 1992) (considerations in amount of support); 24 CAL. FAM. L. SERV. Spousal Support § 53 (1986)
(earning capacity of the supporting spouse as a consideration in spousal support); 25
CAL. FAM. L. SERV. Child Custody & Support § 9 (1986) (earning capacity of spouse
as a consideration in child support).
6. Simpson, 4 Cal. 4th at 232, 841 P.2d at 935, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 415. See supra
note 2 for the statutory text.
7. Id. at 232, 841 P.2d at 935, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 415.
8. Id. The court noted, however, that when the supporting spouse's income is
reduced because of circumstances beyond that spouse's control, the court should
consider only the spouse's actual income in determining the amount of support. Id.
9. Id. at 233, 841 P.2d at 936, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416. The superior court found
that Mr. Simpson's change in work regime was attributable to his desire to avoid
support obligations. Id. at 233-34, 841 P.2d at 936, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416. Additional-
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The court then examined whether the potential earning capacity of a
spouse should be determined by the spouse's actual work schedule when
extraordinary in nature."0 The court determined that a spouse's earning
capacity may be based only on prior earnings occurring within a normal
work regime." The court reasoned that it would be improper to penalize
an individual for working in excess of a standard forty hour week by
basing his support payments on those extended work hours.
III.

CONCLUSION

Section 4801 effectively grants broad discretion to trial courts in determining whether or not to utilize earning capacity in lieu of actual earnings when determining the amount of child and spousal support. 3 In
Simpson, the California Supreme Court decreed that a spouse's earning
capacity may only be determined by considering income from a normal
work regime.' 4 Section 4801 originally sought to prevent supporting
spouses from evading support payments by reducing their work hours or
changing jobs after dissolution of marriage.'" The Simpson decision,
however, appears to circumvent the purpose behind section 4801 by
allowing a supporting spouse to decrease support payments by merely
reducing an extraordinary work schedule to the standard forty hour
work week.'6 Based on the Simpson decision, 7 the supporting spouse
may continue an extraordinary work schedule without the penalty of
facing higher support payments.
KIMBERLY WOSICKI DAVIS

ly, the court noted that Mr. Simpson had paid only $100 in child or spousal support
pursuant to temporary support awards through the date of trial. Id. at 234, 841 P.2d
at 936, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416.
10. Simpson, 4 Cal. 4th at 234-36, 841 P.2d at 936-37, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416-17.
11. Id. Mr. Simpson's earning capacity must be viewed in light of societal norms
regarding working hours, such as a standard forty hour work week. Id. at 235-36, 841
P.2d at 937, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417.
12. Id. at 228, 841 P.2d at 932, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412.
13. See supra note 2. The statutes do not impose any limitations or provide any
specific guidelines for determining when and how to substitute earning capacity for
actual earnings. Simpson, 4 Cal. 4th at 232, 841 P.2d at 935, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 415.
14. Simpson, 4 Cal. 4th at 234-35, 841 P.2d at 936-37, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416-17.
15. See supra note 2.
16. Simpson, 4 Cal. 4th at 235-36, 841 P.2d at 937-38, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416-17.
17. Id.

VII.

INSURANCE LAW
A. Section 11580.2(c)(3), which requires an insured to obtain
the insurance carrier'sconsent before settling with an
uninsured driver, is inapplicablein the context of an
underinsured motorist: Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
Macri.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Macri,' the California Supreme
Court addressed whether Insurance Code section 11580.2(c)(3), 2 requiring an insured to obtain the insurance carrier's written consent prior to
reaching a settlement with an uninsured motorist, also applies to underinsured motorist coverage.' The court concluded that the section does
not apply to claims involving underinsured motorists, and therefore, does
not bar recovery of underinsured motorist benefits when the insured
does not obtain the carrier's consent.4

1. 4 Cal. 4th 318, 842 P.2d 112, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (1992). In Hartford, Irene
Macri suffered injuries as a result of an automobile accident caused by another's negligence. Id. at 322, 842 P.2d at 113, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814. Macri's injuries exceeded
the $50,000 insurance policy held by the tortfeasor. Id. Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford") insured Macri with underinsured motorist coverage for an amount
up to $100,000. Id. Macri's policy contained a clause stating that Hartford did not
provide uninsured motorist coverage for any bodily injury sustained by the policyholder if that policyholder settles a third party bodily injury claim without Hartford's consent. Id. at 322, 842 P.2d at 114, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815. Two years after the accident, and without Hartford's consent, Macri settled with the tortfeasor's insurance
carrier for the $50,000 policy limit. Id. at 323, 842 P.2d at 114, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
815. Macri then filed a claim with Hartford for $50,000, the difference between the
third party's policy limit and her underinsured motorist policy limit. Id. Hartford refused coverage, claiming that Macri failed to meet her obligation to acquire Hartford's
consent prior to settlement. Id. In Hartford's action for declaratory relief, the court of
appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hartford,
holding that the consent requirement applied to underinsured as well as uninsured
motorist coverage. Id. The California Supreme Court granted review. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. Macri, 828 P.2d 671, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (1992).
Chief Justice Lucas delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Mosk,
Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George concurred. Harford, 4 Cal. 4th at 321-32, 842
P.2d at 113-20, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814-21. Justice Panelli wrote a separate concurring
opinion. Id. at 332-34, 842 P.2d at 120-21, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821-22.
2. All statutory references are to the Insurance Code unless otherwise specified.
See infra notes 5, 6, and 12 for the applicable text of § 11580.2.
3. Hartford, 4 Cal. 4th at 321-22, 842 P.2d at 113, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814.
4. Id. at 322, 842 P.2d at 113, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814.
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II.

ANALYSIS

In determining that section 11580.2(c)(3)5 is inapplicable to underinsured motorist claims, the court recognized that section 11580.2(p), 6
which specifically governs underinsured motorist claims, does not contain a consent provision.7 The court relied on the rules governing statutory interpretation to find that the express language of subdivision (p) re-

5. Section 11580.2(c)(3) states in pertinent part:
The insurance coverage provided for in this section does not apply either as
primary or as excess coverage . . . [t]o bodily injury of the insured with respect to which the insured or his or her representative shall, without the
written consent of the insurer, make any settlement with or prosecute to
judgment any action against any person who may be legally liable thereof.
CAL INS. CODE § 11580.2(c)(3) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
6. Subdivision (p) states in pertinent part:
This subdivision applies only when bodily injury . . . is caused by an underinsured motor vehicle. If the provisions of this subdivision conflict with
subdivisions (a) through (o) [the uninsured motorist provisions], the provisions of this subdivision shall prevail . . .
(3) This coverage does not apply to any bodily injury until the limits of bodily injury liability policies applicable to all insured motor vehicles causing the
injury have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements, and
proof of the payment is submitted to the insurer providing the underinsured
motorist coverage.
(4) When bodily injury is caused by one or more motor vehicles .... the
maximum liability of the insurer providing the underinsured motorist coverage
shall not exceed the insured's underinsured motorist coverage limits, less the
amount paid to the insured by or for any person .. . that may be held legally liable for the injury.
(5) The insurer paying a claim under this subdivision shall, to the extent of
the payment, be entitled to reimbursement or credit in the amount received
by the insured from the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle
or the insurer of the owner or operator.
CAL INS. CODE § 11580.2(p) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
7. Hartford, 4 Cal. 4th at 322, 842 P.2d at 113, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814. See
generally 8D JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN,

INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 5132 (1981) (discussing CAL INS. CODE § 11580.2 and the consent requirement).
8. Hartford, 4 Cal. 4th at 326, 842 P.2d at 116, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817. Chief
Justice Lucas explains that in order to fully understand the legislature's intent in
passing the underinsured m6torist provisions of the code, "[the court] must first turn
to the words of the statute itself." Id. (citing California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego
Community College, 28 Cal. 3d 692, 698, 621 P.2d 856, 858, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820
(1981)). Further, the court maintained, "'A construction which makes sense of an
apparent inconsistency is to be preferred to one which renders statutory language
useless or meaningless.'" Id. (quoting Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc., 29 Cal. 3d

quired that it prevail over subdivision (c)(3).' In addition, the court examined the legislative intent behind the enactment of subdivisions (p)
and (c)(3)"° and found two bases which supported its holding. First,
there was no possibility of double recovery by the insured," and second, there was no need to protect the subrogation 2 rights of the insurer."

781, 788, 632 P.2d 217, 221, 176 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108 (1981)). See also California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College, 28 Cal. 3d 692, 698, 621 P.2d 856, 858,
170 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820 (1981) (holding that the legislature's intent must be given
deference when construing the language of a statute); Campbell v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 3d 871, 874-75, 257 Cal. Rptr. 542, 543 (1989) (concluding that if statutory language is clear, a liberal interpretation may not be applied to
compel a specific construction of the statute); DeYoung v. City of San Diego, 147
Cal. App. 3d 11, 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 722, 726 (1983) (emphasizing that in construing a
statute, significance should be given to each and every word or phrase to ascertain
the specific legislative purpose).
For a broad discussion of statutory interpretation and the general rules associated therewith, see generally 7 B.E. WrrKoN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAW, Constitutional Law § 94 (9th ed. 1988); 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes §8 82-133 (1980); 82 C.J.S.
Statutes §§ 311, 321 (1953 & Supp. 1992).
9. Hartford, 4 Cal. 4th at 324, 842 P.2d at 115, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816. Subdivision (p) explicitly states that if conflict arises between the subdivision which governs
underinsured motorists (subdivision (p)), and the provisions -governing uninsured
motorists, (subdivisions (a) through (o)), subdivision (p) shall prevail. For applicable
language of subdivision (p), see supra note 6.
10. Id. at 326-29, 842 P.2d at 116-18, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817-19.
11. Id. at 330, 842 P.2d at 119, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820. The court noted that the
facts in this case precluded the possibility of double recovery for the insurer. Id.
Chief Justice Lucas pointed out that Macri informed Hartford of her intention to
pursue a claim against the tortfeasor, and that Hartford acknowledged that it is entitled to reimbursement from Macri, according to the policy, if Hartford pays her claim
and she subsequently receives damages from the tortfeasor. Id. at 330-31, 842 P.2d at
119, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820. The court concluded that Macri never compromised
Hartford's right to reimbursement, and thus, Macri's potential for double recovery was
non-existent. Id. at 331, 842 P.2d at 119, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820.
12. The right of the insurer to subrogation is found in § 11580.2(g), which states:
The insurer paying a claim under an uninsured motorist endorsement or coverage shall be entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the insured to whom
the claim was paid against any person legally liable for the injury or death
to the extent that payment was made. The action may be brought within
three years from the date that payment was made hereunder.
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(g) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
See generally 58 CAL JUR. 3D Subrogation §§ 1, 22-24 (1980) (outlining subrogation and the rights and responsibilities attached thereto). For a detailed discussion of
subrogation in the context of insurance claims, see 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts §§ 510-11 (1977).
13. Hartford, 4 Cal. 4th at 329, 842 P.2d at 118, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819. See also
Terzian v. California Casualty Indem. Exch., 3 Cal. App. 3d 90, 97, 83 Cal. Rptr. 255,
258 (1969) (finding that the legislative intent behind excluding uninsured motorist coverage when insured falis to obtain the consent of his carrier before prosecuting to
judgment an action against the uninsured motorist was to protect the insurer's rights
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III.

CONCLUSION

After Hartford, the California practitioner should note that in a claim
for underinsured motorist benefits, the insured is not obligated to acquire the carrier's consent before settlement with the tortfeasor 4 The
Hartford holding effectively gives plaintiffs' attorneys "the green light" in
their pursuit of underinsurance benefits even when settlements or judgments have been reached against the tortfeasor without the consent of
the underinsured motor vehicle carrier." This appears reasonable because the legislature's intent to avoid double recovery and not compromise subrogation rights has been upheld.
ALAN J. JACKSON

of subrogation against the uninsured motorist).
The Hartford court reasoned that because § 11580.2(p) (3) mandates that underinsurance coverage does not apply until the insured has exhausted the limits of the
underinsured motorist's liability, the insurer's subrogation rights are essentially null
and void. Hartford, 4 Cal. 4th at 329, 842 P.2d at 118, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819.
Justice Panelli concurred with the opinion of the court, but wrote separately to
voice his concern with the legislature's failure to afford underinsurers their subrogation rights. Id. at 332, 842 P.2d at 120, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821 (Panelli, J., concurring). While the uninsured motorist's carrier will always have the right to seek recovery directly form the tortfeasor, Justice Panelli noted that the underinsured motorist
carrier is "forced to depend on its insured to seek the tortfeasor's assets." Id. at 333,
842 P.2d at 121, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 822 (Panelli, J., concurring). Therefore, Justice
Panelli urged the legislature to re-think its position regarding the subrogation rights
of the underinsurer. Id. at 334, 842 P.2d at 121, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 822 (Panelli, J.,
concurring).
14. Id. at 332, 842 P.2d at 120, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821.
15. Id. at 321-32, 842 P.2d at 113-20, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814-21.
16. See id. at 328-30, 842 P.2d at 117-19, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 818-20.

B. Under section 1031 of the Insurance Code, reinsurersare
entitled to setoff claims against insolvent insurers with priority over policyholders and other creditors: Prudential
Reinsurance Company v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Prudential Reinsurance Company v. Superior.Court,' the California Supreme Court addressed whether, pursuant to section 1031 of the
Insurance Code, reinsurance debts owed by an insurer to a reinsurer may

be set off when the insurer becomes insolvent.2 In this matter of first
impression, the court decided that section 1031 permits the setoff of
mutual debts and credits during the course of liquidation proceedings.3
The court determined that this interpretation comported with the public
policy of risk distribution while avoiding harm to the public in the form
of increased insurance costs.4
In a reinsurance contract, an insurer procures a third party to insure
against claims made under the original policy.5 Typically, a portion of the
premiums are "ceded" to the reinsurer in return for insuring a portion of
the possible claims under a policy.6 Essentially, reinsurance acts as risk
distribution among insurance companies.7
In Prudential, Mission Insurance company was placed into conservatorship due to insolvency on February 2, 1982.' The Insurance Commissioner subsequently ordered liquidation pursuant to section 1016 of the
Insurance Code.9 Under this order, the Commissioner demanded that all

1. 3 Cal. 4th 1118, 842 P.2d 48, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 (1992). Chief Justice Lucas
delivered the majority opinion joined by Justices Panelli, Arabian, and Baxter. Id. at
1123-43, 842 P.2d at 50-63, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751-64. Justice Kennard delivered a
separate dissenting opinion joined by Justice Mosk. Id. at 1143-44, 842 P.2d at 63-65,
14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764-66. Justice Kline also delivered a dissenting opinion with Justices Kennard and Mosk concurring. Id. at 1144-69, 842 P.2d at 65-82, 14 Cal. Rptr. at
766-83.
2. Id. at 1123, 842 P.2d at 50, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751.
3. Id. at 1124-25, 842 P.2d at 51, 14 Cal. Rotr. 2d at 752.
4. Id. at 1125, 842 P.2d at 51, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752.
5. Id. at 1123, 842 P.2d at 50, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7517. See also 39 CAL JUR. 3D
§ 512 (1977) (explaining reinsurance).
6. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1123, 842 P.2d at 50, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751. See 39
CAL JuR. 3D §§ 513-515 (1977) (describing operation of reinsurance between companies).
7. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1123, 842 P.2d at 50, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751. Because
potential liability is spread among companies, any individual incident and resulting
claim will not pose a substantial hardship to the company which created the policy.
See 39 CAL Jun. 3D § 512 (1977).
8, Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1125, 842 P.2d at 51, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752-53.
9. Id. at 1125, 842 P.2d at 51-52, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752-53. Section 1016 reads:
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reinsurers of Mission pay the amounts owed under their reinsurance contracts."0 The reinsurers sought to offset these debts against amounts that
Mission owed them under the contracts entered into prior to insolvency
which would, in effect, place the reinsurers at a higher priority than other Mission creditors. 1 The Commissioner filed suit against the
reinsurers to compel payment without the setoff.2
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Majority Opinion

The court first addressed the concept of setoff in section 1031."3 The
court noted that setoff requires mutuality in three respects. 4 First, the
debts must be owed contemporaneously." Second, the debts must exist

If at any time after the issuance of an order under section 1011, or if at the
time of instituting any proceeding under this article, it shall appear to the
commissioner that it would be futile to proceed as conservator with the conduct of the business of such person, he may apply to the court for an order
to liquidate and wind up the business of said person. Upon a full hearing of
such application, the court may make an order directing the winding up and
liquidation of the business of such person by the commissioner, as liquidator,
for the purpose of carrying out the order to liquidate and wind up the business of such person.
CAL. INS. CODE § 1016 (West 1993).
10. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1125, 842 P.2d at 52, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753.
11. Id.
12. Id. The trial court granted the Commissioner's summary judgment motion. Id.
at 1125-26, 842 P.2d at 52, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753. The court of appeal issued a
peremptory writ of mandate ordering that the order be vacated. Id. at 1126, 842 P.2d
at 52, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753. The Commissioner sought review of the court of
appeal decision. Id.
13. Section 1031 reads in pertinent part:
In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the person in liquidation under Section 1016 and any other person, such credits and debts shall
be set off and the balance only shall be allowed or paid, but no set off shall
be allowed in favor of such other person where .. . : (a) The obligation of
the person in liquidation to such other person does not entitle such other
person claiming such set-off to share as a claimant in the assets of such
person in liquidation.
CAL INS. CODE § 1031 (West 1993).
14. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1127, 842 P.2d at 53,, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
15. Id. 3 Cal. 4th at 1127, 842 P.2d at 53, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754. See also Stamp
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 908 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding contempora-

between the same persons or entities. 6 Third, setoff may take place only between parties of equal capacity.'7
The Insurance Commissioner argued that the debts owed to Mission,
which were payments for losses by insureds, were incurred after the
liquidation, while the premiums owed by Mission to the reinsurers occurred prior to liquidation.' 8 The court cited precedent that stated mutuality depends on whether the debts were in existence before insolvency,
not whether the claims arose after the date of the insolvency."9 The
court concluded that the reinsurance obligations constituted
preliquidation debts and were subject to setoff.2
Next, the court examined the insolvency clause which section 922.2 of
the Insurance Code requires to appear in all reinsurance contracts.2' The
Commissioner asserted that the presence of the clause destroyed contemporaneous mutuality.' Because section 1031 is modeled after a New
York statute, the majority placed much emphasis on a New York decision
which permitted setoff. Following the reasoning in the New York decision, the court held that the function of the insolvency clause is to provide the liquidator with rights and obligations equal to that of the insol-

neous mutuality among reinsurer and insurer when the debt arose before insolvency).
16. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1127, 842 P.2d at 53, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
17. Id. See Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal. App. 2d 323, 336, 227 P.2d 484, 491-92
(1951) (allowing setoff between insurance agent and insolvent insurer).
18. Prudential,3 Cal. 4th at 1128, 842 P.2d at 53, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
19. Id. at 1130, 842 P.2d at 55, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756 (citing O'Connor v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 622 F. Supp. 611, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (noting that reinsurer's
debts following insolvency are provable because reinsurance contracts existed prior to
the insolvency and hence can be considered preliquidation debts), affd sub. nom.
Stamp v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 908 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1990)).
20. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1132, 842 P.2d at 56, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757.
21. Id. at 1133-36, 842 P.2d at 57-60, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-61. Section 922.2
reads in pertinent part:
No such deductions specified in Sections 922.1 and 922.15 shall be made or
allowed unless the contract of reinsurance contains provision in substance as
follows: . . . In the event of insolvency and the appointment of a conservator, liquidator or statutory successor of the ceding company, such portion
shall be payable to such conservator, liquidator or statutory successor immediately upon demand . . . without diminution because of such insolvency.
CAL. INS. CODE § 922.2 (West 1993).
22. Prudential,3 Cal. 4th at 1134, 842 P.2d at 57, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758. See also
Melco System v. Receivers of Trans-America Ins. Co., 105 So. 2d 43, 46-47 (Ala. 1988)
(holding that reinsurer may not setoff because the insolvency clause requires payment
after insolvency).
23. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1133, 842 P.2d at 57, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758. See In
re Midland Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1186 (N.Y. 1992). The Prudential court agreed with
the New York Court of Appeal's decision that the insolvency clause did not conflict
with § 7427 of the New York Insurance Law. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1133, 842 P.2d
at 57, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
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vent insurer with respect to the reinsurance contract.24
The Commissioner also argued that the appointment of a liquidator
destroyed the required mutuality of identity.' The court rejected this
assertion, holding that section 1031 provided for a broad meaning of
identity,- but limited the application of the statute to the principal insurers involved.27 The court rejected Prudential's contention that its subsidiaries should also be allowed setoff with Mission.' The court, held that
only parties to the reinsurance contract would be allowed priority
setoff.'
The court next looked to the language of section 1031(a) for further
evidence that the legislature intended to allow setoff.' The court interpreted section 1031(a) as a restatement of the mutuality requirements
discussed above."
Finally, the majority opinion addressed the argument presented by the
Commissioner and the dissenting opinion that public policy prohibits
setoff.' The majority held that section 1031 represented the legislature's
express intention to make an exception to the rules of preference favoring policyholders contained elsewhere in the Insurance Code.' Furthermore, the majority stated that allowing setoff would not result in harm to
the public.' Instead, setoff would facilitate reinsurance for smaller firms
who need risk distribution to survive.' Thus, the majority claimed that

24. Id. at 1135, 842 P.2d at 58, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
25. Id. at 1136, 842 P.2d at 59, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760.
26. Id. at 1137-37, 842 P.2d at 60, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760.
27. Id. at 1137, 842 P.2d at 60, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760-61. The court was not inclined to extend setoff to companies that did not have express mutuality agreements
with Mission. Id. at 1137, 842 P.2d at 61, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1137-38, 842 P.2d at 60, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761.
31. Id. at 1139, 842 P.2d at 61, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762. The majority believed that
§ 1031(a) was a restatement of the general rule because the legislature had shown
no explicit intent to deny setoff in this instant case. Id.
32. Id. at 1139, 842 P.2d at 61-63, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762-64; see infra notes 36-44
and accompanying text for a discussion of the dissent's arguments.
33. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1140, 842 P.2d at 61-62, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762.
Section 1033 of the Insurance Code gives preference to policyholders in the liquidation context. CAL. INS. CODE § 1033(a)(5) (West 1993 and Supp. 1994).
34. Prudential,3 Cal. 4th at 1140, 842 P.2d at 62, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763.
35. Id. at 1142, 842 P.2d at 63, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764. The majority stated, "Offsetting debts not only spreads risk but also acts as mutual security for performance."
Id. Quoting Stamp, they further declared, "Such security is especially important for

public policy actually favored their interpretation allowing setoff.
B.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Kline's vigorous dissent, which was joined by Justices Mosk
and Kennard, strongly disputed the majority's conclusions in many respects.' The dissenting justices argued that the majority had misconstrued section 1031(a).37 According to the dissent, subdivision (a) bars
setoff by those entities that do not actually share in the insurer's assets.' The dissent claimed that the majority's construction of the statute
subverted the clear intention of the legislature that policyholders have
priority over reinsurers as expressed in section 1 0 33 .' The dissenting
opinion also disputed the view that the reinsurance contract could control the liquidation, stating that parties may not deprive a third party of
statutory rights created by contract."
The main thrust of the dissent involved equitable and public policy
concerns.4' Under this view, the application of the statute is of no consequence because statutory setoff has never been permitted to expand
what is allowed under principles of equity.42 The dissent argued that

smaller insurers; if the large firms could not count on the netting of balances to satisfy obligations, they would be more likely to exclude smaller or tottering firms." Id.
(quoting Stamp v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 908 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1990)).
36. Justice Kline was a presiding justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
Division 2, assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Id. at 1144
n.*, 842 P.2d at 64 n.*, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766 n.*.
37. Id. at 1145-50, 842 P.2d at 65-68, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766-69 (Kline, J., dissenting). This view is best expressed in Justice Kennard's brief concurrence with the dissenting opinion. Justice Kennard wrote that the majority's interpretation failed to give
independent meaning to section 1031(a). Id. at 1143, 842 P.2d at 63, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 764 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard reasoned that the court's decision
rendered § 1031 meaningless, and failed to harmonize the statutes at issue in the Insurance Code. Id. at 1143-44, 842 P.2d at 63-64, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764-65 (Kennard,
J., dissenting). Accordingly, the court broke the three basic rules of statutory construction. Id. at 1144, 842 P.2d at 64, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1148, 842 P.2d at 67, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 768 (Kline, J., dissenting).
39. Id. (Kline, J. dissenting). Justice Kline opined that the majority's reasoning
violated the principle that specific statutes should be given effect over general statutes. Id. at 1149, 842 P.2d at 68, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769 (Kline, J., dissenting). Section 1033 of the Insurance Code is directed specifically at creditor preference
whereas § 1031 speaks only to general setoff principles. Id. (Kline, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Kline, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 1150-65, 842 P.2d at 69, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769-80 (Kline, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1150, 842 P.2d at 69, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770 (Kline, J., dissenting).
Because the dissent believed that insolvency statutes should not be interpreted as
creating creditor preferences when the legislature did not explicitly create such
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allowing setoff would harm insurance policyholders who would otherwise be first among the creditors to collect from the insolvent insurer.'
The dissent disagreed with the majority's counter argument that setoff
facilitates reinsurance pools, and noted the lack of empirical evidence in
support of that position.'
III.

CONCLUSION

Reinsurance companies hailed the court's decision.4" The outcome
however, stands in stark contrast to the position of the California Insurance Guarantee Association ("CIGA") on the setoff issue.' The Prudential ruling will likely have a significant impact on state regulator's policies in other states because many have not yet adopted either the CIGA
position or the Prudential court's conclusion.47 Meanwhile, the burgeoning insurance crisis is certain to produce many insolvencies in the
near future.
DAVID KNOBLOCK

preference, the majority appeared to violate statutory construction rules. See 3A
NORMAN J. SINGER, ,STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 69.07, (5th ed.
1992)(discussing bankruptcy statutes).
43. Prudential,3 Cal. 4th at 1152-54, 842 P.2d at 70-71, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771-72.
The dissent relied heavily upon Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bank of Am., 701 F.2d
831 (9th Cir., cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983). The Ninth Circuit disapproved of a
setoff under similar circumstances. That court stated that the creditor's right to setoff
is subject to judicial limitations based upon public policy considerations or inequity.
Id. at 836-37. Thus, the dissent in Prudential claimed that reinsurers were aware that
they had the lowest creditor preference prior to the decision in the instant case.
Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1154, 842 P.2d at 71, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772 (Kline, J., dissenting).
44. Prudential,3 Cal. 4th at 1159, 842 P.2d at 75, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776.
45. Dean Hansell, a partner with LeBoef, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, whih represents
many major reinsures, claimed that insurance costs would have been driven up and
many small insurance companies would have been forced out of business had the
verdict gone the other way. Alfred G. Haggerty, Reinsures Hail Decisions on Setoffs,
Nat'l Underwriter, Prop. & Casualty Risk & Benefits Mgmt Edition, Dec. 21, 1992,
at 6. Steven Sletten, a partner with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, another major representative of reinsures claimed that the decision affected "billions" of dollars in claims.
Rob Rossi, High Court Rules for Reinsures on Setoffs, THE RECORDER, Dec. 1, 1992,
at 1.
46. The CIGA adopted a restrictive position on setoffs prior to the Prudential
decision. Prudential, 3 Cal. 4th at 1139, 842 P.2d at 61, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763.
47. It appears that only the Stamp decision in the Seventh Circuit and the instant
case have directly addressed this issue. See generally Stamp v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am.. 908 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1990).

C. Insurer did not breach its duty of good faith andfair dealing
or violate statutory duties regardingunfair claim settlement
practices by declining to pursue arbitrationunder policy
until after resolution of workers compensation claim:
Rangel v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile
Club.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Rangel v. Interins. Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal.,' the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether section 11580.2 subdivision (h) of the Insurance Code authorizes an insurer to withhold payment until pending workers' compensation claims are settled.2 Section
11580.2 subdivision (h) authorizes an insurer to reduce the loss payable
to the insured by "the amount paid and the present value of all amounts
payable" under workers' compensation law. The supreme court conclud-

1. 4 Cal. 4th 1, 842 P.2d 82, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783. Justice Panelli wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian, Baxter, and George
concurred. Justice Kennard wrote a separate dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Mosk concurred.
In Rangel, the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern
California ("Exchange") insured Alice Rangel, who was involved in an accident caused
by an uninsured motorist in February 1978. Id. at 5, 842 P.2d at 83, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 784. Rangel filed an uninsured motorist claim under her policy. Id. However, the
Exchange refused to pay until Rangel had resolved her workers' compensation claim
in which she sought medical expenses. Id. Six and one-half years after filing her
claim, the Exchange agreed to pay Rangel the maximum amount under her uninsured
motorist coverage. Id. at 6, 842 P.2d at 83, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784. Rangel did not
receive benefits under her workers' compensation claim until 1986. Id.
In September 1985, Rangel sued the Exchange for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing and for unfair claims settlement practices in breach of statutory
duties under California Insurance Code section 790.03 Id. at 6, 842 P.2d at 84, 14
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785. The Exchange moved for summary judgment in January 1988,
which was denied by a judge in the law and motion department. Id. at 7, 842 P.2d
at 84, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785. A different judge was then appointed to determine
pretrial matters and preside over the trial. Before this judge, the Exchange made a
motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that they had no duty to pay plaintiff
any uninsured motorist benefits until after the workers' compensation claim was
determined. Id. The motion for judgment on the pleadings, was granted. Id. Rangel
appealed and the court of appeal reversed, holding that an insurer may have a duty
to settle an uninsured motorist claim before the resolution of a workers' compensation claim when a lien is available. Id. The court of appeal determined that a lien
was available in this case and thus, held that the complaint stated a cause of action
for both a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for violations of
section 790.03. Id. See Rangel v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club of S. Cal., 10
Cal. App. 4th 472, 487, 285 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1991).
2. Rangel, 4 Cal. 4th at 7, 842 P.2d at 84, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785.
3. Section 11580.2 subdivision (h) provides, in pertinent part, that: "Any loss
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ed that an insurer may delay payment of benefits pending the outcome of
a workers' compensation claim.4
II.

ANALYSIS

The underlying issue was whether Interinsurance Exchange breached
its duty of good faith and fair dealing or violated section 790.03' by holding Rangel's arbitration in abeyance while her workers' compensation
proceeding was pending.' The court relied upon section 11580.2,' which
expressly provided that arbitration could be delayed until worker's compensation claims were resolved.' The court noted that this practice of
postponing arbitration until resolution of workers' compensation claims

payable under the terms of the uninsured motorist endorsement or coverage . . . may
be reduced: (1) By the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable to
him or her ... under any workers' compensation law, exclusive of nonoccupational
disability benefits."
CAL INS. CODE § 11580.2(h) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).

4. Rangel, 4 Cal. 4th at 17, 18 842 P.2d at 92, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793. See generally B.E. WITKIN, Summary of California Law, Workers' Comp. (9th ed. 1987).
5. Section 790.03 subsection (h) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Falling to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Falling to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable
time after proof of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by
the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1992).
6. Rangel, 4 Cal. 4th at 5, 842 P.2d at 83, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784.
7. The court examined section 11580.2 and concluded that the legislature had
expressly permitted the insurer to delay arbitration of uninsured motorist claims
while a workers' compensation claim was pending, in the absence of a showing of
good cause. Rangel, 4 Cal. 4th at 8, 842 P.2d at 85, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786.
8. Id. The court cited section 11580.2 subdivision (0, which states, in pertinent
part, that: "If the insured has or may have rights to benefits, other than nonoccupational disability benefits, under any workers' compensation law, the arbitrator shall
not proceed with the arbitration until the insured's physical condition is stationary
and ratable." CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(f) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).

was wholly consistent with the legislature's goal of avoiding double recovery.' Lastly, the court found that because the insurer could not place
a lien on the workers' compensation benefits,'" there was no guarantee
that the insurer would recover benefits paid in excess of its liability after
the workers' compensation benefits were paid." Therefore, the court
concluded that Interinsurance Exchange did not breach its covenant of
good faith and fair dealing or its statutory duties under section 790.03 by
delaying payment pending the outcome of the workers' compensation
proceeding.' 2
III.

CONCLUSION

In allowing delayed payment in uninsured motorist cases, the court
indirectly approved of an insurance company's withholding payment for
more than six years by not labeling it an unfair business practice.'3 The
court suggests that the insurance company had the right to make the

9. Rangel, 4 Cal. 4th at 8, 842 P.2d at 85, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786 (citing Interinsurance Exch. v. Marquez, 116 Cal. App. 3d 652, 656-67, 172 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1981));
Id. at 16-17, 842 P.2d at 91, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792. The court also noted that the
purpose of section 11580.2 was to "shift the cost of an industrial injury sustained by
an employee, as the result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist, from the
motoring public (who pay the premium for uninsured motorist coverage) to the
employer or workmen's compensation carrier." Id. at 8, 842 P.2d at 85, 14 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 786. (citing California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Jackson, 9 Cal.
3d 859, 869, 512 P.2d 1201, 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (1973)(quotation omitted)).
For a general discussion of California's uninsured motorist statute and the insurer's
right to subrogation see John L Antracoli, Note, California's Collateral Source Rule
and Plaintifs Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 680-95
(1986).
10. Rangel, 4 Cal. 4th at 14, 842 P.2d at 89, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790. "[Tlhere can
be no lien against a workers' compensation award for any kind of debt except as the
Labor Code specifically provides." Id. at 15, 842 P.2d at 90, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791
(citing CAL LAB. CODE § 4901).
11. Id. at 16-17, 842 P.2d at 91, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
In fact, that is what occurred in the present case. Rangel received $15,000
from the exchange in addition to her workers' compensation payment $15,000 more than she was entitled to receive .... Under the statute, arbitration is delayed until the workers' compensation claim is resolved. Because
the loss payable is subject to arbitration under the policy, payment may be
delayed until the amount of the loss payable has been determined in arbitration. This result is wholly consistent with the Legislature's goal of avoiding
double recovery.
Id.
12. Id. at 17, 842 P.2d at 92, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
13. Justice Kennard, in her dissenting opinion, noted that the Exchange "had no
right to withhold payments to Rangel when liability and the extent of damages
caused by the uninsured motorist were not disputed." Id. at 27, 842 P.2d at 98, 14
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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insured wait for as long as it takes to resolve the workers' compensation
claim. 4 Furthermore, because arbitration is used to resolve not just disputes as to the amount owed but also the ultimate issue of the uninsured
motorist's liability, an insurance company can essentially postpone determination of even the most crucial issues until after resolution of
workers' compensation claims. 5
The insurer should undoubtedly have the right to reduce uninsured
motorist benefits by any amount recovered by the insured from another
source. However, the court here is imposing on the insured the burden
of a lengthy waiting period during which benefits are completely withheld - a burden that the legislature probably did not intend."6 Most
importantly, an insurance policy is a contract to pay a certain sum of
money upon the occurrence of an event and, when that event occurs, the
insured should not be required to wait an extended period of time for recovery without it being deemed an unfair business practice. "
KIMBERLY J. HERMAN

14. Justice Kennard noted that "This result does not make sense." Id. at 23, 842

P.2d at 95, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796 (Kennard, J., dissenting). In 1990, litigated
workers' compensation claims in California took an average of 45 months from injury
to resolution. Daniel Akst, Calfornia & Co.: Workers' Comp: Can the New Chief Fix
It? L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1991, at DI.
15. Rangel, 4 Cal. 4th at 13, 842 P.2d at 88, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789. "Even when
the policy expands the scope of arbitration beyond the minimum statutory requirements, the provisions of section 11580.2 continue to apply." Id. (citing, e.g., Freeman
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 473, 486-87, 535 P.2d 341, 349, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 485 (1975)).
16. Id. at 24, 842 P.2d at 96, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
17. Would it not have been an unfair business practice if the Exchange could have
anticipated that the workers' compensation claim would take 6h years to settle?

VIII.

LABOR LAW
A.

Section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not
extend the forty-five day period allotted under section
5950 of the Labor Codefor filing a petitionfor writ of
review of a Workers' CompensationAppeals Board decision: Camper v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Camper v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,' the California
Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the state's appellate courts.!
The court concluded that Code of Civil Procedure section 1013' does not

1. 3 Cal. 4th 679, 836 P.2d 888, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (1992). In December of 1990,
the workers' compensation judge ("WCJ") issued a judgment for Camper, finding
specific, but not cumulative, injury. Id. at 681, 836 P.2d at 889, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
102. On January 4, 1991, Camper made a timely motion to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board for reconsideration of the decision. Id. at 682, 836 P.2d at 889,
12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102. On July 24, 1991, the Board filed its opinion, which upheld
the decision of the WCJ. Camper received service by mail on the same date. Id. On
September 12, 1991, Camper filed a petition for writ of review in the court of appeal,
50 days after the Board filed its opinion. Id. The court of appeal concluded that
Camper's petition for writ of review was untimely. Id. at 683, 836 P.2d at 890, 12
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103. The supreme court granted review. Id. at 684, 836 P.2d at 890,
12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103.
Justice Panelli delivered the majority opinion 'ofthe court, in which Chief Justice
Lucas, and Justices Mosk, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George concurred.
2. Compare Malloy v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 1 Cal. App. 4th 1658,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 820 (1991) (stating that petition for writ of review of the Board's
decision was untimely and that Code of Civil Procedure section 1013, which extends
the filing period by five days when service is by mail, did not apply) and Southwest
Airlines v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1421, 286 Cal. Rptr.
347 (1991) (holding that section 1013 is not applicable to extend the forty-five day
time period prescribed by Labor Code section 5950 for filing a petition for writ of
review) with Postural Therapeutics v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 179 Cal.
App. 3d 551, 224 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1986) (finding that section 1013, applied to
petitioner's writ of review despite Labor Code section 5950) and Hinkle v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 175 Cal. App. 3d 587, 221 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1985) (holding
that section 1013 applied to petitioner's writ of review despite Labor Code section
5950) and Villa v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 156 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203
Cal. Rptr. 26 (1984) (deciding that section 1013 applied to the filing of the petitions
for writ of review).
3. Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 states in pertinent part:
[a]ny prescribed period of notice and any right or duty to act or make any
response within any prescribed period or on a date certain after the service
of such document served by mail shall be extended five days if the place of
address is within the State of California ....
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extend the forty-five day period established by Labor Code section 5950'
within which a petition for writ of review of a Workers' Compensation
Board decision must be filed because the operative triggering event of
the time period is the filing date of the decision rather than the date of
service.'
II.

ANALYSIS

The court relied on the specific language of Labor Code section 5950
to find that Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 does not extend the
time for filing a petition for a writ of review.' The court reasoned that
the operative trigger of the forty-five day time limit is the filing date of
the Board's order. Inasmuch as Camper's petition for writ of review was
filed fifty days after that triggering date, the petition was untimely, notwithstanding that service of the order was by mail.7 In so deciding, the

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1013(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1993).
4. California Labor Code § 5950 states:
Any person affected by an order, decision, or award of the appeals board
may, within the time limit specified in this section, apply to the Supreme
Court or to the court of appeal for the appellate district in which he resides,
for a writ of review, for the purpose of inquiring into and determining the
lawfulness of the original order, decision, or award or of the order, decision,
or award following reconsideration. The application for writ of review must
be made within 45 days after a petition for reconsideration is denied, or, if a
petition is granted or reconsideration is had on the appeal board's own motion, within 45 days after the filing of the order, decision, or award following
reconsideration.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 5950 (West 1989).
5. Camper, 3 Cal. 4th at 684-85, 836 P.2d at 891, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104. See also
Citicorp N. Am., Inc. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 536, 261 Cal. Rptr. 665
(1989) (holding that § 1013 applies to extend the filing period following service by
mall only when the prescribed time is triggered by service). For a general discussion
of writs of review in workers' compensation cases, see 65 CAL. JUR. 3D Work Injury
Compensation §§ 345, 346 (1981).
6. Camper, 3 Cal. 4th at 679, 836 P.2d at 888, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101. Justice
Panelli noted that there is no reference in § 5950 to service, and "'any reasonable
sense of semantics dictates that "a petition for reconsideration is denied" within the
meaning of the statute when it is filed,'" not when it is served. Id. at 684 n.4, 836
P.2d at 891 n.4, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104 n.4 (quoting Southwest Airlines v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1421, 1426, 286 Cal. Rptr. 347, 350
(1991)).
7. Id. at 682-84, 836 P.2d at 889-91, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102-04.

court expressly overruled Villa v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board,8 and its progeny.'
III.

CONCLUSION

The Camper decision eliminates the option of using Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 to extend the forty-five day time period specified in
Labor Code section 5950 within which a petition for writ of review must
be filed."° The rule under Camper is specific: To be considered timely, a
petition for writ of review of a ruling must be filed within forty-five days
from the filing date of the Board's order."
Further, the practitioner should be aware that the Camper ruling may
raise constitutional questions. Although the court declined to address the
issue, due process requirements of notice may dictate that Labor Code
section 5950 be interpreted to incorporate Code of Civil Procedure section 1013.2 At the very least, however, Camper has effectively removed
any ambiguity in the area of time requirements for filing a petition for
writ of review in workers' compensation cases.
ALAN J. JACKSON

8. 156 Cal. App. 3d 1076, 203 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1984).
9. Camper, 3 Cal. 4th at 688, 836 P.2d at 893, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106.
10. Id. at 681, 836 P.2d at 888, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101.
11. Id. The general rule is that when computing the period in which an act must
be done, when the last day for the performance of the act falls on a holiday or
Saturday, the period is extended to include the next day that is not a holiday or
Saturday. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 12(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). See also Alford v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 198, 169 P.2d 641 (1946).
12. See Camper, 3 Cal. 4th at 688 n.7, 836 P.2d at 893 n.7, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106
n.7. For a general discussion on the constitutional requirements of notice, see 16a
AM. JUR. 2D Const. Law §§ 814, 827-38 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992).
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B.

While the state's general authority to approve an
apprenticeshipprogram avoids ERISA preemption, the
state's authority to deny approval of new apprenticeship
programs that adversely affect existing ones is preempted: Southern California Chapter of Associated
Builders & Contractors, Joint Apprenticeship
Committee v. California Apprenticeship Council.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Southern CaliforniaChapterof Associated Builders & Contractors,
Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. CaliforniaApprenticeship Council,'
the California Supreme Court concluded that, with regard to apprenticeship programs, both (1) the state's general approval authority, and (2)
Title 8, California Code of Regulations, section 212.2(a),2 fall within the
scope of the preemption clause of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 3 In applying ERISA's general savings
clause, the court found that although the state's approval authority was
saved from federal preemption, section 212.2 specifically was not saved.4
In Associated Builders, the Southern California Chapter of the Association of Building Contractors, Inc. sought to sponsor an apprenticeship
program and established a joint apprenticeship training committee
("ABC-JAC"). 5 The ABC-JAC solicited state approval of its new program'
which was to operate in at least three counties where existing programs
were already in operation.'

1. 4 Cal. 4th 422, 841 P.2d 1011, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491 (1992). Justice Panelli
wrote for the majority; Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard, Arabian, Baxter,
and George joined in the opinion. Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment
2. Section 212.2(a) requires the Chief of the Division of Apprenticeship Standards
of the Department of Industrial Relations to disapprove an apprenticeship program
which will adversely impact an existing program. Id. at 434, 841 P.2d at 1017, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 497.
3. Id. at 428, 841 P.2d at 1013, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493.
4. Id.
5. Id. The ABC-JAC established a trust fund through which the program was to
be administered. Id.
6. Justice Panelli explained, "While neither federal nor state approval is required
for a sponsor to operate an apprenticeship program, strong financial incentives exist.
at both the state and federal levels for sponsors to obtain approval." Associated
Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 428-29, 841 P.2d at 1013, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493 (emphasis in
original).
7. Id. at 428, 841 P.2d at 1013, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493.

Initially, the Chief of the Division of Apprenticeship Standards reviewed and approved the proposed ABC-JAC program.8 The existing
apprenticeship programs objected to the Chiefs approval, citing section
212.2(a) to support their claim that "the new program would adversely
affect the existing prevailing conditions in the area."' The California Apprenticeship Council heard the appeal by the existing programs and reversed the Chiefs decision."
After more than a year of battle in superior court," the court of appeal affirmed the ultimate decision of the lower court which approved
the ABC-JAC program. 2 The court of appeal reasoned, in part, that the
Council's disapproval of the ABC-JAC program, which was predicated on
section 212.2(a), was preempted by ERISA. 3 Upon review, the supreme
court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal, but based its holding
on a slightly different theory." While the state's general approval authority is preempted by ERISA, that authority is specifically saved from
preemption by the savings clause. 5 Moreover, section 212.2(a) is also
preempted by ERISA, but it is not saved by the clause, and thus, section
212.2(a) "cannot be relied upon by the state [the existing programs or the
Council] to deny... approval to the ABC-JAC program or any other
apprenticeship program."

8. Id. at 429, 841 P.2d at 1014, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494.
9. Id.

10. Id. The Council based its reversal on the ground that the disparity between
the wages and benefits of the ABC-JAC and the existing programs would negatively
impact the existing programs' ability to compete for private projects. Id.
11. In December 1988, the ABC-JAC sought a writ of mandate which asked the
superior court to direct the Council to vacate its decision. Id. at 429, 841 P.2d at
1014, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494. The superior court agreed with ABC-JAC that the new
program posed no real threat to the existing programs and granted the petition for
writ. Id. In view of the superior court's findings, the Council approved the new
program. Claiming the Council had misinterpreted the court's instruction, the existing
programs subsequently sought a writ of mandate from the superior court. Id. at 430,
841 P.2d at 1014, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494. The court granted the petition and remanded the matter back to the Council. Id. The Council then issued a statement wherein
it reverted back to its original position and disapproved the ABC-JAC program. Id.
The ABC-JAC petitioned for a third writ of mandate which the superior court granted
in March 1990 and again reversed the Council's decision. Id. The existing programs
and the Council then appealed to the California Court of Appeal. Associated Builders,
4 Cal. 4th at 430, 841 P.2d at 1014, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Id. at 428, 841 P.2d at 1013, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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II. TREATMENT
The California Supreme Court began its assessment of the case by
reviewing the applicable federal and state statutes that govern the approval process of apprenticeship programs.'7 The court noted that Congress enacted the Fitzgerald Act 8 to specifically administer the foundation of apprenticeship programs." Congress set the specific federal standards of apprenticeship and implemented the Act through Title 29, Code
of Federal Regulations, sections 29.1-29.13."o The court focused on section, 29.12 which allows the federal government to delegate its authority
to approve apprenticeship programs to a certified State -Apprenticeship
Council ("SAC").' The court indicated that California has been SAC certified since 1978.'
With this foundation, the court considered whether ABC-JAC was an

employee benefit program for purposes of ERISA preemption.' The
court relied primarily on Hydrostorage v. Northern California Boiler-

17. Id. at 431-34, 841 P.2d at 1015-17, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495-97.
18. Known formally as the National Apprenticeship Act, the Fitzgerald Act was
passed to encourage the creation of modem apprenticeship programs. Associated
Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 432, 841 P.2d at 1015, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495.
The Fitzgerald Act provides:
The Secretary of Labor is authorized and directed to formulate and promote
the furtherance of labor standards necessary to safeguard the welfare of
apprentices, to extend the application of such standards by encouraging the
inclusion thereof in contracts of apprenticeship, to bring together employers
and labor for the formulation of programs of apprenticeship, to cooperate
with State agencies engaged in the formulation and promotion of standards of
apprenticeship, and to cooperate with the Office of Education under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in accordance with section 17 of
Title 20. For the purposes of this chapter the term "State" shall include the
District of Columbia
29 U.S.C.A. § 50 (West Supp. 1992).
19. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 432-33, 841 P.2d at 1015-16, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 495-96.
20. Id. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 29.1-29.13 (1992). The federal standards for apprenticeship
are specifically set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 29.5 (1992).
21. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 432-33, 841 P.2d at 1016, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
496. The Secretary of Labor confers upon the SAC the authority to approve an apprenticeship program as long as it "conforms with the Secretary's published standards." 29 C.F.R. § 29.12(a) (1992).
22. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 433, 841 P.2d at 1016, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
496.
23. Id. at 436, 841 P.2d at 1018-19, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498-99.

makers Local Joint Apprenticeship Committee' in finding that both the
fund and the standards established by the ABC-JAC constituted an "employee welfare benefit plan" under the Code.25 Therefore, the court concluded that ABC-JAC was governed by ERISA.2"
Next, the court considered whether ERISA's preemption clause27 applied to state SAC approval of apprenticeship programs.' The court considered the statute on its face and focused on the phrase, "relates to."'
The court reasoned that because ERISA preempts state laws regarding
employee benefit plans and the new apprenticeship program was an
employee benefit plan, ERISA necessarily preempts any state law related
to apprenticeship programs.' The court relied on the foregoing analysis

24. 891 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1989).
25. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 437, 841 P.2d at 1019, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
499. See also Hydrostorage, 891 F.2d at 728.
Section 1002, paragraph (1) of Title 29 of the Code states in pertinent part:
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" . . . mean[s] any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose
of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise ... apprenticeship or other training programs ....
29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1) (West 1985) (emphasis added).
26. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 437, 841 P.2d at 1019, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
499. The existing programs and the Council argued that the new program standards
were not within the confines of ERISA under Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107
(1989). Id. at 438-40, 841 P.2d at 1019-20, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499-501. The court,
however, distinguished Morash from the case at bar on several grounds. Id.
27. ERISA's preemption clause is found under Title 29, § 1144(a), which states in
full:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter Il of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this Title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this Title. This section shall take effect on January 1,
1975.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1985).
28. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 44046, 841 P.2d at 1021-25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 501-05.
29. Id. at 441, 841 P.2d at 1021, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 501. Under the court's interpretation of § 1144(a), a state law is preempted by ERISA if that law relates to, or
is connected with, an employee benefit plan. Id. at 441, 841 P.2d at 1022, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 502.
30. Id. at 440-41, 841 P.2d at 1021-22, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 501-02. Cf. Tod A
Cochran, Note, The Golden State of Labor Preemption: The Circuit Courts Have
Gone Too Far, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 131 (1992) (contending that federal preemption of
state labor law has gone far enough).
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in holding that the state's general approval power was, indeed, a state
law "related to" the new apprenticeship program, and was therefore
preempted by ERISA.3'
Justice Panelli, writing for the majority, however, did not end his analysis there.' The court found that, although preempted on its face, the
state law granting the state authority to approve the new program was
saved by section 1144(d), the general savings clause.' The court noted
that ERISA's preemption clause serves to "foreclose any non-Federal
regulation of employee benefit plans."' The court cited cases recognizing that state laws may be saved from federal preemption if such preemption would "impair or modify" federal law.' The court reasoned that
because federal preemption of the state's approval power would "have a
negative effect on the functioning of, or standards set forth in, the federal law," the general savings clause saves the state's general approval
power from federal preemption.'
Finally, the court analyzed the savings clause with respect to California
Code of Regulations, Title 8, section 212.2(a).3' The court noted that section 212.2 provides program standards that are not required by federal
law.' The court ruled that, because section 212.2 represents a require-

31. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 441, 841 P.2d at 1022, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
502.
32. Id. at 446, 841 P.2d at 1025, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505.
33. Id. ERISA's savings clause is found under Title 29, section 1144(d), which
states in full: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify,
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States (except as provided in
sections 1031 and 1137(b) of this Title) or any rule or regulation issued under any
such law." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(d) (West 1985).
34. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 446, 841 P.2d at 1025, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
505 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 104 (1983)) (emphasis added).
35. Id. See, e.g., Shaw, 463 U.S. at 85, 102-05.
36. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 448-50, 841 P.2d at 1026-28, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 506-08. Justice Panelli focused on the language of Title 29 and found that the
Secretary of Labor specifically intended state agencies to be recognized as the "appropriate agenc[ies] for registering local apprenticeship programs for certain Federal
purposes." Id. at 449, 841 P.2d at 1027, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 507 (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 29.1(b) (1992)). The court concluded that preemption of the state's approval authority would prevent the state from doing exactly what the legislature intended and
would thereby "impair" federal law. Id. at 449, 841 P.2d at 1027, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
507.
37. Id. at 450, 841 P.2d at 1028, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508.
38. Id. The Regulation states in pertinent part: "Approval shall be denied when it
is found that existing prevailing conditions (including training standards) in the area
and industry would in any way be lowered or adversely affected." CAL. CODE REGS.

ment not present in federal legislation, preemption of this state law
would not "impair or modify" federal law.' The court concluded that
the portion of section 212.2(a) providing approval for apprenticeship
programs which do not adversely affect existing programs is not saved
by the savings clause of ERISA, and is therefore preempted."
III.

CONCLUSION

Associated Builders stands for several propositions. First, state apprenticeship programs constitute employee benefit plans for purposes of
ERISA." Second, the state's approval authority is within the scope of
ERISA's preemption clause, but that authority is saved from preemption
by ERISA's general savings clause because preemption would specifically
impair the intent of federal law. 2 Finally, Title 8, section 212.2 is likewise preempted by ERISA and is not saved by the savings clause because
it contains requirements completely independent of those set forth in
federal law, thus, preemption would not impair or hinder federal law.'
This case serves to warn existing state apprenticeship programs not to
rely on section 212.2(a) in denying Fitzgerald Act approval of new programs. California practitioners should note that if new programs are to
be denied approval, the denial must be predicated on an aspect of the
new program which offends the federal standards as set out in Title 29
of the federal regulations.'

ALAN J. JACKSON

tit. 8, § 212.2(a) (1993).
The court found that "[n]either the Fitzgerald Act nor the regulations promulgated under it contain" any requirement that approval of a program be contingent upon
a finding that prevailing conditions in the area will not be adversely affected. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 450, 841 P.2d at 1028, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 508.
For the text of the Fitzgerald Act, see supra note 18.
39. Associated Builders, 4 Cal. 4th at 452, 841 P.2d at 1029, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
509. The court recognized that preemption of § 212.2 could neither hinder nor impair
federal law because the state law is recognized only so far as it has accomplished
federal objectives. Id. at 451-52, 841 P.2d at 1029-30, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 509-10.
Because § 212.2 embodies policies outside the scope of the Fitzgerald Act and its
regulations, it does not further federal objectives. Id.
40. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 427-55, 841 P.2d at 1012-32, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 492-512.
44. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey

[Vol. 21: 261, 19931

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

IX. TAX LAW
Title insurance companies do not receive taxable income
when an underwritten title company pays a policyholder's
claim pursuant to a contractualarrangement.Further,the
State Board of Equalizationmust follow the statutorily required administrativeproceedings before it may assert a
deficiency assessment in superior court: Title Insurance
Co. of Minnesota v. State Board of Equalization.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota v. State Board of Equalization,'
the California Supreme Court rendered its interpretation of the portion of
the California Tax Code2 governing title insurance companies ("insurers"). The court concluded that when an underwritten title company
fulfills its contractual obligation to an insurer by paying its portion of a
policyholder's claim, the insurer does not realize a gain, and thus, receives no income.' The court further held that in order for the State
Board of Equalization 4 ("the Board") to assert a deficiency in superior
court, the Board must have first raised the issue in the statutorily required administrative proceedings.5
The background of this case indicated that the plaintiff insurers issue
title insurance policies through underwritten title companies. The insurers and the title companies are bound by contractual agreement, whereby the title companies agree to perform certain duties' in return for retaining approximately ninety percent of the premium fees.7 In addition,

1. 4 Cal. 4th 715, 842 P.2d 121, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822 (1993) [hereinafter Title Insurancel. Justice Panelli authored the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and

Justices Arabian, Baxter, and George concurring. Justice Kennard filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Mosk concurred.
2. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
3. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 728, 842 P.2d at 129, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830.
4. For a general discussion of the State Board of Equalization, see generally 9
B.E. WITIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW TAXATION, § 205 (1989).
5. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 730, 842 P.2d at 130, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831.
6. Pursuant to the underwriting agreements, the title companies "conduct title
searches, prepare title reports, issue the title insurance policies to the policyholders
using forms prepared by the insurers, determine the premiums from schedules supplied by the insurers, and collect premiums." Id. at 734, 842 P.2d at 133, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 834 (Kennard, J.,dissenting).
7. Id. at 720, 824 P.2d at 123, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824.

although the title companies are not parties to the title insurance policies, the contracts obligate the title companies to pay a portion of certain
policyholders' claims.'
For the years in question, the insurers failed to report as income either: (1) the value of the claims paid by the title companies, or (2) the
portions of the premiums retained by the title companies.' The Board
issued a tax assessment against the insurers for the value of the claims
paid by the title companies.'" When the insurers unsuccessfully contested these assessments in the administrative proceedings they paid the assessments and filed separate actions for refunds." After the actions
were consolidated in superior court, the Board raised the second issue of
the unpaid premiums as a defense to the refund claims of the insurers.'"
The trial court found for the insurers, and the Board appealed. 3 In
reversing the trial court's decision, the court of appeal held both that the
claims paid by the title companies and the premiums retained by them
represented taxable income to the insurers.'4 The title insurance companies appealed, and upon review, California's high court reversed the
court of appeal, holding that an insurer does not receive taxable income
when a title company pays a policyholder's claim pursuant to a contractual arrangement.' Secondly, the court held that the superior court
lacked jurisdiction to resolve the issue of the retained premiums because

8. Id. In certain circumstances, the title company pays the policyholder directly;
in others, the insurer pays the policyholder, and then the title company reimburses
the insurer. The court makes no distinction between the two forms of payment: "We
agree that the distinction between direct and indirect payment of claims has no legal
significance. To hold otherwise would exalt form over substance, a practice that
courts strive to avoid when interpreting tax law." Id. at 723, 842 P.2d at 125, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 826. See also Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982) (stating that
the "substance, not the form, of the agreed transaction controls); United States v.
Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938) (holding that a "transaction . . .is to be regarded
in substance," not form).
9. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 720, 842 P.2d at 123, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. It
is important to note that the Board did not raise the second issue in any of the
administrative proceedings, but rather, first mentioned that it would use the unclaimed premiums as a defense shortly before trial. Id. at 729, 842 P.2d at 129, 14
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830.
10. For a comprehensive discussion of gross premiums tax levied upon insurance
companies, see generally 9 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW TAXATION, § 293
(1989); 34 CAL. JUR. 3D Franchise Taxes § 24 (1977).
11. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 721, 842 P.2d at 124, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 729, 842 P.2d at 129, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830.
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the Board failed to raise the issue during the initial administrative proceedings."6
II. TREATMENT

A.

Majority Opinion

The majority began its appraisal of the present case with a brief synopsis of California taxation law for title insurers.'7 The California Constitution requires that insurance companies be taxed differently than all other
California corporations. 8 This contrasts with the treatment accorded
title companies which are taxed as ordinary corporations. 9 The foregoing established the foundation upon which the court built its analysis in
addressing the two issues before the court."0

16. Id. at 730, 842 P.2d at 130, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831.
17. Id.
18. Article XIII states in relevant part:
(b) Annual tax. An annual tax is hereby imposed on each insurer doing business in this state on the base, at the rates, and subject to the deductions
from the tax hereinafter specified.
(c) Basis. In the case of an insurer not transacting title insurance in this
state, the "basis of the annual tax" is, in respect to each year, the amount of
gross premiums, less return premiums, received in such year by such insurer
upon its business done in this state, other than premiums received for reinsurance and for ocean marine insurance.
In the case of an insurer transacting title insurance in this state, the "basis
of the annual tax" is in respect to each year, all income upon business done
in this state, except:
(1) Interest and dividends.
(2) Rents from real property.
(3) Profits from the sale or other disposition of investments.
(4) Income from investments.
(f) Other taxes and licenses. The tax imposed on insurers by this section is
in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state, county, and municipal, upon
such insurers and their property ....
CAL CONST. art. XIII, § 28. See also CAL REV. & TAx. CODE § 12204 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1993).
19. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 722, 842 P.2d at 124, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825.
20. Id. at 722-29, 842 P.2d at 124-29, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825-30.

1. The Claims Paid by the Underwritten Title Companies
The supreme court founded its reasoning of the first issue on the contract that existed between the insurers and the title companies.2 The
court began by noting that it was "appropriate to look to federal as well
as state authorities for an understanding of the term 'income. '"' Accordingly, the court adopted the federal definition of "income," which is "the
accrual of some gain....
Applying this definition, the court emphasized that "the title insurer
and the title company, through the underwriting agreement,... agreed
to allocate the labor, risk, liability and premium[s]," between them by use
of an "arm's-length contract. " ' Thus, the court reasoned that, because
each party presumably knew the value of the other's performance, and
because each paid consideration in return for the other's promised performance, the fulfillment of the contract by the title companies did not
constitute an additional gain for the insurers.25 Therefore, with the understanding that "there [was] no gain, it follows that there [was] no in26
come."
The court concluded by stressing that the insurers were not relieved of
a tax liability for which they were the sole obligor because the obligation
had been allocated between the title insurer and the title company.'
Thus, the insurers did not receive a gain when the title companies paid
the policyholder's claims.'

21. Id. at 725, 842 P.2d at 126-27, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 827-28.
22. Id. at 723, 842 P.2d at 125, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826. See CAL REV. & TAX.
CODE § 24271 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993) (directing the reader to § 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code for the definition of gross income); 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1983) (gross income defined as "income from whatever source derived"); see also Spurgeon v. Franchise Tax Bd., 160 Cal. App. 3d 524, 528, 206 Cal. Rptr. 636, 638 (1984) (stating that
"the federal and California definitions of 'income' are identical").
23. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 724, 842 P.2d at 126, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 827.
24. Id. at 725, 842 P.2d at 126, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 827. On a side note the court
commented that the underwriting agreement was not an insurance contract, which
would be illegal, for two reasons: first, the contract does not distribute the risk of
liability between "similarly situated persons;" and second, the main function of the
contract is not to assign risk, but rather, to provide an incentive to title companies
to perform accurate title searches. Id. at 726, 842 P.2d at 127-28, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
828-29.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 728, 842 P.2d at 129, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830. The court noted that reliance must be placed on the federal definition of "income" to determine its meaning.
27. Id. at 727, 842 P.2d at 128, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829.
28. This argument was prompted by the Board's reliance on several cases in which
the sole obligor of the tax was relieved of liability when the tax was paid by another. See Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982); Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). Such cases were promptly distinguished by the court.
Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 727, 842 P.2d at 128, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829.
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2.

The Premiums Paid to the Underwritten Title Companies

Justice Panelli succinctly handled the second issue. The opinion focused on whether the Board was limited to those claims properly pursued at the administrative proceedings.' The court looked at the applicable statutes' and decided that the Board had attempted to charge a deficiency against the insurers without first following the "statutorily required administrative procedures."3 Justice Panelli reasoned that "[jiust
as the taxpayer is limited to the claims it may assert in the superior
court to those pursued in the administrative proceedings, the Board
should be limited in its assertion of setoffs in the superior court action
to those deficiency assessments formally pursued under [the Code]. " '

B.

The Dissent

Justice Kennard filed a dissenting opinion in order to voice her concern with the majority's concept of "income. " ' In her view, the rule was

29. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 729-30, 842 P.2d at 130, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831.
30. CAL REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 12421-12435 (West 1970 & Supp. 1993).
31. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 730, 842 P.2d at 130, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831.
32. Id. In citing the Code, the court noted the procedural steps binding the Board:
(1) the commissioner must note the deficiencies in the taxpayers return, then submit
to the Board a proposal for a deficiency assessment; (2) if the Board decides to
make the deficiency assessment, the taxpayer must be notified; (3) the taxpayer is
then allowed 30 days in which to petition for a redetermination; (4) if no petition is
received within the 30-day time limit, the assessment becomes final; (5) if the taxpayer petitions for redetermination, the taxpayer is entitled to an oral hearing-before the
Board; (6) after the order of the Board regarding the taxpayers petition (if any)
becomes final, and the deficiency assessment becomes payable, the taxpayer may file
an action in superior court for a refund or credit. Id. See supra note 30.
The court specified that these procedural safeguards are for the protection of
the laxpayer, and the government should be held to the same standards of procedural accuracy as the taxpayer. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 730, 842 P.2d at 130, 14
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831.
33. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 733, 842 P.2d at 132, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833
(Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard argued that the concept of income is a
broad concept, aptly defined by the United States Supreme Court. See Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (Justice Warren authoring the oftquoted language that income includes all "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayer has complete dominion and control").
Justice Kennard's dissent did not address whether the Board must first exhaust
its administrative procedures before bringing an action in superior court. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 733, 842 P.2d at 132, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833 (Kennard, J., dissenting).

clear: "title insurers must pay tax on 'all income upon business done in
this state. '"'
Justice Kennard focused on whether the claims paid by the title companies constituted income to the insurers.' Justice Kennard noted that
the indirect payments made by the title companies on policyholders'
claims fit the classic definition of income because the insurer receive a
benefit in return for services rendered.'
Moreover, Justice Kennard decided that the direct payments made by
the title companies to the policyholders on behalf of the insurers constituted income to the insurers. 7 The dissent cited the rule governing discharge of indebtedness' in finding that "[wlhen a title company steps in
and pays a policy claim on behalf of the insurer, it discharges a debt of
the insurer resulting in income. "'
Justice Kennard concluded by pointing out that, while the majority
asserted that the "transfer of risk in a contractual context somehow
negates the receipt of income," it disregarded the fact that the insurers
were ultimately liable for the obligation, thus, no "risk" was actually
transferred.' In her final analysis, Justice Kennard reasoned that when
the title companies either directly or indirectly paid policyholders'

34. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 734-35, 842 P.2d at 133, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834
(quoting CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 28 subd. (c)) (Kennard, J., dissenting). See supra
note 18.
35. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 734-41, 842 P.2d at 133-37, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
834-38 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard broke her discussion into two subissues: (1) Whether the title companies' payments to the insurer as reimbursement for
claims paid represent income to the insurer? and (2) whether the title companies'
direct payments to the insured on behalf of the insurer represent income to the
insurer? She answered both question in the affirmative. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 736, 842 P.2d at 134, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted that the insurers provided insurance to the title companies for use
in the companies' package deal. In return for that service, the title companies obligated themselves to pay certain claims. The dissent stressed that this would amount
to gross income in any other business context. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 737, 842 P.2d at 135, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
38. See United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1983) (holding that discharge of a
party's indebtedness will result in income to that party); Douglas v. Wilcuts, 296 U.S.
1 (1935) (stating in dicta that the discharge of a general obligation is income to the
party whose obligation was discharged).
39. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 738, 842 P.2d at 135, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 739 n.1, 842 P.2d at 136 n.1, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837 n.1 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting). See also California Supreme Court Survey, 10 PEPP. L.REV. 954 (1983)
(providing an analysis of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 32 Cal. 3d 649, 652 P.2d 426, 186 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1982) and stating that mere
agents of an insurance company who collect premiums and distribute claims relieve
the insurer of taxable income).
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claims, the insurers in question received a gain subject to income taxation under article XIII of the California Constitution.'

III.

CONCLUSION

Title Insurance stands for the proposition that title insurance companies may not be taxed on claims paid by underwritten title companies
pursuant to underwriting contracts.42 Moreover, the majority ruled that
the State Board of Equalization must follow the statutorily defined administrative proceedings before it may claim a deficiency assessment in
superior court.'
The instant holding raises questions as to future interpretations of the
tax code. In her dissent, Justice Kennard pointed out a very real and
substantial possibility for a tax loophole.' In one poignant example, Justice Kennard illustrated that where a corporate employer pays an
attorney's variable rate mortgage the attorney may reasonably claim that
the risk was contractually transferred, thereby negating any income for
which the attorney might otherwise be liable. 5
In sum, the California practitioner should note that the door is now
open for parties to claim that the payment by a third party of their debt,
where there is some allocation of risk involved, is not income for tax
purposes.
ALAN J. JACKSON

41. Title Insurance, 4 Cal. 4th at 740-41, 842 P.2d at 137, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 728-29, 842 P.2d at 129, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830.
43. Id. at 732-33, 842 P.2d at 132, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
44. See id. at 739 n.1, 842 P.2d at 136 n.1, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837 n.l.
45. Id.

X.

TORT LAW
A.

In a libel action against a newspaper, the CaliforniaCivil
Code section 48a(1) notice requirement is satisfied by
serving notice upon: (1) the publisher; (2) a person
designated by the publisher to receive notice; or (3) another
newspaper employee and the publisheracquires actual
knowledge of the demand for.correctionwithin the twenty
day period pursuant to the statute: Freedom Newspapers,
Inc. v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court addressed whether a plaintiff satisfied the notice requirement of Civil Code section 48a(1) by sending notice of a libelous
statement to a newspaper editor.' Section 48a(1) requires that in a libel
action3 against a newspaper, if a plaintiff wishes to recover damages other than "special damages," the plaintiff must first notify the publisher of
the allegedly libelous statements and demand a correction.4 The court

1. 4 Cal. 4th 652, 842 P.2d 138, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839 (1992). Justice George wrote
the majority opinion with Justices Mosk, Panelli, Arabian, and Baxter concurring. Id.
at 654-59, 842 P.2d at 138-41, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83942. Justice Kennard wrote a
separate concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas joined. Id. at 659-67, 842
P.2d at 14147, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84248.
2. Id. at 654-55, 842 P.2d at 138-39, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83940.
3. For a summary discussion on both libel and slander, see 5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 471-72 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1992) provides:
In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper,
or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and be not published or
broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher, at
the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of broadcast, a written
notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that
the same be corrected. Said notice and demand must be served within 20
days after knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the statements
claimed to be libelous.
Id.
For a general discussion of Civil Code § 48a, see 5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNiA LAw, Torts §§ 557-566 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993).
In a slander action against a radio station, the plaintiff may sue for general, special, or exemplary damages. See generally CAL CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1992). The Civil
Code defines "general damages" as "damages for loss of reputation, shame, mortification and hurt feelings." CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(a) (West 1992). In contrast, "special
damages" are "all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered in
respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, including such
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held that a plaintiff satisfied the notice requirement when the notice is:
(1) served upon the publisher,' (2) served upon a person designated by the publisher to receive such notices, or (3) served upon someone employed at the newspaper other than the publisher or the publisher's designee and the publisher acquires actual knowledge of the request for correction within the time limit set
forth in the statute.'

In Freedom Newspapers, Calvin Schmidt,' a municipal court judge,
filed a libel action against Freedom Newspapers, the parent company of
The Orange County Register ("The Register").' Judge Schmidt alleged
that The Register published three articles which falsely accused him of
rendering "favorable decisions in return for sexual favors from prostitutes."' After the newspaper published the third article, Judge Schmidt
sent the editor of the newspaper a letter demanding a correction."0 The
editor received the letter, but failed to print a retraction or correction."

amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has expended as a result of
the alleged libel, and no other." CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(b) (West 1992). Finally, "exemplary damages" are "for the sake of setting an example by way of punishing a defendant who has made the publication or broadcast." CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(4)(c) (West
1992). For a detailed analysis of the three types of damages, see W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 116A (5th ed. 1984).
5. The court previously interpreted the meaning of "publisher" in Field Research
Corp. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 110, 453 P.2d 747, 77 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1969). The
supreme court concluded that the legislature intended that the word have its common
and ordinary meaning which refers to the owner or operator of the newspaper or
radio station rather than the originator of the defamatory statement. Id. at 114, 453
P.2d at 750, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
6. Freedom Newspapers, 4 Cal. 4th at 658, 842 P.2d at 141, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
842. In a discussion concerning the specific use of the word "publisher" as opposed
to "editor," the court noted that the legislature has the prerogative to determine the
proper means to carry out its goals. Id. at 657, 854 P.2d at 140, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
841. The court reasoned that the legislature may have believed that the publisher,
rather than a subordinate employee, would have a greater interest in defending the
newspaper against a libel suit. Id. at 657, 842 P.2d at 140, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 841.
7. Calvin Schmidt passed away before the case reached the supreme court, however, the court allowed the executor of his estate to continue as real party in interest. Id. at 655 n.1, 842 P.2d at 139 n.1, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840 n.l.
8. Id. at 655, 842 P.2d at 139, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840. Schmidt sought $200,000 in
general and special damages as well as punitive damages. Id. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
9. Id.
10. Id. The three articles in question were published on October 9, 1988, December 14, 1988, and on March 9, 1989. Id. Judge Schmidt sent his letter on March 13,
1989, within the twenty day time period required by section 48a(1). Id. See also CAL
CIV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1992).
11. Freedom Newspapers, 4 Cal. 4th at 655, 842 P.2d at 139, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

Because the plaintiff served notice on an editor and not the publisher,
the court addressed whether the alternative form of notice satisfied section 48a(1).'" Citing section 48a(1)'s requirement that "notice be served
on the publisher," the defendants moved to strike the request for general
and punitive damages.'3 In response, Judge Schmidt alleged that even
though the letter was sent to the editor, the notice requirement was still
satisfied because the publisher had knowledge of the letter and the editor had authority to print a retraction."4 The supreme court determined
that the section 48a(1) notice requirement should be loosely interpreted. 5 Thus, the court left open the possibility that notices served upon
editors, rather than the actual publisher, may suffice.'6

II. TREATMENT
The California Supreme Court focused its analysis on the legislative
purpose behind Civil Code section 48a(1).'7 The court noted that it had
previously determined that the purpose of section 48a(1) was to bring
the alleged libel to the attention of the newspaper in a timely manner.'8
Thus, this section provides newspapers with an opportunity to correct
otherwise libelous statements before subjecting them to liability.'9
In Kapellas v. Kofman," the court liberally construed the notice requirement as it applied to the actual contents of the notice.2 ' The
Kapellas court noted that while still desiring to protect newspapers, the

840.
12. Id. at 655, 842 P.2d at 138-39,; 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839-40.
13. Id. at 655-56, 842 P.2d at 139, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840. The superior court
denied the motion, and subsequently, on a writ of mandate, the court of appeal
ordered the trial court to issue a new order granting the motion. Id.
14. Id. at 655, 842 P.2d at 139, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 840. Specifically, Judge Schmidt
alleged that "although addressed to the editor, (the letter] was known to the publisher of the newspaper at or about the time it was written and [that] the editor . . . had actual authority by delegation from the publisher, or by a pattern or
practice developed over a period of years" to act upon requests for correction. Id.
15. Id. at 658, 842 P.2d at 141, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 656-58, 842 P.2d at 139-41, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840-42.
18. Id. at 657, 842 P.2d at 140, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 841 (quoting Kapellas v.
Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 30-31, 459 P.2d 912, 918, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 365-66 (1969) (arguing that the purpose of the statute was to foster a newspapers' efforts in ascertaining the truth of an article)).
19. Id. By allowing newspapers to correct themselves, § 48a(1) was expected to
"facilitate the publisher's investigative efforts in determining whether statements in the
initial article contained error and should be protected." KapeUas, 1 Cal. 3d at 30, 459
P.2d at 918, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66.
20. 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969). "
21. Id. at 31, 459 P.2d at 918, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
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legislature did not want to erect "technical barriers" to recovery for a
plaintiff who had given notice to the publisher.22 Analogizing to
Kapellas, the court in Freedom Newspapers determined that in using the
word "serve," the legislature did not intend to protect a publisher by
"erecting a technical barrier" when a plaintiff attempts to satisfy the purpose of section 48a(1).' Therefore, the court concluded that "notice on
the publisher" was satisfied when the demand for correction was served
upon: (1) the publisher; (2) a person designated by the publisher to receive notice; or (3) another newspaper employee and the publisher acquire actual knowledge of the demand for correction within the twenty
day period pursuant to section 48a(1).'
Ill.

CONCLUSION

One of the legislative purposes in enacting Civil Code section 48a(1)
was to protect one of our most precious commodities, the "free and
rapid dissemination of the news."' The decision in Freedom Newspapers, by expanding the list of possible individuals who can be served
notice, remains consistent with this goal.26
There are, however, a series of potential problems that may arise from
the court's expansive interpretation, namely an increase in the potential
cost, time, and overall congestion of our court system. It is now quite
possible that a significant amount of pretrial discovery and trial time will
be devoted to resolving: (1) if the publisher designated anyone to receive
demands for correction; (2) whether a publisher actually knew of a demand given to an employee; (3) whether the publisher made an actual
delegation of authority; and (4) whether the publisher delegated authority
by pattern or practice.27

22. Id. The KapeUas court stated that the "crucial issue in evaluating the adequacy
of the notice turns on whether the publisher should reasonably have comprehended
which statements plaintiff protested and wished corrected." Id.
. 23. Freedom Newspapers, 4 Cal. 4th at 658, 842 P.2d at 141, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
842.
24. Id.
25. See Field Research-Corp. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 110, 115, 453 P.2d 747,
751, 77 Cal. Rptr. 243, 247 (1969).
26. See Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 30, 459 P.2d 912, 917, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360,
365 (1969) (reasoning that § 48a encourages a more active press by insulating
newspapers from liability for publishing erroneous statements).
27. Freedom Newspapers, 4 Cal. 4th 652, 665, 842 P.2d 138, 146, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
839, 847 (1992) (Kennard, J., concurring).

In a concurring opinion,' Justice Kennard propounded a much more
narrow interpretation of Civil Code section 48a(1). Justice Kennard stated that the word "publisher" should be construed to include only "the
owner of the newspaper, the person designated by the newspaper as its
publisher and the newspaper's principle editor."' She reasoned that
some editors may not have the authority to make the necessary corrections, and thus concluded that service on these individuals should not
serve to satisfy the notice requirement of section 48a(1).'
In an effort to further limit litigation of pretrial issues Justice Kennard
commented that the word "serve" should be narrowly defined." Indicating that it "should have its usual ordinary meaning, that is, the delivery
of a document, personally or by mail."'
Nevertheless, the court may have had these specific problems in mind
because the court set forth a list encompassing only three groups of
people.' While this list clearly expands the scope of the term "publisher," the objectives of Civil Code section 48a(1) are still met. The publisher or his designee must be given an opportunity to retract the libelous
statement before subjecting the newspaper to liability.' The more ex-

28. Id. at 659-67, 842 P.2d at 14147, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84248. (Kennard, J., concurring)
29. Id. at 659, 842 P.2d at 142, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Justice Kennard asserted, "[Tihere is good reason for [§ 48a(1)] to designate the publisher or broadcaster as the party on whom notice to retract must be served . . . it
is only the publisher or broadcaster who has the power effectively to correct or retract." Id. at 662, 842 P.2d at 143, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839 (alterations in original)
(Kennard, J., concurring) (quoting Field Research, 71 Cal. 2d at 115, 453 P.2d at 747,
77 Cal. Rptr. at 243).
30. Id. at 663, 842 P.2d at 144, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845. (Kennard, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 659, 664-65, 842 P.2d at 141, 145, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843, 846 (Kennard,
J., concurring).
32. Id. at 659, 842 P.2d at 141, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839 (Kennard, J., concurring).
Justice Kennard gave the following as an example of the uncertain results that could
arise from the court's decision:
Assume newspaper A and newspaper B both publish the same defamatory
statement about the plaintiff. Plaintiff serves a demand for correction on a
reporter from each of the newspapers. The reporter for newspaper A promptly -informs the publisher, the reporter for newspaper B loses or deliberately
destroys the demand for correction. Neither newspaper makes a correction.
Under the majority's holding, the plaintiff will recover general, special, and
possibly punitive damages from newspaper A, but only special damages from
newspaper B. Thus, under the majority's analysis, identical acts by the plaintiff will lead to completely different legal results because of circumstances
entirely unrelated to the plaintiff's attempt to comply with .the statute.
Id. at 665 n.3, 842 P.2d at 146 n.3, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847 n.3 (Kennard, J., concurring).
33. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

[Vol. 21: 261, 1993]

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

pansive interpretation in Freedom Newspapers still requires that the
publisher or his designee have actual notice of the alleged defamatory
statement. Thus, the newspaper and its reporters continue to have the
opportunity to correct the "errors of their ways."
BARRY EDWARD BOROWITZ

B.

Under the principles of comparativefault, where the
defendant does not have a duty to protect the plaintifffrom
the risk that caused the injury because of the nature of the
activity and the parties'relationship to the activity, the
assumption of the risk doctrine continues to operate as a
complete bar to the plaintiffs recovery; however, where the
plaintiff assumes a known risk caused by a breach of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff, the assumption of the risk
doctrine is merged with comparativefault principles, and
any loss from the injury may be apportionedamong the
responsibleparties:Knight v. Jewett.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Knight v. Jewett,' the California Supreme Court addressed the issue
of what the "proper application of the 'assumption of the risk' doctrine"
is under comparative fault principles.2 The case involved an injury sustained in a touch football game when defendant (Jewett) knocked plaintiff (Knight) to the ground and then stepped on her hand.' Knight filed

1. 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992). Justice George wrote
the plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Arabian concurred.
Justice Mosk filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Panelli wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which Justice Baxter concurred. Id. at 324, 834 P.2d at 714, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
Justice Kennard wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
2. Id. at 299-300, 834 P.2d at 697, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3; see Ford v. Gouin, 3 Cal.
4th 339, 874 P.2d 724 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (1992) (companion case). For a detailed
analysis of the court's decision in Knight v. Jewett and Ford v. Gouin as they relate
to assumption of risk in California, see Corey Y. Hoffman, Does Implied Assumption
of the Risk Exist in Califorzia's Comparative Fault Scheme? The [Not Sol Definitive Answer of Knight v. Jewett and Ford v. Gouin, 29 CAL W. L. REV. 409 (1993);
James J. Moloney, California Supreme Court Survey, Ford v. Gouin, 20 PEPP. L. REv.
1649 (1993). See also Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 812-13, 532 P.2d 1226,
1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864 (1975) (adopting comparative fault principles in California).
3. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 300, 834 P.2d at 697-98, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3-4. Knight
and Jewett were among a group that gathered at a friend's home to watch the Super
Bowl. Id. at 300, 834 P.2d at 697, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3. At half-time, several people
decided to play touch football on a nearby dirt lot. Id. There were four or five
players per team consisting of both women and men. Id. Knight and Jewett were on
opposing sides. Id.
During the game Jewett ran into Knight. Id. Knight claimed that she told Jewett
.not to play so rough or [she] was going to have to stop playing." Id. Jewett admitted that Knight asked him to "be careful," but did not recall Knight saying that she
would quit. Id.
Knight was injured on the next play. Id. Jewett claimed that he jumped up to
intercept a pass, knocked Knight to the ground on his way down and stepped back-
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suit against Jewett based on negligence and other grounds."
The plurality identified two distinct categories of the assumption of the
risk doctrine:
'[Pirimary assumption of the risk' [exists] where, by virtue of the nature of the
activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal
duty to protect the plaintiff from the particular risk of harm .... '[S]econdary
assumption of the risk' [exists] where the defendant does owe a duty of care to
the plaintiff, but the plaintiff proceeds to encounter a known risk imposed by the
defendant's breach of duty ....

The plurality ruled that primary assumption of the risk continues to act
as a complete bar to recovery.6 Secondary assumption of the risk, on the
other hand, is "merged into the comparative fault system" and any loss
from the injury may be apportioned among the responsible parties.7 Applying this analysis, the plurality held that Jewett's conduct did not constitute a breach of any duty owed to Knight and, therefore, Knight's action was barred by the primary assumption of the risk doctrine!

ward onto Knight's hand as he landed. Id. According to Knight and her teammate,
Andrea Starr, Jewett was trying to run down Starr when he knocked Knight to the
ground from behind and then stepped on her hand. Id. at 300-01, 834 P.2d at 697-98,
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3-4.
After a series of unsuccessful operations, doctors amputated Knight's finger. Id.
at 301, 834 P.2d at 698, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4. Knight filed suit on grounds of negligence, assault and battery. Id. Jewett filed an answer and moved for summary judgment. Id. Jewett relied on the court of appeal's decision in Ordway v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988), for the proposition that the
reasonable implied assumption of risk remains a defense under comparative fault
principles. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 301, 834 P.2d at 698, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4. Knight
responded by relying on Segoviano v. Housing Authority, 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191
Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983), which held that the reasonable implied assumption of risk
doctrine cannot operate in a comparative fault system. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 301, 834
P.2d at 698, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Jewett Id. at 303, 834
P.2d at 699, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that Ordway
controlled. Id. The supreme court "granted review to resolve the conflict among
Court of Appeal decisions as to the proper application of the assumption of the risk
doctrine in light of the adoption of comparative fault principles," id., and affirmed.
Id. at 321, 834 P.2d at 712, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
4. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 301, 834 P.2d at 698, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4.
5. Id. at 314-15, 834 P.2d at 707-08, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13-14.
6. Id. at 315, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 321, 834 P.2d at 712, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18. The three concurring justices agreed with the holding of the plurality, but disagreed with the plurality analysis.
See id. at 321-24, 834 P.2d at 712-14, II Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18-20.

II. TREATMENT
The court first examined the confusion that has surrounded the assumption of the risk doctrine since the adoption of comparative fault.'
Under contributory negligence principles, assumption of the risk doctrine
was "used in a number of very different factual settings involving analytically distinct legal concepts."'" With the adoption of comparative fault,
however, it became necessary to distinguish the various settings in which
the assumption of the risk doctrine is applied."
Before the adoption of comparative fault, the California rule provided
that "'[e]xcept where the defendant has the last clear chance, the
plaintiffs contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant
whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable to the plaintiff for the harm sustained by him.""..2 With the adoption of comparative
fault in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., " the Knight court recognized that the last
clear chance doctrine no longer had any relevant function and, therefore,
was subsumed by comparative fault principles.'4 Likewise, the court recognized that comparative fault principles would profoundly affect the assumption of the risk doctrine.' 5
The Li court identified two situations in which assumption of the risk
was applied by incorporating contributory negligence principles.'" The
first situation was "'where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to en' 7
counter a specific known risk imposed by a defendant's negligence. ""
The second situation was "'where [a] plaintiff is held to agree to relieve
defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct toward him.""..8 The Li
court concluded that the assumption of the risk doctrine should be par-

9. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68

(5th ed. 1984); 4 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., TIlE LAW OF TORTS § 21
(2d ed. 1986); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.1 (2d ed. 1986); 3
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §§ 12:46-12:47 (1986); 6 B.E.

ed. 1988).
10. Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 303, 834 P.2d 696, 699, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2, 5
(1992).
11. Id. at 304, 834 P.2d at 700, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 6.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 1104-1109 (9th

12. Id. at 304, 834 P.2d at 700, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 6 (quoting Li. v. Yellow Cab

Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 809-10, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 862 (1975)).
13. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).

14. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 305, 834 P.2d at 701, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7.
15. Id.
16. Id.

17. Id. at 305-06, 834 P.2d at 701, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7 (quoting Li, 13 Cal. 3d at
824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872).
18. Id. (quoting Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872).
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tially merged into comparative fault and partially retained as a complete
bar to recovery in certain cases."
Following the Li decision, appellate courts disagreed on which category of the assumption of the risk doctrine was to be merged and which
was to be retained.' One line of appellate decisions construed the language in Li to create a distinction between cases where a plaintiff unreasonably encountered a known risk and where a plaintiff reasonably did
so." These decisions allowed the assumption of the risk to act as a
complete bar to recovery only where the plaintiff acted reasonably.'
In Knight, the supreme court rejected this interpretation of Li, stating
that nothing in the Li opinion indicated that a distinction should be
drawn between cases where a plaintiff reasonably or unreasonably encounters a risk.' The court held, rather, that the distinction must be
made between "primary" and "secondary" assumption of the risk." '
Primary assumption of the risk refers to the situation in which the
court concludes as a matter of law that the defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty of protection from a particular risk." Secondary assumption
of the risk embodies more traditional notions of assumption of the risk,
involving situations "in which the defendant does owe a duty of care to
the plaintiff but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of injury caused
by the defendant's breach of that duty." 2' The distinction between primary and secondary assumption of the risk is not based on whether the
plaintiff reasonably or unreasonably encountered the risk, but rather
whether the defendant owed the plaintiff any legal duty.2" In determin-

19. Id. at 306, 834 P. 2d at 701, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 306, 834 P.2d at 701-02, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7-8. See Ordway v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 103-05, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 538-40 (1988).
22. Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 306, 834 P.2d 696, 701-02, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2,
7-8 (1992).
23. Id. at 307, 834 P.2d at 702, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8.
24. Id. at 308, 834 P.2d at 703, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9. See 2 FOWLER V. HARPER &
FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.1 (2d ed. 1986); see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (5th ed. 1984)
(analogizing express assumption of risk to primary assumption of risk); 3 STUART M.
SPEISER, ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORT, § 12:47 (1986).
25. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 308, 834 P.2d at 703, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 309, 834 P.2d at 704, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.

ing whether a legal duty exists, the court will look to the nature of the
defendant's activity and the relationship of both parties to that activity.'
Utilizing these principles, the court held that primary assumption of
the risk does not merge into comparative fault and continues to operate
as a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery, whereas, secondary assumption
of the risk does merge with comparative fault principles.' The court
reasoned that not only is this interpretation consistent with the Li opinion, but that it is also supported by the fundamental principles of comparative fault.' By definition, primary assumption of the risk cases involve a defendant who owes no legal duty to the plaintiff. Plaintiff is
therefore properly barred from recovering on a negligence theory.' In
secondary assumption of the risk cases, however, the defendant's breach
of a legal duty creates the risk which the plaintiff knowingly encounters.32 Therefore, the merger of secondary assumption of the risk
with the principles of comparative fault is consistent with the theory
behind comparative fault; it is the combination of the plaintiffs and the
defendant's actions which caused the harm, and thus the loss should be
apportioned accordingly.'
Applying this analytical framework to the present case, the court focused on "whether, in light of the nature of the sporting activity in which
defendant and plaintiff were engaged, defendant's conduct breached a legal duty of care to plaintiff."' The court recognized that although "persons have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to others, the nature of
a sport or activity is relevant in determining the duty of care owed by a
particular defendant."' The general rule for sporting activities is that the
participants "have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a
participant over and above those inherent in the sport."' There are situations, however, in which careless conduct of coparticipants is an inherent risk of the sport.37 The court held that to determine whether
careless conduct is an inherent risk of the sport, the focus must not be

28. Id.

29. Id. at 308, 834 P.2d at 703, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
30. Id. at 310, 834 P.2d at 704, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
31. Id.

32. Id. at 310, 834 P.2d at 704-05, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10-11.
33. Id.

34. Id. at 315, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
35. Id.

36. Id. at 315-16, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
37. Id. at 316, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14. See Mann v. Nutrilite, Inc.,
136 Cal. App. 2d 729, 289 P.2d 282 (1955)(holding that a baseball player generally
cannot recover for a carelessly thrown ball); Thomas v. Barlow, 5 N.J. Misc. 764, 138
A. 208 (Prerog. Ct. 1927)(holding that there can be no recovery for a carelessly
thrown elbow in a basketball game).
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on the subjective knowledge of the plaintiff, but rather on the nature of
the sport itself and on the relationship of the defendant to that sport.'
Looking to cases both inside and outside of its jurisdiction, the court
concluded that the majority rule regarding liability of coparticipants in a
sporting event is that
it is improper to hold a sports participant liable to a coparticipant for ordinary
careless conduct committed during the sport... and that liability properly may be
imposed on a participant only when he or she intentionally injures another player
or engages in reckless conduct that is totally outside the range of the ordinary
activity involved in the sport.

38. Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 316-17, 834 P.2d 696, 709, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2,
15 (1992). For examples of this form of duty analysis see Quinn v. Recreation Park
Ass'n, 3 Cal. 2d 725, 730 46 P.2d 144, 146 (1935) (holding that a spectator at a baseball game assumed the risk of being struck by a baseball); Danieley v. Goldmine Ski
Assocs., Inc., 218 Cal. App. 3d 111, 122 266 Cal. Rptr. 749, 755 (1990) (holding that
ski resort had no duty to remove tree from ski area); Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal.
App. 2d 532, 554 51 Cal. Rptr. 575, 589 (1966) (denying recovery for injury to a
second baseman resulting from base runner's hard slide during family picnic softball
game); Shurman v. Fresno Ice Rink, 91 Cal. App. 2d 469, 476 205 P.2d 77, 80 (1949)
(finding that ice-rink operator must exercise reasonable care to protect spectators
from flying pucks); Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club, 27 Cal. App. 2d 733, 736 81
P.2d 625, 626-27 (1938) (holding stadium owner liable for falling to provide patrons
protection from flying baseball bats).
39. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318, 834 P.2d at 710, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16. See
Tavernier, 242 Cal. App. 2d at 551, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 586; See also Gaspard v. Grain
Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (denying recovery for baseball player hit on the head by an accidentally thrown bat during a school game);
Gauvin v. Clark, 404 Mass. 450, 537 N.E.2d 94 (1989) (holding that plaintiff hockey
player must show reckless disregard by defendant to recover for injury resulting from
being hit with a hockey stick); Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 147 N.W.2d 587
(1966) (denying recovery when an ice skater who was skating backwards tripped
over a fallen skater); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982) (requiring plaintiff to
show recklessness in order to recover for injury caused by collision with a base
runner during a baseball game); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290
(Ct. App. 1983) (requiring plaintiff to show intentional or reckless conduct of defendant to recover for injury sustained in an informal tackle football game); Marchetti v.
Kalish, 53 Ohio St. 3d 95, 559 N.E.2d 699 (1990)(requiring plaintiff to show intentional
or reckless conduct of defendant to recover for injury sustained while playing "kick
the can"); cf Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979) (allowing recovery when football player, in frustration and anger, 'struck the back of
opponent's head, who was kneeling on the ground watching the end of a play), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill. App. 2d 412, 128 N.E.2d 363
(1955) (allowing recovery where plaintiff was wantonly assaulted by player on opposing team); Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (allowing recovery for injury sustained during baseball game when the base runner, apparently to
break up a double play, ran into second baseman after the ball was thrown and

The rationale for such a rule is that in active sporting events, "a
participant's normal energetic conduct often includes accidentally careless behavior."" Holding a participant legally liable for such conduct
would discourage vigorous participation in such events."' The court
adopted the majority rule stating that "a participant in an active sport
breaches a legal duty of care to other participants ...only if the participant intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct that is so
reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport."'
Applying this rule to the present case, the court held that the
defendant's conduct was, at most, negligent. 3 The court stated that "the
conduct alleged in those declarations is not even closely comparable to
the kind of conduct.., that is a prerequisite to the imposition of legal
liability upon a participant in such a sport."'
The court concluded that, inasmuch as the defendant's conduct did not
breach a legal duty owed to the plaintiff, this was a case of primary assumption of the risk.45 Therefore, plaintiff's negligence action was
barred, and comparative fault principles could not properly be applied.'
Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.4 7 He generally agreed with the analysis of the plurality opinion, but would have gone further by eliminating the doctrine of assumption of the risk entirely, and instead, relying solely on the principles of
comparative fault.'
Justice Panelli, joined by Justice Baxter, also wrote a separate opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.49 Justice Panelli agreed with
the result of the plurality opinion,w but rejected the duty-based analysis

when the second baseman was standing four to five feet from the bag); Overall v.
Kadella, 138 Mich. App. 351, 361 N.W.2d 352 (1984) (allowing recovery where hockey
player intentionally punched opposing player in the face after the conclusion of the
game); Averill v. Lutrell, 44. Tenn. App. 56, 311 S.W.2d 812 (1957) (allowing recovery
when baseball catcher deliberately hit a batter in the head with his fist).
40. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318, 834 P.2d at 710, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16.
41. Id.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

320, 834 P.2d at
320, 834 P.2d at
320-21, 834 P.2d
321, 834 P.2d at

711, 11
711, 11
at 712,
712, 11

Cal. Rptr. 2d at
Cal. Rptr. 2d at
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
Cal. Rptr. 2d at

17.
18.
at 18.
18.

46. Id.

47. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
48. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
49. Id. at 322, 834 P.2d at 713, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19 (Panelli, J., concurring and
dissenting).
50. Id. (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting).
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adopted by the plurality, instead favoring the consent-based analysis
presented by Justice Kennard's dissenting opinion."
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard disagreed with both
the analysis and the result of the plurality opinion.' Justice Kennard
argued that the traditional implied assumption of the risk analysis should
have been applied.' 3 Furthermore, she contended that under either her
consent-based analysis or the plurality's duty-based analysis, Jewett had
not presented sufficient evidence to warrant the granting of summary
judgment in his favor.'
III.

CONCLUSION

The supreme court's decision marks a partial victory, albeit a tenuous
one, for the defense bar and for proponents of tort reform.' Under the
"new" assumption of the risk analysis, defendants will still be able to
have cases dismissed on summary judgment motions prior to trial where
the case involves primary assumption of the risk. Where the case involves secondary assumption of the risk, however, defendants will be
forced to try their case under comparative negligence principles. Although Knight dealt specifically with assumption of the risk in the setting of sporting activities, it remains to be seen whether this court will
be willing to apply the same analysis to other areas of tort law, such as
strict products liability."
DAVID C. WRIGHT

51. Id. (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting).
52. Id. at 324, 834 P.2d at 714, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). For a criticism of the plurality decision, see
Armen L. George, Assuming The Risk of Erroneous Precedent, THE RECORDER, September 17, 1992, at 8.
54. Id. at 338, 834 P.2d at 724, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
55. See John E. Morris, Assumption of the risk Defense Kept Alive by Supreme
Court, THE RECORDER, August 25, 1992, at 1 (noting that eight separate opinions were
written for this case and its companion case, Ford v. Gouin, 3 Cal. 4th 339, 834 P.2d
724, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (1992)).
56. Alexander Peters, Safe at Any Speed?, THE RECORDER, December 21, 1992, at 1.

